

Teheran chancellor resigns in protest

Iran Cracks Down on Universities, Students

TEHERAN

Iranian universities, where much of the anti-government protest has been centered in recent months, were closed last week by the new military-controlled government appointed by Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.

Following the change of government, Iranian troops sealed off the campus of the University of Teheran to prevent anti-government groups from using it as a staging area for protests.

The university's chancellor, Abdul Ali Shaibani, resigned in protest over the crackdown.

Much of the violence that immediately preceded the resignation of the civilian government under Prime Minister Jafar Sharif-Emami began on the university campus, when troops with automatic weapons and tear-gas grenades fired at several thousand students who were demonstrating against the Shah.

Five Students Killed

At least five students were killed. One report put the death toll as high as 40.

The shootings led to two days of violent protest, which spread from the campus through a large area of downtown Teheran.

The protesters set fire to banks, hotels, and theaters and attacked the British embassy.

Those outbreaks, which came after months of less dramatic protests against the Shah, led to the resignation of Prime Minister Sharif-Emami and his cabinet and to the appointment of Gen. Gholam Reza Azahari, chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces, as prime minister.

Even before Mr. Sharif-Emami resigned, the cabinet ministers responsible for education and for higher education and science had resigned to protest government actions at the University of Teheran.

In addition to closing the university, the government imposed restrictions on all



WIDE WORLD

Iranian riot police confront anti-government demonstrators at campus of the University of Teheran. At least five protesters were killed when troops opened fire on students.

matollah Nassiri, head of SAVAK, the Iranian secret police force that has been the target of widespread protest by groups of Iranian students at universities in the United States and Western Europe.

Anti-government forces in Iran include radical students who oppose the country's ties to the United States and other Western countries; more moderate middle-class

religious conservatives who seek a return to the traditional Moslem values that they feel the Shah has abandoned in his effort to modernize the country.

The conservative Moslems, who may make up the largest anti-Shah group, are led by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who has effected a revolution in the country.

protesters who oppose the government's

postponed. However, by late October, most universities had held at least some classes.

Before the government collapsed, the Minister of Higher Education and Science, Abol-fazl Qazi Shariat-Parachi, had announced plans to submit a new law to Iran's legislature that would grant students complete freedom of expression.

Teheran chancellor resigns in protest

Iran Cracks Down on Universities, Students

TEHERAN
Iranian universities, where much of the anti-government protest has been centered in recent months, were closed last week by the new military-controlled government appointed by Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.

Following the change of government, Iranian troops sealed off the campus of the University of Teheran to prevent anti-government groups from using it as a staging area for protests.

The university's chancellor, Abdul Ali Shaibani, resigned in protest over the crack-down.

Much of the violence that immediately preceded the resignation of the civilian government under Prime Minister Jaafar Sharif-Emami began on the university campus, when troops with automatic weapons and tear-gas grenades fired at several thousand students who were demonstrating against the Shah.

Five Students Killed

At least five students were killed. One report put the death toll as high as 40.

The shootings led to two days of violent protest, which spread from the campus through a large area of downtown Teheran.

The protesters set fire to banks, hotels, and theaters and attacked the British embassy.

Those outbreaks, which came after months of less dramatic protests against the Shah, led to the resignation of Prime Minister Sharif-Emami and his cabinet and to the appointment of Gen. Gholam Reza Azahari, chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces, as prime minister.

Even before Mr. Sharif-Emami resigned, the cabinet ministers responsible for education and for higher education and science had resigned in protest over the government's actions at the university.

Even to the university's chancellor, the Shah's government had ordered a crack-down on



Iranian riot police confront anti-government demonstrators at campus of the University of Teheran. At least five protesters were killed when troops opened fire on students.

gious conservatives who seek a return to the traditional Moslem values that they feel the Shah has abandoned in his effort to modernize the country.

The conservative Moslems, who may count as the largest anti-Shah group, are led by the calligrapher Ayatollah Khomeini, who has called for a war of war if the Shah is forced to leave the country.

matollah Nassiri, head of SAVAK, the Iranian secret police force that has been the target of widespread protest by groups of Iranian students at universities in the United States and Western Europe.

Anti-government forces in Iran include radical students who oppose the country's ties to the United States and oppose a crack-down on protesters, more moderate radicals who

postponed. However, by late October, most universities had held at least some classes.

Before the government collapsed, the Minister of Higher Education and Science, Abolfazl Qazi-Sabzpoosh, had announced plans to submit a new law to Iran's legislature that would grant students the right to elect faculty members.

Those protests, which came after months of lawlessness, provoked a sharp reaction from the government of Prime Minister Shapur Bakhshi and his cabinet and to the appointment of Gen. Chohran Reza Azahari, chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces, as prime minister.

Even before Mr. Sharif-Emami resigned, the cabinet ministers responsible for education and for higher education and science had resigned to protest government actions at the University of Tehran.

In addition to closing the universities, the new government imposed censorship on all newspapers in Tehran and began arresting political activists. It also arrested Gen. Ne-

Iranian riot police confront anti-government demonstrators at campus of the University of Tehran. At least five protesters were killed when troops opened fire on students.

WIDE WORLD

Anti-Shah Students in U.S. Plan to Step Up Activity

WASHINGTON

Iranian student activists in America are watching news of the crisis in their country with mixed emotions. At a press conference in Washington last week, leaders of five militant student organizations denounced the newly appointed military government as Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's "last card" in an attempt to squash the growing discontent with his regime in Iran.

"We don't think the military government can last but for a short while," said a spokesman for one of several Iranian Student Associations in the U. S.

In separate interviews, however, other Iranian students and their American supporters said they are torn between a hope that the developments will increase the dissatisfaction with the Shah and a fear that the new military government will stifle the anti-Shah movement indefinitely.

'A Step Backward'

For example, a spokesman for the I.S.A. in Berkeley, Cal., said the new crackdown on civil liberties under the military government was "basically a step backward" for the anti-Shah movement.

One I.S.A. leader in Washington said more than 100 Iranian students had returned home from the U. S. and other countries over the past three months to take a more active role

in the efforts to bring down the Shah. Many of them have joined with conservative Moslem leaders in a coalition that wants to see the country governed by a social democracy, the spokesman said.

Meanwhile, anti-Shah groups reportedly are stepping up their activities in the U. S. by "educating" Americans about Iranian developments in meetings, press conferences and protest demonstrations around the country.

'Distortion of the Facts'

Most Americans, due to a "distortion of the facts by the news media," have the impression that the Iranians are fighting the Shah because of his modernization policies, an I.S.A. leader said. "But the truth is that they are fed up with his dictatorial policies," the student said.

The students said they plan to increase their protest activity in America as the situation in Iran deteriorates. "Our demonstrations haven't had much effect on anything," said the student in Berkeley, "but we have to get the word out to the Americans the best way we know."

Noting the presence of several thousand military advisers and a number of large American corporations in his country, the student said: "This is the next Vietnam for you, and the majority of your people don't realize it."

—LORENZO MIDDLETON

gious conservatives who seek a return to the traditional Moslem values that they feel the Shah has abandoned in his effort to modernize the country.

The conservative Moslems, who may make up the largest anti-Shah group, are led by the exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who has called for civil war if the current protests do not lead to the establishment of a conservative Moslem state.

Mr. Khomeini's supporters say large numbers of Iranian students studying abroad—including many of the 37,000 in the United States—have abandoned leftist or Marxist views and now support his concept of a socially oriented Islamic state.

Chief Source of Opposition

For the six months leading to the collapse of the government last week, the universities had been a chief source of opposition to the Shah.

A number of students boycotted exams last spring, and this fall's opening of classes, scheduled for Oct. 7, had been repeatedly

postponed. However, by late October, most universities had held at least some classes.

Before the government collapsed, the Minister of Higher Education and Science, Abolfazl Qazi Shariat-Panahi, had announced plans to submit a new law to Iran's legislature that would grant students complete political freedom.

Effort to Stem Militancy

The law was designed to assure freedom of speech and writing on campuses and provide students with immunity from arrest on university campuses.

The proposed law was designed as an effort to stem the growing militancy of university students.

However, its prospects dimmed with the collapse of the civilian government. Mr. Shariat-Panahi resigned his post even before the government collapsed.

About 150,000 students were enrolled in Iranian universities and other post-high-school institutions in 1977-78, almost twice as many as in 1971.

—MALCOLM G. SCULLY

Tokyo U. President Disciplined

TOKYO

In an unprecedented action, the Japanese Ministry of Education has disciplined the president of Tokyo University by reducing his salary by 10 per cent for two months.

The ministry took the action against the president, Takashi Mukaito, because of damage caused to the campus by a fire that broke out while radical students were occupying administration offices.

At the same time, the ministry reduced the salary of the dean of the faculty of letters by 10 per cent for three months.

A small group of students had been sitting in at the dean's office since last January to protest a \$55-million fund-raising campaign for the school's centennial observance. The university had not called in police.

The fire, apparently unintentional, destroyed four rooms, including the dean's office, in the university's law and literature

building. The student protesters reported the fire to a guard and tried unsuccessfully to extinguish it themselves. A local fire department eventually brought it under control.

The Ministry of Education decided to discipline the president and the dean following an investigation of the incident in which it concluded that the two administrators had been negligent in their care of state property.

The ministry acted after Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda's cabinet had instructed it to urge the university to take sterner measures against radical students. At one point during the investigation, the dean of the faculty of letters said he might have trusted the students too much. Previously, the strongest disciplinary action taken against a Tokyo University president was a rebuke issued in 1975 in connection with a financial scandal at the university's astronomical observatory.

—CHRISTINE CHAPMAN


Beleaguered liberties of a political religion

When I began this article Iran's universities and colleges were just beginning to settle down after the recent upheavals. Now, with the country under attack from the Ba'athist régime of Iraq, it seems a luxury to follow my original intention and simply discuss "academic freedom" and the "cultural revolution". Instead, I want to examine the force so alien to the Western observer, that has inspired and still fires novel developments in Iran: Islam.

That force has always been an important element of Iranian life, although largely ignored by Western politicians and scholars who found it easier to fall in line with the Shah's views of his country. In 1971 the Shah prepared for the lavish celebration of the 2,500th anniversary of the founding of the Persian monarchy to the accompaniment of praise and admiration from abroad. Meanwhile Samad Behrangî, a writer for children who was then teaching in a poor village school, wrote: "Until we see an environment or society closely, until we live in it, mix with the people and hear their griefs and learn about their wants, it is vain and useless to show ourselves sympathetic to that society and people..."

The Shah and his supporters ignored this precept and eventually paid the penalty. It is interesting in passing to reflect that the Shah's attempts to link himself with Iran's imperial past were met with approval, while the present governors of Iran are now condemned for apparently turning back the clock.

The Iranian Revolution has generally had a bad press in this country, the Islam which inspired it has been labelled "fanatical", "rigid", "backward-looking". Part of the trouble is that Islam is linked in the Western mind with oriental despots, kings or shaikhs, with absolute rulers living a luxurious life while imposing orthodox austerity on their subjects. It is a bitter paradox for the intelligent Muslim to see, on one hand how autocratic rulers, who typify this distorted kind of Islam, are politely treated by the West while an Islamic leader who tries to bring about some kind of social justice is criticized and reviled. It is ironic that in the years when Islam slept, its leaders were wooed and flattered by the West, but when it rose from its sleep it was immediately condemned and ostracized.



Cartoons from the Iranian Press on the Revolution's effect on higher education.

G. Sabri Tabrizi examines a key force in Iranian life which has been obscured by the West's preference to accept the

try which wants to be independent of foreign aid and guidance. There is agreement that Iran's universities and colleges have failed to meet the country's requirements, and about the urgent need for reform. There have been attempts to define what a university should aim at, how it can produce students with a social conscience and graduates equipped to run the country and yet not alienated from the people's culture. Successes and failures of countries which have faced similar problems have been examined.

There is a general consensus that radical changes must be made. There must be an attempt, not only to coordinate higher education with the technological needs of the country, but also to introduce a universal higher education, embracing all the people. Local need must be the main priority for accepting students, and positive discrimination must be made in favour of students from a poorer background: education and technological know-how must no longer be the monopoly of those with a privileged background.

Immediate steps for improvement taken by the Revolutionary Council have been the formation of a committee for the Jihad-e-Sazandagi (fight for reconstruction), and the institution of a new campaign against illiteracy in which women play a prominent part. Two main schools of thought govern thinking on the university issue: one faction believes that the "cultural revolution" must take place while the universities carry on as usual, another that the universities must be closed while essential reorganization takes place. In the end it was decided to close the universities this summer after students had taken their examinations, partly because the faction that favoured a total closure of the universities had brought matters to a head by attacking certain left-wing elements. A committee of seven prominent educationists was set up to compile a report and list of recommendations. Questionnaires have been sent to academic staff/advising their views.

At the moment the universities are still closed, but it is strongly urged that they be soon reopened: Iran cannot afford a long closure. This would be, says Ayatollah Montazeri, "a disaster... we need doctors... we are short of 20,000

has been obscured by the West's preference to accept the Shah's views of his country

that in the years when Islam slept, its leaders were wooed and flattered by the West, but when it rose from its sleep it was innately condemned and ostracized. While the West is quietly tolerant of the excesses of some other regimes, it raises its hands in horror at any alleged misdeed in Iran. The critical observer wonders whether it is because the one is content to follow the Western lead, but the other strives for independence.

Informed Muslim scholars who have rejected the Islam of princes and kings have turned back for inspiration to what they see as the original, pure spirit of Islam. The late scholar Ali Shariati argued in Iran that Islam was originally in revolt against the oppressive rulers of the time, but was soon taken over by these same rulers to be used as another "instrument of oppression". Like Christianity, Islam was taken over as a state religion by leaders who advocated acceptance and humility while they themselves lived in splendour. Iqbal, the greatest Muslim poet of the twentieth century, writing when India was still under colonial rule, condemned this kind of exploitation:

"What shall I say about the poor, suffering Muslim, valuable only as a human being? He has neither energy nor excitement in his blood."

His hands are as empty as his pockets. Do not tell me that God has done this. You can wash away the dust by this excuse. Turn upside down this world where the unjust steals from the just."

Original Muslim writers have often been labelled by Western scholars as sectarian or mystic rather than products of true Islam. In reality they were generally broad-minded and tolerant of other religions. Naser Khostrovan, a medieval Persian poet, castigates a self-righteous believer:

"What is your superiority to a Christian?"

You regard yourself as a believer because you believe in Mohammad. He is regarded as heathen because he believes in Christ! They are prophets and fellow men;

Why do you unreasonably regard the Christians as your enemy?"

Naser Khostrovan was following the Qur'an's teaching, because Islam was originally tolerant. The Qur'an states: "There is no compulsion in religion." Where the Qur'an attacks Christians and Jews, its criticism is aimed at those who use religion for their own selfish ends. "Those who accumulate gold and silver will be punished severely..." Commentators agree that this verse was a censure of the greed of Ahbar and Rohban (Christian and Jewish priests). The Prophet Mohammad himself set a precedent of tolerance, choosing advisers from different religions. Later conflicts have usually sprung from political bias and motivation. Today, in Iran, there are still sizeable religious minorities, who live peacefully with the Muslim majority. Where other religious bodies have been attacked it is because they have been allegedly linked with supporters of the old regime of the Shah.

The present leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran argue that both religion and education have been used in the past to protect the interest of the minority ruling class (the Mosakbarin) against the deprived majority (the Mosazafin). True Islam originally rose in defence of the underdog, and Mohammad himself sided with the slaves and the poor against his own rich ruling Qurashite tribe in Mecca. Today's Islamization of the social and educational systems in Iran is meant to enable Islam to benefit all people instead of a minority. (Following the Islamic decree that land belongs to those who work on it, for example, the large estates have been nationalized.) This is more of a political stand, an attempt to solve social problems through an interpretation acceptable to the majority of the people, rather than a mere turning back to some so-called idyllic past. Islam, like other religions, has both progressive and conservative followers, according to their socio-political outlook. There are parallels in Christianity. In the days when the official Church worked hand-in-glove with the ruling class, there arose revolutionary Christian writers

who turned for inspiration back to the original concept of Christ, the saviour of the poor and wretched. William Blake defended his vision against that of the official Church:

The vision of Christ that thou dost see, Is my vision's Greatest Enemy, Thine loves the same world that mine hates, Thy Heaven doors are my Hell gates. Both read the Bible day & night, But thou readst black where I read white.

This vision is still active in present-day Latin America where worker-priests often side with the people in their struggle against the ruling classes. This is a religious activity that Khomeini would approve. As he said to some visiting Christian clergy: "All theologians of different nations, Christians, Muslims, Jews and others have a single duty, and that is to follow devotedly the prophets who came to improve education, peace and human piety... I would like to suggest that you study the world's problems as they really exist."

The vision of Islam which inspired the Revolution in Iran is one that is deeply rooted in the imagination of the ordinary man and women. It has sprung neither from the abstract and negative teaching of the clergy who used to decree blind obedience to authority, nor from rigid, oppressive forms of bigotry.

A return to Islamic origins should, therefore, not imply a narrowing of outlook but rather a broadening of opportunity. Those who look back to the original Islam regard it as the religion of the common people, where a person's qualities and actions are all important.

"Oh people, we created you male and female, we brought you together as tribes and nations in order that you might know and cooperate with each other. Certainly the most respected by Allah among you is the one who is most pious."

A person's superiority lies in his piety or "taqva" as it is called in Islam. Mohammad said: "There is

no preference of Arab over non-Arab except by piety or 'taqva'." This piety is a positive and social quality, in which the good of all is set above individual and limited interest. Those who simply pursued their own interest were regarded as unbelievers who had turned away from the path of the Prophet. Iranians often quote his son-in-law Imam Ali: "No-one is a man of riches unless he upholds the rights of others."

This last precept has been the guiding light of the Iranian Revolution. "Islam is a political religion," says Khomeini. "Our Revolution is the Revolution of the oppressed and oppressed against the oppressors..." Our social, political and educational systems must change to suit the interests of this deprived class." We have to study the social and educational upheaval in Iran in this context.

Before the Revolution the whole educational system was directed from Teheran and geared to represent and support the ruling class. Education, indeed, was like some luxury consumer item. During the past 20 months it has inevitably been undergoing fundamental changes in line with the aims and objectives of the Revolution, which are, basically, for the country to be run in the interests of the majority of people.

In the past, vast numbers of arts graduates were trained to run the bureaucracy. Many students became civil engineers to work for private companies who were providing superfluous rather than what the country needed; the owners of these companies have now left Iran, leaving the graduates unemployed. Many of the middle and upper classes who had a monopoly of education have emigrated, to oppose the Revolution from abroad, and left a vacuum to be filled.

Immediately after the Revolution, a provisional government under Bazarگان came into power. He failed to come to grips with the country's many problems and soon resigned. After the Revolutionary Council took over, a more vigorous approach was instituted. There has been an on-going and spirited debate about how education can fulfil the needs of a third world coun-

This would be, says Ayatollah Montazeri, "a disaster... we need doctors... we are short of 20,000 doctors. We also need engineers... If we do not become self-sufficient in science and technology, then we shall remain dependent."

Idle students and teachers would soon become disillusioned and discontented, heralding future strife. Furthermore, the cultural revolution will obviously be a long process, better carried out by patience and persuasion, rather than with chaos and coercion. Eventually, there must be (as Ayatollah Khomeini suggests) a compromise. The teachers and their students, who are the tools of the new education, reflect many different outlooks: progressive Muslim, Marxist, Liberal. Such diversity is both healthy and inevitable in a thinking society. There is no one viewpoint, no simple answer to each question, and to enforce uniformity would be both futile and also smack too much of the repression that was endured under the Shah. Both staff and students must use their new freedom of working together to take part in constructive discussion and activity to protect and strengthen the results of the revolution.

Obviously there is a long struggle ahead before any ideals can be realized: the present war serves to prolong the agony of waiting and speculation. Apart from the danger from without there are also weaknesses within the country. Despite warnings from Ayatollah Khomeini's President Bani-Sadr and Prime Minister Rajai, certain right-wing extremists still threaten the work of the Revolution. The Koran says: "Congratulate those who listen to others' words and select the good parts of them." Unless the progressive vision of Islam is put into practice in society and the principle of tolerance is upheld both in the universities and society, then the Islamic Revolution supported by the masses will defeat its own purpose. The present war has shown the strength of this Islamic Revolution. Despite predictions in the West that Iran was crumbling, as always, and on the verge of chaos, the country has pulled together in its attempt to defeat the enemy. Iranians will not so easily give up their dearly-won freedom.

The author is a lecturer in the department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Edinburgh.

Elie Kedourie describes the failure of Western constitutionalism to replace the old forms of rule within the Ottoman Empire; a failure from which have sprung in turn insecurity and military regimes

Islam and nationalism: a recipe for tension

The term Middle East as denoting an area stretching roughly from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Eastern frontier of Iran came into general currency during the Second World War. The term is indicative of a strategic and geopolitical consideration, seen from the vantage point of the European Great Powers, and subsequently of the Superpowers. These considerations are still very much to the fore today. They may even be said to have greatly increased in importance. Middle Eastern oil has become indispensable to Western Europe and Japan, and scarcely less indispensable to the United States.

Soviet power and influence, progressively increased in the past two decades or so, has greatly enhanced the threat to Western interests in the area. The Soviet Union, which in close geographical proximity, now able to dominate or to make secure the sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf to Europe and the Far East, to deny Middle Eastern oil to West or—as the invasion of Afghanistan has shown—to occupy otherwise control actual Middle Eastern territories. Any one of these developments the West might, conceivably consider a *casus belli*, a point which can initiate a war, or at the least extremely are hostilities.

In this respect, then, the situation in the Middle East today and in any foreseeable future is not without parallel to what it was during the nineteenth century—the era of what textbooks call the Eastern Question. Willy-nilly, Middle Eastern cannot help being involved in national conflicts and rivalries. Sometimes they will welcome this involvement, and seek to exploit it for strategic position and their oil over oil in order to extract advantages from both power blocks. This position of seeming strength has been most noticeable since 1973,

meant the withdrawal of Egypt from the anti-Israel coalition. The remaining members in a position to wage war against Israel, namely Syria and Jordan, will probably consider the risks of a war now too great for it to be seriously entertained. If so, the Arab-Israeli conflict might easily quietly fade away, or even be ended through a formal settlement.

But if Egypt and Israel were to fall out again and the original coalition of 1948 re-established, the Arab-Israeli war should still not be the most important feature to strike an outside observer. For even if the Arab-Israeli conflict were to disappear with the defeat and destruction of Israel, other features which are, even now, more significant will continue to be so.

These are political instability, intellectual disorientation and spiritual tension. These features may be said to have appeared in the area when its isolation came to an end, and to signal a failure or an unwillingness to come to terms with another civilization. Since the Ottoman Empire and other traditional polities disappeared, political instability has characterized the area. The traditional polities were of a kind which the textbooks know as Oriental despotism. In this kind of rule, government is carried on for the advantage of the rulers whose main preoccupation is the extraction of taxes and the maintenance of armies, and between whom and the subject there is otherwise little contact, and less trust. For various reasons this kind of polity broke down in the nineteenth century, but no other viable regime has succeeded in replacing it. For a time, the educated and official classes who had become more or less westernized, fervently believed that Western constitutionalism and representative government could successfully replace the old forms

striking, and which will perhaps prove the most enduring, political feature of the area.

From the very beginning nationalism as the organizing principle of a policy aroused objections on the score that it negates or overrides loyalty to Islam which ought to constitute the sole political bond for Muslims. Various strategies were employed to meet this difficulty. Turkish leaders who anyway believed that Islam was reactionary and to be suppressed did not pay much attention to such objections. Pan-Arab thinkers sought to argue that Islam and Arabism went hand-in-hand, since the Prophet was an Arab, his first followers were Arabs, and Islam was part of the national heritage of the vast majority of Arabs. But these were, ultimately, no more than gestures meant to pacify and placate, and clearly giving the primacy to Arabism over Islam. Such arguments had to be resorted to because new-fangled theories about Arabism, etc., in spite of benefiting from the full extent of official support still could not replace Islam as the focus of popular loyalty.

Strong and deep-rooted, Islam provided for the masses a morality and a view of the world and of human destiny which was comprehensive and consolatory. But, as has been said, the dominant attitude of this traditional Islam to politics was one of passivity and resignation, born out of the conviction, strengthened by centuries of political vicissitudes, that the greater the distance a God-fearing man put between him and those in power, the better it would go for him, now and hereafter.

This attitude was in a way reinforced by the intellectual and political Westernization which gradually began to dominate the official and intellectual classes, removing their universe of discourse further and further from that of the masses. In various Muslim countries, this divorce between Islam and the dominant political doctrines and institutions eventually began to dismay and alarm Muslim thinkers: Mawdudi among the Indian Muslims, Banna the late founder of the



Illustration by David Smith

CRITICAL COLLISIONS AND RIVALRIES. Sometimes they will welcome this involvement, and seek to exploit their strategic position and their control over oil in order to extract advantages from both power blocks. This position of seeming strength has been most noticeable since 1973, when oil prices were quadrupled, and the oil-producing states assumed full control over prices and level of production and began to enjoy enormous financial resources. In the richest oil state, however, most hope to approach the Superpowers or indeed any state like France or Britain or Japan in point of population, technical or industrial resources, or military power. Middle Eastern states are thus just likely—or perhaps even more likely—to be victims rather than beneficiaries of international rivalry and conflict. Their vulnerability may be difficult to credit at the moment, given the cocksure—and even arrogant—stance many of these states have, following the triumph of the Opec cartel, paraded before the world. But a moment's reflection shows that even the richest and most powerful among them—a Saudi Arabia or an Iraq—are likely to find themselves, in any serious conflict, quickly out of their depth. But there are other ways of looking at this area than those in terms of strategy or geopolitics. If, then, we were to consider it not as a Middle East, but as the heartland of Islam, mainly inhabited and ruled by Arabs, Turks, Iranians, and Persians, other aspects and different issues will be present before our minds. Of these the most prominent, and generally judged the most important, is the Arab-Israeli conflict. Such a judgment is no doubt influenced by the prominence which the media accord to the conflict, and the urgent, passionate, and occasionally doom-laden rhetoric which the contestants use, and which cannot but impress outsiders. It is, however, questionable whether the Arab-Israeli conflict should loom quite so large in the minds of those not directly affected. One main reason why the conflict has lasted for so long is that the Arab side has consisted of a coalition of states with divergent and sometimes inimical views and interests, and who could never be brought to agree as to what settlement they collectively desired. In this coalition, theynch-pin was undoubtedly Egypt, both by reason of its geographical position and its military power. Camp David has

has succeeded in replacing it. For a time, the educated and official classes who had become more or less westernized, fervently believed that Western constitutionalism and representative government could successfully replace the old forms of rule. This was the great dream of the Young Ottomans, the Persian Constitutionalists and the Liberal Constitutionalists of Egypt. It was also something which Western governments, who became dominant in the region before and after the first world war, also favoured and encouraged. But it very soon became apparent that the society was not such as to be able to sustain and operate parliamentary government. In one country after another military-backed regimes have become usual. But usual as they have become, such regimes do not, and cannot have, the benefit of legitimacy, or the security which legitimacy gives to a government: an Amurath Amurath succeeds, and there seems no prospect of this vicious circle being broken.

The prospects of social and political stability are made even dimmer by relatively recent developments. The new kind of rulers, whether willingly or not, have assumed vast powers to control and direct an immense variety of social and economic activities—something traditional rulers had never even thought was within the ambit of government. This kind of control requires great centralization and a concomitant increase in bureaucracy. This in itself will keep productivity and inventiveness at a low level and hence precludes the autonomous generation of, and increase in, wealth. It is significant that increased wealth in these societies usually comes from the outside, whether as governmental aid, or as remittances from workers in European countries or—much more important—in the form of the inflated revenues which the oil cartel allows producers to extract from the consumers. But centralized control, unwholesome and disagreeable for the ruled, also entails great risks for the rulers. True, they are not accountable to those over whom they rule, but if difficulties arise, they are not easy to contain or localize. The whole regime comes to be in

question, because it is the regime which has assumed the responsibility for everything—from providing employment to the supply of housing and the price of sewing thread. Instability also comes from the fact that modern media of communication, even when they are wholly controlled by governments, break down the isolation of various social groups and different localities, and thus erode that incurious passivity which was such an asset in the hands of the traditional ruler. Suddenly the social space becomes much more crowded, and there is somehow less elbow-room and greater volatility. The terrorist gangs infesting Turkey in recent years, the mobs which day after day called for the Shah's downfall in Iranian cities, the killing of *Awamti* by Sunnis in Syria all serve to exemplify this condition. If, then, the traditional political institutions have irrevocably gone, and nothing solid and satisfactory has come to replace them, exactly the same is true in the realm of ideas. That it is a religious duty for ruler, be he mad or bad, had come to sum up and articulate the political experience of the Muslim world. In modern times this notion began to seem inadequate and unacceptable. What was to take its place? That the political bond is formed by a constitutional order in which regulates and defines the public relations between the citizens—this notion, the product of a European legal and political tradition, though it came to be known and appreciated by many members of the intellectual classes in the Middle East proved in the end too far removed from indigenous traditions, too exotic to strike roots.

Other ideas, deriving from other parts of the European tradition, proved more popular. Of these, the most popular by far was the idea of the nation and of nationalism. That the political bond is the outcome of, and is constituted by a shared language and culture, and indeed obvious. Why should it not serve as a political organizing principle which was in tune with the requirements of modernity, but which did not demand the abandonment of one's own past and traditions? To be an Arab in a state all composed of Arabs, a Turk or an Iranian likewise—what could be more satisfactory? What more natural? It seemed dead easy—except that when it came to identifying who or what was an Arab, etc., the difficulties seemed suddenly to multiply. Nor was the area so conveniently partitioned that all the Arabs were to be found in one territory, the Iranians in another, or the Turks similarly. And for the Arabs in particular, there was the added difficulty that Arabs here and now lived not in one state but in a multitude of states. If there was any truth in the idea that the Arabs formed a single nation, then this truth was by no means reflected in actual reality. And if it was the truth, then reality had to be made to conform to it. This was the programme or ideology of Pan-Arabism, which from 1945 onwards increasingly dominated the political rhetoric of the Arab world, as well as the preoccupations of its leaders. But the struggle to realize the Pan-Arab dream changed—to use Charles Péguy's distinction—into *mystique* into *politique*. A politics in which leaders fought and intrigued against one another, in which one regime sought to overthrow its neighbour, a struggle, in short, from which were absent measure, moderation and scruple.

Nasser was the best-known and the most-fearful practitioner of this kind of ideological politics, in which political principles were transformed into slogans to rouse and to destroy. In all in the end came to nothing, and though Pan-Arabism and the like remain the official doctrines which schools are required to teach, and publicists to propagate, they have lost their power to inspire and convince. They hide an intellectual and ideological vacuum which is as painful as it is dangerous, and which serves to accentuate the political instability which is the most

It is obvious that such a stance is a response, a reaction to what is felt to be a challenge and a threat. But the question must arise whether this response is adequate to a situation which those concerned first place, is there not a risk that this reaction might, because it is a reaction, enhance the importance and strengthen the appeal of that very Western civilization it is intent on banishing and exorcising? For, after all, Western civilization still provides the yardstick and the organizing ideas by which all other civilizations are judged and understood, and it still remains the source of intellectual and artistic achievement, the restless centre of political and economic innovation. In the second place, is it really feasible that a modern society of any complexity or sophistication should be governed and organized according to principles which Muslim societies in all their variety from the Umayyad Caliphate up to the present have found it impracticable to follow? To ask this question is to appreciate the spiritual tension which modernity has created for Islam—a tension very uncomfortable to live with, but for which no resolution is in sight.

The author is professor of politics in the department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science.



David Smith

U.S. Notes



DEANIS COOK—ASSOCIATED PRESS

Memorials: the annual mouthwash



SHEPARD SHERRELL—PICTURE GROUP

Supreme Court: embattled Bork



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Environment: a damless Hetch Hetchy valley, circa 1910

MEMORIALS

Old Abe Gets The Brush

Just after midnight on a hot, moonlit summer Tuesday, a National Park Service crew assembled, scrub brushes in hand. Its mission: to clean a year's worth of grime off the distinctive features of the 16th U.S. President. Once a year the 19-ft.-high statue of Abraham Lincoln at the heart of the Grecian-style memorial in Washington gets a thorough rubdown with special soap and natural-bristle brushes. Though Mr. Lincoln's baths are infrequent, their cost and duration are impressive. The twelve-hour cleaning set taxpayers back some \$1,400.

POLITICS

Reagan Takes The Pledge

In the wake of the Iran-*contra* fiasco, the President moved last week to head off congressional efforts to restrict his power to conduct covert activities. In a formal announcement made in the Oval Office on Friday, Reagan promised that he would notify Congress of such initiatives within 48 hours, barring the "most exceptional circumstances."

The President unveiled a six-point agreement laboriously negotiated between Na-

tional Security Adviser Frank Carlucci and the Senate Intelligence Committee. Key provisions: that all orders for covert operations be written and made available to National Security Council members, including the Secretaries of State and Defense; that Congress be told of all private individuals assisting in such activities; that all covert actions be subject to annual review. The House Intelligence unit is working on a similar agreement. But Oklahoma Democrat David Boren, chairman of the Senate committee, conceded that the new accord was not an "absolute, airtight insurance policy" against Iran-*contra*-style capers.

SUPREME COURT

Bracing for a Bork Blitz

"A Supreme Court Justice is not supposed to be a White House 'team player,'" asserts an ad appearing in four major U.S. newspapers beginning last week. The full-page message cost People for the American Way, a liberal activist group, some \$135,000. But that is small change in the all-out lobbying war over the Supreme Court nomination of Appeals Court Judge Robert Bork. Anticipating this fall's Senate confirmation vote, hundreds of liberal and conservative interest groups are expected to spend more than \$20 million in multimedia ad campaigns and

direct contact by mail and phone. Their main target: the 20-odd Senators who have yet to make up their minds.

CRIME

Pint-Size Heist

It was shortly before noon when the gang of thieves struck. By ripping a screen and prying open a ground-floor window, they entered the Lily Furgerson Child Development Center in Waterloo, Iowa, and swiftly made off with \$350 worth of goods. But the weekend burglary had a twist. The robbers were three small children ages 4, 5 and 7. The loot: three fancy tricycles.

The pint-size pilferers somehow managed to hoist the heavy steel trikes out the window before joyriding four blocks to a nearby youth club. A neighbor saw them break into the club and called police, who nabbed the two preschoolers. The savvy ringleader escaped through a second-floor window of the youth club, only to be found later cowering under a bed at the day-care center. The child, whose name was withheld, was charged last week with two counts of second-degree burglary, which police expect to drop. His two accomplices, however, were released to the kind of sentencing only red-faced parents can hand down.

ENVIRONMENT

Resurrecting A Valley

"Dam Hetch Hetchy! As well dam for water tanks the people's cathedrals and churches, for no holier temple has ever been consecrated by the heart of man." So wrote Naturalist John Muir almost 75 years ago in a vain effort to keep the U.S. Government from flooding Northern California's magnificent Hetch Hetchy valley, a Yosemite look-alike, to provide San Francisco with power and water.

Last week Interior Secretary Donald Hodel proposed a reversal of that decision. If the reservoir could be drained and the valley restored to its original condition, mused Hodel in a staff memo, "what a tremendous payoff for America."

Conservationists are wary of the idea and accuse Hodel of using the scheme as a smoke screen to divert attention from such controversial measures as oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Others say he is actually looking for a way to get Washington to pay about \$1 billion to complete the half-finished Auburn Dam nearby. But no one is more opposed than Mayor Dianne Feinstein of San Francisco, which still depends on the reservoir. Snapped Feinstein: "It's the worst idea since selling arms to Iran."

COVER STORIES

At War on All Fronts

Once again, a frenzied Iran lashes out with fury and fanatic zeal



They jammed Revolution Avenue in the heart of Tehran last week, a million Iranians raising their fists and shouting as if with one voice, "Revenge! Revenge! Revenge! Revenge!" The clutches of women dressed in black chadors, the phalanxes of men bearing placards that said DOWN WITH U.S.: the angry scene had been played out before. This time, however, the crowd seemed reinvigorated, its fury fresh and lethal. "Death to America!" they chanted in the near 100° heat. Their rage rose higher still as Hashemi Rafsanjani, the speaker of Iran's parliament, called upon Allah to "avenge the blood" of nearly 300 Iranian pilgrims who had been killed a week earlier in Mecca, Islam's holiest city. Rafsanjani also uttered a demand that sent a tremor through the Arab world and beyond: the rulers of Saudi Arabia, the keepers of Mecca, must be "uprooted."

Then came the hypnotic voice of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, 87, still the country's supreme leader. Speaking in fierce whispers over nationwide radio, Khomeini first lashed out at the "inept and spineless" Saudi Arabian royal family. But he placed the blame for the bloody deaths in Mecca squarely on the U.S., still the "Great Satan" in the eyes of the fevered Iranian nation, and vowed vengeance. Promised Khomeini: "God willing, at the opportune time we shall deal with her."

That confrontation suddenly seemed at hand last week—for America and for the world. Since he took power in 1979, the Ayatollah has threatened to spread his uncompromising brand of Islamic fundamentalism across the fragile, oil-rich states that line the Persian Gulf and to upset the global balance of power. He has sought his goals openly in Iran's seven-year war with Iraq, and he has promoted them stealthily through terrorist bombings and kidnappings abroad. Now

Khomeini's brooding presence loomed larger than ever as he seemed ready, even eager, to take on a host of nations.

Angered by Washington's decision to reflag and escort Kuwaiti tankers through the gulf, Iran announced with great fanfare that it would stage four days of war games in the Strait of Hormuz, the entryway to the gulf. In case there was any doubt about the intent of the maneuvers, they were code-named "Martyrdom." One of the reflagged ships, the fully loaded *Gas Prince*, slipped quietly out of Japan before the exercises began. But the supertanker *Bridgeton*, damaged last month by a mine that may have been planted by the Iranians, remained in Kuwait. Meanwhile, Washington found itself in the humiliating position of pleading with its European allies to send minesweepers to the gulf, a request that all spurned. At week's end the U.S. was rushing eight Sea Stallion minesweeping helicopters to the region, while three more Kuwaiti tankers moved into the gulf escorted by American warships.

Khomeini's anti-American fervor echoed those 444 days in 1979-81 when Iran held 52 Americans captive in the U.S. embassy in Tehran. "The American presence in the gulf has turned back the clock to the years of the hostage crisis," said an Iranian journalist. "That is the atmosphere now." But a major factor in the new frenzy was the congressional hearings on the U.S. arms-for-hostages deal with Iran, which Iranians followed closely by newspaper and radio. The public revelations of those dealings last November and the fresh airing given the scandal on Capitol Hill over the past three months revealed Khomeini's willingness to traffic with the Great Satan and thus deeply embarrassed Tehran. In order to restore its

Sending a tremor around the world: volunteer fighters show their support for the republic







Prelude to violence: Iranian pilgrims, carrying posters of their Shi'ite leaders, parade through the streets of Mecca on July 31

KAYHAN PHOTOS, IRAN

credibility, Khomeini's regime apparently felt it imperative to demonstrate anew its hatred of America. "It all was like waving a red flag in front of Iran," says Gary Sick, a former Carter Administration official and expert on Iran. "They had to respond, to redeem themselves both domestically and internationally."

But the U.S. is only one target of Khomeini's wrath. Iran has been locked in a face-off with France since the two nations broke off relations last month. The French aircraft carrier *Clemenceau* last week steamed to the gulf as Iranian police continued to hold 15 French citizens hostage in the French embassy in Tehran. Tensions remained high between Iran and Britain over earlier incidents involving their diplomats. After the Mecca tragedy, gangs ransacked the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian embassies in the Iranian capital and took four Saudis prisoner.

Amid the rage, however, Tehran was still capable of making shrewd diplomatic maneuvers. In one such move that promised to heighten superpower tensions in the region, Iran and the Soviet Union last week began to negotiate plans to reopen oil pipelines and build a second rail link from Iran to Soviet Central Asia. While the Soviets and the U.S. are officially neutral in the Iran-Iraq war, the superpowers appeared to be moving into opposite corners: Washington seemed to tie itself to Baghdad by aiding its ally Kuwait, while Moscow warmed to Tehran.

The Soviet pact spotlighted Iran's strategic importance. One of the world's leading oil producers, Iran (pop. 50 million) has more people than all the other

gulf states combined and geographically dominates the richest petroleum-producing region on earth. The country is a vast land bridge between the gulf and the Soviets on the north, the Turks on the west, and the Asian nations of Afghanistan and Pakistan on the east. Washington rightfully views any increase in Soviet influence in Iran as worrisome indeed.

But it is the gulf states that fear their brawling neighbor the most. As the world's only Shi'ite-ruled Muslim country, Iran seeks to export its brand of Islamic revolution throughout the region and to overthrow the Sunni-ruled Muslim regimes in countries like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The two religious factions have been fierce rivals for centuries. Painfully vulnerable to Iranian subversion, the Sunni gulf nations have been understandably reluctant to alienate Tehran.

Since Khomeini came to power in 1979, tensions have been especially high during the hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca that annually attracts more than 2 million Muslims from some 130 countries. Khomeini viewed the sacred occasion as the ideal time to deliver his revolutionary message, but the Saudis blocked that goal by banning demonstrations and limiting the number of Iranians allowed into the country. Last year Saudi police discovered more than 110 lbs. of explosives hidden in the luggage of 500 Iranian pilgrims.

Two weeks ago, however, the Saudis were not as lucky. According to accounts pieced together last week, the trouble began on Friday, only minutes after the end

of midday prayer services. In 115° heat, a white-robed sea of penitents swarmed around the Sacred Mosque, where the devout come to touch the Black Stone, a meteorite inside the shrine that millions of pilgrims have worn smooth over the centuries in the belief that it will absolve them of sin. Suddenly the worshippers' hymns and shouts of *Allahu-Akhbar!* (God is great) were drowned out. Crying "Death to America! Death to the Soviet Union! Death to Israel!" ragged lines of Iranian demonstrators began weaving through the crowds. Many carried posters of Khomeini that they waved over the heads of the faithful. Their alleged aim: to seize the Sacred Mosque and proclaim Khomeini leader of all Islam.

Police rushed in as the pilgrims and intruders began to clash. Waves of Iranians charged the officers, hurling rocks and other objects. Some agitators brandished clubs and knives. Others set fire to nearby cars and motorcycles. Terrified bystanders dashed for cover, their white robes frantically flapping. By the time police regained control, 402 people, including at least 275 Iranians, lay dead or dying and an additional 649 had been injured.

Tehran quickly claimed that the Saudis had machine-gunned the victims in cold blood. Riyadh replied that the Iranians had charged police and were trampled to death in the melee. The Saudis buttressed their story with videotape clips that showed an Iranian rampage. Ali Hassan Ash-Shaer, Saudi Arabia's Information Minister, insisted that "not a single bullet was fired" by Saudi forces.

On Saturday, Tehran awoke to a terse



Iranian speedboats race across the gulf in a military exercise chillingly named "Martyrdom"

7 a.m. newscast that reported that "scores of Iranian pilgrims have been shot dead by the Saudi police." By 8 a.m. a crowd of 600 had gathered outside the Saudi embassy. After briefly being restrained by armed police, the growing mob burst into the two-story villa, smashing windows and destroying embassy documents. Last week thousands of mourners walked through Tehran alongside coffins containing bodies brought back from Saudi Arabia. Chants of "Death to America!" and "Death to the fascist Saudi police!" filled the air.

For the conservative Saudi rulers, the bloodshed at Mecca was appalling and terrifying. Iran's revolutionary zeal had penetrated the borders of one of the most cautious and security-conscious countries in the world. "We are determined to defend our land and our holy places by all means," declared King Fahd. Arab leaders from Bahrain to Morocco rallied behind Riyadh and condemned the rioters.

Four days after the Mecca riots, Iran reported launching its "Martyrdom" maneuvers in the gulf. According to Tehran radio, frogmen, pilotless aircraft and explosive-laden vessels staged mock attacks. Iranian television showed "suicide" speedboats skimming the waters, apparently practicing for the day when they would be called upon to crash into enemy warships. The Iranians even claimed to have launched their first submarine.

Iran's noisy saber rattling is only the latest lurch in its erratic foreign policy. Though Khomeini has often declared his hatred for the West, Iran's dealings with other countries are determined as much

by its domestic politics as by ideology. After several years of insisting that Iran's only goal was to spread its brand of Islam across the globe, Khomeini began in late 1984 to soften his rhetoric in order to rebuild ties with other countries. The move reflected the fact that Iran desperately needed help: four years of war with Iraq had devastated the economy, and Khomeini's implacable hostility toward the outside world had turned his nation into

an international pariah. In short order, Iran signed a trade pact with China, opened negotiations with France to resolve a \$1 billion dispute, and entered fence-mending agreements with the Arab world that included a limit on the number of Iranian pilgrims who would make the yearly trek to Mecca.

Beneath Iran's public diplomacy, however, its politics was seething, its national leadership split. On one side were the relative pragmatists like Rafsanjani, who favored accommodation abroad. On the other were the hard-liners such as the Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, Khomeini's designated successor, and Mehdi Hashemi, a key Montazeri aide, who shunned contact with the West. Rafsanjani acknowledged the split in a 1986 speech, in which he declared that "two relatively powerful factions in our country" disagreed on virtually every policy and "may in fact be regarded as two parties without names." Khomeini presided over this division like a fond father, encouraging first one side and then the other.

The split became a chasm after Iran decided in late 1985 to buy arms from the U.S. The decision did not reflect a fundamental shift in policy; the arrangement only illustrated Tehran's fanatical desire to defeat Iraq, no matter who supplied the weapons. In addition, Washington's eagerness to swap TOW missiles for hostages was interpreted by many in Iran as proof that terrorism paid off. Nonetheless, the deal infuriated extreme hard-liners like Hashemi. There was little they could do about it since the Ayatollah had approved the negotiations. When former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane undertook his now famous mission to Tehran in May 1986, supporters of Hashemi tried to have him kidnapped, but Rafsanjani's followers intervened.



A wounded pilgrim and the coffins of his dead comrades return to Tehran from Mecca
After the tragedy, a demand that the Saudi Arabian dynasty be "uprooted."

World

That trip might still remain secret today if Hashemi and dozens of his associates had not been arrested in Tehran last October on murder and other charges. Several days later friends of Hashemi leaked details of the McFarlane visit to the Lebanese weekly magazine *Ash-Shiraa*. The sensational account made worldwide headlines and sent the pragmatists scurrying for cover.

Though Khomeini has forbidden public criticism of the arms deal, the explosive revelations have forced all factions in Tehran to talk and act tough. "To be perceived as nonrevolutionary in Iran is the kiss of death," says Iranian Expert Gary Sick. Almost overnight the softening face that Iran presented to the world reverted to a furious scowl. Khomeini reportedly was in his blackest mood in years as the annual Mecca pilgrimage neared. "Break the teeth of

the Americans," he told the 150,000 Iranians who set out on the trip.

The war with Iraq continues to dominate Iranian policy at home and abroad. Since Baghdad started the conflict by invading Iran in September 1980, some 300,000 Iranians and 200,000 Iraqis have lost their lives in the fighting. Tehran's hopes for victory soared in January, when its troops pushed within a few miles of Basra, Iraq's second largest city. In the past few months, however, Iran has made little headway in its drive to crush Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Indeed, the Iraqis have succeeded in reclaiming much of their lost ground.

Even the number of Iranian war victims reflects the country's political divisions. Iranian troops are split among the regular military, the fanatical Revolutionary Guards and the often ragtag volunteer

corps known as the *basisi*. Iran's moderate phase in the mid-1980s in Tehran reduced the death toll by relying on trained professional soldiers for most of the fighting. Rafsanjani announced in 1985 that Iran intended "to achieve victory with as few casualties as possible." But last year champions of the zealous Guards gained a stronger voice in ruling circles. The Guards have scant concern for casualties and favor launching human waves against enemy positions. In a unanimous vote last month, the U.N. Security Council demanded that Iran and Iraq declare a cease-fire, and last week the U.S. pushed efforts for a resolution calling for an arms embargo on Iran.

The relentless war with Iraq is only the most visible sign of Khomeini's determination to defeat heretics. No less important are Tehran's ties with the terrorist

The Unending Feud: Shi'ites vs. Sunnis

"There is no god but God, and Muhammad is the Messenger of God."

That confession of faith, the *shahada*, is professed by all Muslims, be they the 700 million Sunnis who dominate the Islamic world from Morocco to Indonesia or the 90 million Shi'ites who rule Iran and form majorities in Lebanon, Bahrain and Iraq. To the *shahada*, however, the Shi'ites add, "And Ali is the Friend of God." Those additional words in praise of Ali, whom the Shi'ites passionately claim is Muhammad's true successor, epitomize the complex and often bloody feud between Islam's two branches.

Among the close disciples of the Prophet, his son-in-law Ali was the most familiar with the teachings of Islam's founder. Yet when Muhammad died in A.D. 632, his followers bypassed Ali for the succession. However, the Shi'at Ali, the partisans of Ali, argued that the Prophet had designated Ali and his family the hereditary rulers of Islam. Persevering with his claim, Ali became Islam's leader in A.D. 656, only to be assassinated five years later. Hussein, Ali's son, eventually pressed his own claim to the leadership. But he and most of his family were killed in battle with rival forces at Karbala in Iraq. To the horror of all Islam, the Prophet's grandson was cruelly tortured before being beheaded.

To the Shi'at Ali, who later became known as Shi'ites, Hussein's tragic attempt to establish the Prophet's true succession was the supreme sacrifice for the faith. Martyrdom thus offers Shi'ites a chance to imitate their sainted hero. In Iran, which is more than 90% Shi'ite, passion plays depicting Hussein's last hours are performed regularly. Each year, on the date of Hussein's death, thousands of penitents march through Iranian streets whipping themselves with chains and branches, seeking purification through suffering.

Faithful Shi'ites admit only to the authority of Muhammad and the Twelve Imams, who comprise Ali, Hussein and certain of their direct descendants. The Shi'ites consider the Twelve to be mediators between God and man. Though the Twelfth and last Imam went into hiding in A.D. 940, Shi'ites believe that he will re-emerge to rule the world as the mess-



Ali, the "Friend of God"

anic Mahdi. Until that time, the Shi'ite clergy are responsible for interpreting Islam. The Ayatullah Khomeini, however, has gone one step further by establishing his government as a regency for the Mahdi. Khomeini, who claims descent from Muhammad through the Seventh Imam, has never claimed to be the Twelfth Imam, but he has done nothing to discourage his followers from hailing him as such. Some Shi'ites consider that zeal misplaced and heretical.

While they honor Ali, the Sunnis do not venerate their imams as divine intercessors. Sunni imams mainly conduct community prayers. Each Sunni (from *sunna*, "the tradition of the Prophet") believes he can have a direct relationship with God. While the Sunnis scorn emotional outbursts and engage in private, meditative piety, Shi'ites are more likely to indulge in displays of religious ardor. Indeed, the Sunnis, who consider themselves the orthodoxy, did not accept Shi'ism as a legitimate school of Islam until 1959.

Among some Arab states on the Persian Gulf, the relationship between Sunni rulers and Shi'ite subjects remains volatile. After all, in the eyes of the Shi'ites, any regime not under the rule of the Prophet's true heirs is an abomination. Indeed, Bahrain, which is more than 70% Shi'ite, defused a 1981 coup attempt allegedly inspired by Tehran. Kuwait, which is 24% Shi'ite, has been victimized by a wave of bombings believed to be the work of pro-Iranian terrorists.

In the war between Iraq and Iran, however, Iraqi Shi'ites, who make up almost 60% of their country's population, have chosen to be Iraqis first and Shi'ites second. The ancient animosity between Arabs and Persians apparently transcends religious sympathies. Nonetheless, the Iraqis receive constant reminders of Iranian Shi'ite fervor. Tehran's major offensives are named Karbala, after the place where Hussein died, and captured Iranian soldiers proudly show off the "keys to Heaven" issued to them when they enlisted. The celestial keys: dog tags. Observes an Iraqi official: "The Iranians are still fighting the Battle of Hussein."

World

network of Shi'ite radicals that stand ready to do the Ayatullah's bidding. Though tactics may shift, Khomeini's ultimate goal remains the same as when he came to power in Iran in 1979: to extend Shi'ite fundamentalism over all of Islam and recover the unity and power that the Muslim world has lost since the Middle Ages. "Khomeini is a one-track fanatic," contends a senior Israeli official. "But he is very cunning, very clever and knows what he wants to do."

So far, though, Khomeini has failed to export his revolution much farther than Beirut. That is the stronghold of the Hizballah, or Party of God, terrorists who revere Khomeini. Acting under such names as the Islamic Jihad and the Revolutionary Justice Organization, the Hizballah is suspected of holding most of the 24 foreign hostages, including nine Americans and Anglican Envoy Terry Waite, who are missing in Lebanon. As the Iran-contra hearings showed, Reagan's arms sales to Iran were designed primarily to pry Americans from Hizballah's grasp. The deals apparently did secure the release of three Americans—though four more were subsequently kidnaped—just as French contacts with Iran appeared to win freedom for five Frenchmen last year.

Hizballah's exploits are not confined to kidnaping. With the probable aid of 2,000 Revolutionary Guards stationed in the Bekaa Valley and 400 in southern Lebanon, the Islamic Jihad has claimed responsibility for six suicide attacks between 1982 and 1984 that took more than 500 lives and helped drive American, French and Israeli troops out of Lebanon. The campaign included the 1983 truck bombing that killed 241 U.S. servicemen billeted in Beirut.

Hizballah's ties to Tehran are abundantly clear. Leaders visit the Iranian capital regularly and reportedly get instructions from Iranian embassies in Damascus and Beirut. Khomeini is said to spend anywhere from \$15 million to \$50 million a year to finance Hizballah activities. Many Lebanese villages have so embraced Khomeini's way that their mosques and squares are adorned with pictures of the Ayatullah and even Iranian flags. Tehran reciprocates by putting pictures of Lebanese Shi'ite "martyrs" on Iranian postage stamps. Says Hussein Musawi, leader of the Hizballah-allied Is-

lamic Amal: "We do not believe in the presence of a state called Lebanon. We regard the entire Islamic world as our homeland."

Other countries have reason to fear that Hizballah will carry out terrorist acts on behalf of Iran. Last month a suspected member of Hizballah commandeered an Air Afrique jet, singled out a French passenger and shot him dead. Though the hijacking was staged ostensibly to force West Germany to release two jailed Hizballah operatives, the killing of the

near Syrian military posts in the Lebanese capital. Hizballah's most serious provocation came in June, when the group kidnaped U.S. Journalist Charles Glass near a Syrian checkpoint that was supposedly guarding the area.

Khomeini's relations with Saudi Arabia seem almost beyond repair. Ironically, the break follows a period in which Iran seemed to moderate its religious rivalry with the House of Saud. In a conciliatory move two years ago Khomeini replaced his religious representative in Mecca, a hard-line cleric whom the Saudis loathed. Before the start of this year's hajj, however, Khomeini's hatred had revived. Not only were the Saudis still bank-rolling Iraq, they openly supported Kuwait's assistance to Baghdad. Many observers expect Iran to avenge the Mecca deaths by launching terrorist acts on Saudi Arabian soil or by fomenting trouble among the country's 350,000 or so Shi'ites, most of whom live in the oil-rich eastern provinces.

Tehran and Paris have been at daggers' points since mid-July, when France tried to question Wahid Gordji, an Iranian embassy translator. French police suspect that Gordji, who took refuge in the embassy, is linked to a string of Paris bombings last fall. When French officers surrounded the Iranian embassy to prevent Gordji's escape, Iran sealed off the French embassy in Tehran.

Speaking in a televised interview last week, French Premier Jacques Chirac declared that "we have no intention of giving in to blackmail." In an

obvious reference to French warships headed for the gulf, Chirac vowed that "we will intervene" if Iran launched a military attack. Yet Chirac's room for maneuver is sharply limited. Any French military action could endanger the lives of the embassy captives in Tehran and the five French hostages held in Lebanon.

Britain treaded more cautiously last week. London's relations with Tehran have been tense since May, when an Iranian diplomat was arrested for shoplifting. After Iranian Revolutionary Guards beat a British embassy official in response, the two countries began to expel one another's diplomats. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has not wanted to push the quarrel any further, though. Sounded out privately two weeks ago by Washington about sending minesweepers



Leaders, clockwise: Khomeini; Montazeri; Khomeini's son Ahmed; Rafsanjani

To restore credibility, the regime needed to show renewed hate for America.

Frenchman suggested another motive: to pressure Paris to end the continuing diplomatic standoff between France and Iran. Washington last week quietly warned government installations at home and abroad to be alert to the Iranian threat. In West Berlin, the Allied Command ordered a number of Iranian diplomats to leave the city "in the interests of public order and security."

Tehran's ties with Hizballah have put it into conflict with its friends as well. Though Syria depends on Iran for much of its oil, relations between the two countries have deteriorated recently over events in Lebanon. Hizballah fought Syria's forces after Syrian President Hafez Assad sent troops into Beirut last February to restore law-and-order. Now Hizballah-set bombs explode almost nightly

World

to the gulf, she politely said no. Thatcher reportedly was furious when U.S. Ambassador Charles Price formally repeated the same request, forcing her to reject the U.S. again, this time in public. Thatcher has added reason to look askance at the highly publicized American escort operation: London has quietly escorted British tankers through gulf waters for the past six years.

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, gladly seized the opportunity to play a larger role in the gulf. Indeed, it was a Soviet decision last spring to charter three oil tankers to Kuwait that drove the Reagan Administration to counter the move by reflagging Kuwaiti vessels. But in reporting last week's negotiations with Iran, the Soviet news agency TASS noted that both Moscow and Tehran expressed mutual concern over the "unprecedented buildup of the U.S. military presence in the region." Nonetheless, the potential partnership poses problems for both countries. The Soviet Union remains a major arms supplier to Iraq. And Moscow cannot ignore the potential appeal of Khomeini's fiery fundamentalism to Soviet Muslim communities in Central Asia.

Yet Iran's economic woes seem to be nudging it toward the Kremlin. The turning point came last year with the arrival of the highest-ranking Soviet delegation to visit Tehran since the 1979 revolution. Then in December Tehran reported that the Soviets had agreed in principle to resume imports of Iranian natural gas and that the two countries were exploring the joint production of steel and petrochemicals.

For all his bluster, Khomeini is adept at turning the fears and jealousies of rival nations to his own advantage. "Look at Iran's position today," says a senior Israeli. "No one can ignore it. And many will even admire it." Part of that success stems from Khomeini's shrewd cynicism and ability to size up opponents. Speaking of Washington two years ago, the Ayatullah dryly observed, "It is clear that if we take one step toward the U.S., they take 100 in return."

Khomeini swiftly learned the value of dire pronouncements that are never actually carried out. The Ayatullah used the 1979-81 U.S. hostage crisis to inflame his own people and cement his revolution. But when Khomeini no longer needed the hostages, he let them go and agreed to drop demands for a U.S. apology and the return of assets of the former Shah. Since the hostage crisis, Khomeini has repeatedly found that a combination of bullying and pragmatic concessions has kept his enemies off-balance. Observes Richard Bulliet, a professor of Middle East history at Columbia University: "Khomeini is not the lunatic that many people in the West take him for."

Now other nations must again find a way to deal with that figure. For all the problems that Reagan's Kuwaiti escort service has encountered, the President seems determined to continue with the



Rituals of grief: women throw themselves on a grave at a cemetery near the capital

The war with Iraq has cost some 300,000 Iranian lives, with no end in sight.

operation indefinitely. Says a senior Administration official: "He's committed to demonstrating support to our friends in the region." Still, the White House began muting its military role in the gulf last week. Senior officials insisted that the reflagging was first and foremost a display of solidarity toward the moderate Arabs, not a show of muscle.

Whatever Washington's intent, Iran can ill afford a direct clash with the U.S. Not only would Tehran have little chance of winning, but a fight would drain vital resources from the all important war against Iraq. Still, Western military analysts are worried about a possible suicide bomb attack from an explosives-packed plane or boat.


The greatest threat to Khomeini's Iran may finally come not from the battlefield but from the country's almost suicidal tendency to cut itself off from the rest of the world. Each time Iran begins to make overtures to other nations, it seems instinctively to stop and pull back. Tehran's tenuous links with Washington, Paris and London have all been shattered in the past year. So too have been the painstaking efforts of some Iranian leaders to improve ties with Saudi Arabia. Whether Iran can leave such traits behind will ultimately rest with Khomeini's successors. All the indications are that the pragmatic Rafsanjani, 53, is locked in a fierce power struggle with the hard-liner Montazeri. Without a clear winner, the two men could wind up sharing authority in an arrangement that would make Montazeri the religious leader and Rafsanjani the political head of state. Most experts predict that a turbulent transition will follow Khomeini's death.

One power broker may be Khomeini's son Ahmed, 43. While members of the Ayatullah's family have traditionally been left on the sidelines, Khomeini brought Ahmed into government affairs late last year to oversee Tehran's two major newspapers and supervise state TV and radio stations and the national IRNA news agency. Iranian experts now consider Ahmed a full-fledged member of Khomeini's inner circle, along with Rafsanjani and Montazeri.

For all the speculation about Khomeini's successor, the Ayatullah remains very much the spiritual force behind the Iranian revolution. Reportedly afflicted with a weakening heart and prostate cancer, Khomeini nonetheless grants public audiences, meets weekly with the families of martyrs and even performs Islamic marriage ceremonies. On most days, though, he remains secluded in his house in north Tehran, emerging from time to time to issue the whispery proclamations that echo around the world. Intimates say the Ayatullah yearns to ensure that the revolution will survive long after he is gone. That may not be possible, given the nation's fractious politics and the fact that none of the potential successors possesses Khomeini's ability to mesmerize the country. But for now, the brooding leader remains a formidable force, an old man who can at will command the attention of both the superpowers and all of his Arab neighbors. As he first proved eight years ago and continues to prove, the Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini has transformed Iran into a state that the world must reckon with.

—By John Greenwald.
Reported by David S. Jackson/Abu Dhabi and Scott MacLeod/Cairo, with other bureaus

THE SHAMELESS ART
OF PAMPERING



BAILEYS ORIGINAL IRISH CREAM®. FOR THE MOMENTS YOU TREASURE.



World

Living with War And Revolution

Videos, ration books, draft dodging and business as usual in an impassioned land



Seven young men, all in their late teens or early 20s, slipped into a deserted dead-end street in eastern Tehran. From a neighborhood mosque, a loudspeaker rumbled with denunciations of America. While two of the youths acted as lookouts, a third placed a boxlike device at the base of a concrete wall, then rejoined his comrades. Subversives? Yes indeed, but not the kind to start an armed rebellion against the government. These, after all, were children of the Khomeini revolution, indoctrinated in the dream of conquering the world for Islam. But on this occasion they had another aim: they began to dance wildly as the pulsating rhythms of Michael Jackson's disco classic *Thriller* blared from the tape recorder the youth had placed beside the wall.

This scene is part of the cultural underground in Iran today. Among those who can afford them, American rock videocassettes are a big favorite. Groups of young men, many of them draft dodgers, pool their money to buy video recorders. The regime's efforts to eradicate all Western influences, and especially such evils as music, dance and free speech, have spawned a thirst for whatever the Islamic republic denounces as sinful. Example: the continuing popularity of a satirical videotaped movie called *Samad Becomes the Imam*, featuring a goofy, rustic character who emerges as the supreme ruler of the Islamic state.

The visible side of Iranian life today—the hundreds of thousands who march in support of Khomeini's pledge to exact vengeance from Iraq, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia—underscores the fact that the Islamic government still enjoys considerable support. The invisible side is more difficult to assess, but there is evidence of a growing discontent among many Iranians, particularly the educated and the well-to-do.

In the view of dissidents, all the evils for which Khomeini once criticized the Shah—everything from brutality to official corruption—are being committed by members of the current regime. The government continues to enjoy both popularity and legitimacy among millions of Iranians and can still command masses of young zealots who believe in Khomeini's promise to "march to Jerusalem" by way

of Iraq. But the seemingly endless fighting is producing disillusionment among others. Says a factory manager whose plant is virtually closed for lack of raw materials: "A grocer down the block has lost three sons in the war. It would kill him if he had to accept the reality that they died in vain, that there is no march to Jerusalem."

Many educated Iranians, even including Khomeini loyalists, complain about the number of young men killed on the battlefield. Says Sajid Rizvi, a London-based Middle East analyst: "Don't forget, government officials have children too. They are as worried as everybody else that their sons will go off and never come back." Virtually every family that has money or political connections is desperately attempting to bribe or contrive another way to get a young son out of the country. Often they ask Westerners to help arrange visas for prolonged trips abroad. Explains a Londoner who has friends in Iran: "They realize that the war is going to last a long time and that eventually a son is going to get called to the front. And they are simply unwilling to make that sacrifice." Since the ruptures in Iran's diplomatic ties with Britain and France, long lines of visa seekers have been forming outside the West German embassy in Tehran.

According to one military source, the number of army conscripts who refuse to heed the call to battle has sometimes run as high as 30%. But even if a draft dodger manages to avoid a long prison sentence, he soon discovers that it is almost impossible to get a job, go into business or travel abroad if he cannot produce an honorable-discharge certificate. A young man named Hamid admits that he has been in hiding in the homes of parents and relatives for four years, but insists, "It's better than dying in a stupid war." Tens of thousands are believed to have escaped to Turkey, Pakistan, the gulf states and elsewhere but have little means of earning a decent living in exile.

On occasion the government has felt obliged to draft white-collar bureaucrats into the military, thereby creating manpower problems in civilian life. When a tax officer who had been employed at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance was killed at the front, no one took over his ministry caseload. "During the



Defending the Khomeini government on the home



One of the country's few remaining polo clubs

last few offensives, the authorities have had to mobilize the educated bureaucracy," says Rizvi. "The result is that many departments have lost competent people."

Another social problem is the ever growing number of young widows. The government, fearful that these women will be forced to turn to prostitution if not properly cared for, is encouraging families to marry them off again as quickly as possible, but this time to older men who are unlikely to go to war.

Only two kinds of businesses seem to be thriving: those that sell to the govern-

Photographs for TIME by Jean Gaumy—Magnum

TIME, AUGUST 17, 1987



front: chador-clad women receive civil-training at a camp in the northeastern outskirts of the capital



Glancing at a jeweler's well-stocked window



Hawkers still sell carpets and practically everything else on the busy streets of the capital



A time of study on the sidewalks of Qum

ment and those that sell for it. Some merchants who have hoarded such basic items as meat, sugar, flour and even matches have made huge profits. Says a businessman in the import-export trade: "The only money to be made these days is in trading staples, house appliances and the like. People pay whatever they have to to get them."

There is widespread corruption in the bazaars because of the rapid growth of the black market, which now pays at least ten times the official rate of exchange for foreign currency. When the Cabinet dis-

cussed the matter recently, Khomeini reportedly vetoed the idea of imposing harsher sentences for black marketeering because he thought it would only lead to greater public frustration.

Inflation, officially pegged at 20%, has risen sharply in the past 18 months. Wealthy shoppers in north Tehran can still find almost anything they want, including imported luxury goods, but at sky-high prices. Because the salaries of lower-paid workers have increased little if at all since the revolution, many have taken additional, part-time jobs. To help them

cope with inflation, the government has issued special ration books permitting them to buy food staples for roughly a tenth of the price the same items would cost on the open market.

The government launched an all-out campaign against gouging last month, giving inspectors the power to impose fines, shut down shops and force owners to post prices. The names of closed shops are published in daily newspapers, along with the correct costs of basic items. On a morning radio show called *Hello, Have a Good Day*, listeners have repeatedly com-

World

plained about high prices and profiteering. Some gripe that while government employees can barely make ends meet, a few merchants are getting richer and richer. Nonetheless, the social and political status of the *bazaari*, the powerful businessmen who traditionally have run the economy, seems to be declining as the government assumes a larger role in setting prices.

In such an atmosphere, corruption thrives. One prosperous *bazaari*, who lives in a villa on a tree-lined street above the center of Tehran, says he can still bribe a policeman when the officer stops him late at night in his Mercedes-Benz for drunken driving. A diplomat discloses that he pays off local police before giving a dinner party and afterward finds them in his kitchen dining on the leftovers and drinking his vodka.

Less corrupt but far more menacing than the traditional authorities are the *Pasdaran*, or Revolutionary Guards, who constantly patrol the streets. Says a young Iranian Jew who fled to Israel: "They stop you if they do not like your looks or if they have the slightest suspicion that you are not obeying the rules of Islam. If you go hand in hand with your wife, they will stop you and force you to show them your marriage license. If you do not have the document, you will be arrested." In the minds of many Iranians, the Revolutionary Guards have taken the place of SAVAK, the Shah's dreaded secret police.

In paying for the war, the government suffered a serious setback last year when its oil revenues fell from a projected \$18 billion to \$8 billion. Yet the country is not on the brink of financial disaster. Its central bank has a relatively healthy \$5.1 billion in foreign reserves, plus at least \$2 billion in gold. Now that oil prices are climbing again, Iran expects to earn as much as \$12 billion this year.

Tehran, the capital, is unmistakably seedy these days, but it has suffered surprisingly little damage from the war. Women in black chadors still peer into shopwindows filled with Western-style wedding dresses and lingerie. As always, automobiles choke the city, creating a blanket of smog. Near the airport, concrete walls are covered with political cartoons, some depicting America as the "Great Satan" and others attacking Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. One drawing shows Saddam's face peering out of a pot surrounded by hand grenades, and another depicts the U.S. as a skeleton clutching bombs in its hands.

Relics of the past, slowly decaying, can be seen everywhere. Far above the capital stands one of the Shah's palaces, now a sort of museum where schoolchildren gaze in wonder at the cavernous rooms full of crystal and gold. In front of the palace, half of the great bronze statue of the former ruler can still be seen; the monument was severed at the waist during the revolution.

Despite the war, many Iranians enjoy themselves. In summer thousands flock to the Caspian Sea, and in winter the ski re-

from the Koran. The rest of the fare includes foreign-language classes, American science programs of 1950s vintage and news programs in Farsi, Arabic and English, a feature designed to spread Iranian views to the gulf states. The Iranians can even watch quiz shows; one favorite involves teams of players racing to complete a crossword puzzle. Live and televised soccer matches draw large audiences, which watch the four major teams that play regularly in the capital.


Yet the dreadful war never seems far away. With so many men off in the army, women are being given basic military training for civil defense. Apart from worries about loved ones at the front, there is the fear of a revival of the "war of the cities," which flared up again early this year when Tehran and other urban centers were bombed by Iraqi planes. Since then the attacks have abated, but the nervousness remains. When a severe thunder-and-lightning storm struck the capital last month, causing heavy flooding, some city dwellers thought an air raid was in progress and rushed to an underground passageway, where an unknown number drowned in the torrent.

Because so many of the war's victims are from the lower class, the impoverished southern section of Tehran has been particularly hard hit. Posters bearing photographs of the dead are prominently displayed outside many homes. Black cloths hang near the entrances to homes, and small shrines that are covered with mirrors are set beside the doors. "If you drive around the city after a large military operation, you see many of these shrines,"

says a Tehran resident. "They are all over the southern section. Posters of the dead form a sort of collage dedicated to martyrdom. Every so often, municipal workers come to remove the posters, but soon the walls are covered again. It has become so common that people hardly notice anymore."

Without doubt the war has given focus to the country and purpose to the revolution. But the disaffection, however great it may be at present, will grow inevitably as the interminable struggle continues. A recent business visitor to Tehran told a senior Iranian official bluntly, "I have spent three weeks talking to people here, and I haven't found a single one who is satisfied with the regime." Replied the official matter-of-factly: "God's satisfaction is what matters." —By William E. Smith.

Reported by Raji Samghabadi/New York and Adam Zagorin/Paris, with other bureaus



Images of power: selling portraits of the country's leaders in Tehran
Quiz shows and ski holidays, Koran readings and daily prayers.

sorts remain popular. Both beaches and slopes have separate zones for men and women, and there are always the Revolutionary Guards and their chador-clad female counterparts on hand to enforce proper Islamic behavior and maintain the segregation of the sexes. The cinemas, which are often jammed, feature both postrevolutionary Iranian fare and heavily censored foreign films. One recent hit was *Barabbas*, a 1962 picture starring Anthony Quinn. Another was the Iranian film *The Call of the Forest*, which dealt with the popular resistance to the Cossacks, a cavalry unit at one time led by the late Shah's father Reza Shah, who ruled Iran from 1925 to 1941.

Though television antennas sprout in even the smallest villages, the country has only two TV channels. Apart from morning shows for children, the broadcast day usually begins at 2 p.m. with readings

Coping with the Unfathomable

Patience, plus readiness, may be the best weapons against Tehran



"I think there's no point in trying to predict what the Iranians are going to do. We simply have a task to do, and we're going to go ahead and do it." So said Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, reflecting what was probably the Reagan Administration's dominant view of the challenge posed by Tehran. But even as the Administration was being assailed for the lack of foresight in its gulf policy, the Pentagon was thinking hard about what to do in the event of an Iranian attack on U.S. warships in the waterway. Beyond that, other questions loomed. How could immediate tensions in the region be eased? Above all, what can Western governments, and the U.S. in particular, do to cope with a radically unpredictable state like Iran?

The military questions alone threatened to be an enormously nuanced exercise. Some strategists have already been severely critical of the Administration for failing to hit back at Iran when the reflagged tanker *Bridgeton* struck a mine last month.

"We should have pulverized Farsi Island," fumed Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser. "All this power cringing in the area is a terrible embarrassment."

For its part, the Administration insists that its policy is to retaliate swiftly against attacks on the gulf convoy—once the aggressor has been accurately identified. Discussing the *Bridgeton* incident recently, for example, Weinberger asserted that it is impossible to know who laid the mine. "They don't leave fingerprints," said the Secretary curtly.

Other military experts, like Washington's Anthony Cordesman, consultant and author of the forthcoming book *The Iran-Iraq War: 1984-1987*, counsel more caution. Says Cordesman: "The key factor is to allow Iran to determine the level of escalation. The U.S. must not be perceived as escalating the conflict." U.S. military planners last week were hewing closely to Cordesman's line and planning for contingencies based on the nature of any foreseeable Iranian provocations. If Iran were to fire upon an American vessel with its Chinese-made Silkworm missiles, for example, the U.S. would most likely seek to destroy the missile sites. Bombers aboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S. *Constellation*, based just outside the gulf, could be

dispatched on short notice. The Silkworms, situated in isolated spots along the gulf and manned by small crews, could be taken out cleanly.

If Iran chose to escalate in other ways that could be directly traced to Tehran, such as overt mining of gulf waters or frontal attacks on the reflagged tankers, the Pentagon has a menu of additional options. One choice is retaliatory U.S. min-



Constellation can dispatch bombers to targets in the gulf on short notice

ing around the Iranian oil refinery at Kharg Island or around the major port of Bushehr, two crucial harbors for Iranian sea trade. If more aggressive U.S. strikes were needed, particularly in retaliation for direct attacks on the tankers, bombers from the *Constellation* could hit Iranian airfields and key petroleum-refining installations with ease.

Those are largely tactical considerations. At the strategic level of coping with the gulf crisis and with Iran, experts find far fewer cut-and-dried answers. One strongly held view, however, is that Washington must devise all its moves in the region in much closer concert with U.S. allies. "The incredible feature of the gulf at

the moment is how the U.S. is standing virtually alone, exposed," says Military Historian Edward Luttwak, author of *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*. As Luttwak sees it, "The whole lesson of history teaches the necessity of achieving consensus, at home and abroad, for such adventures." The U.S. could help form such a consensus by including its allies, particularly Western Europe, in the formation of a coherent

American policy. Once that was achieved, the U.S. could further bind its allies to its side by avoiding unilateral actions, such as its solitary decision to reflag Kuwait's tankers.

Many foreign policy analysts feel that if Washington wants to defuse Iranian radicalism, it needs to rethink its military options entirely. "If the American aim was to put a military presence in the gulf in order to deter Iranian action, it was an entirely misplaced decision," says Group Captain David Bolton, director of the British government-funded Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies in London. Rather than shows of force, Bolton counsels a gradual withdrawal of

U.S. warships from the area, "while quiet diplomacy U.S. allies seeks an international way out."

In diplomatic terms, such an effort may involve greater American recourse to that much maligned body the United Nations. The advantage of the U.N., explains Gary Sick, an Iran expert and former Middle East adviser to the Carter Administration, is that it allows other Arab nations to join publicly in an effort to moderate Iran's behavior. At the moment, many Arab states feel they cannot back the U.S. openly in any diplomatic enterprise because of Washington's strong support of Israel. The U.N., says Sick, at least offers a forum for low-profile and private discussion of the issue.

The Administration has already backed a U.N. Security Council resolution, passed in June, that called for a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war, an exchange of prisoners and peace negotiations. Tehran has so far refused to listen to the call. But that, says Sick, should discourage no one. He and most other experts agree that in dealing with fundamentalist radicalism, the most important weapons in the American arsenal are probably firmness and patience.

—By Jacob V. Lamar Jr.

Reported by Frank Melville/London and Bruce van Voorst/Washington



The Silkworm, a new Iranian weapon

The U.S. could take out the sites cleanly.

World

PAKISTAN

A Bad Case of Nuclear Friction

Zia rebuffs a U.S. effort to impose restraints on proliferation

For more than a decade Pakistan's determination to have the capacity to build nuclear bombs has strained relations with the U.S. That issue returned to the surface last week, threatening to undermine vital areas of cooperation between Washington and its most important strategic ally in South Asia. U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Michael Armacost arrived in Islamabad with a tough message: Pakistan must submit to on-site inspection of its burgeoning nuclear facilities or risk the suspension of a \$540 million military- and economic-aid package. The government of President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq firmly rejected the demand.

In public, at least, Armacost downplayed the dispute. He described the nuclear discussions as "very frank and, I believe, useful." Further talks, he said, would follow. But Pakistani Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan was more direct. He indignantly declared that acceding to any U.S. inspection demand would be "an affront to our self-respect and harmful to our national interests."

Armacost's trip was originally intended as a friendly call to discuss both U.S. aid, which is slated to total \$4.2 billion over a six-year period, and the war in neighboring Soviet-occupied Afghanistan. Refugee camps in Pakistan serve as bases of operations for 100,000 U.S.-supported *mujahedin* guerrilla fighters who are battling the Soviets. Pakistan is the main pipeline for the rebels' arms, including sophisticated Stinger and Blowpipe antiaircraft missiles.

The Zia government has paid a heavy price for its role in supporting Afghanistan's anti-Communist guerrillas. In recent months, Pakistani cities have been rocked by terrorist bomb attacks that authorities blame on Khad, the Afghan secret police. The worst occurrence left 75 dead and 300 injured in Karachi, Pakistan's largest city, and led to demonstrations for greater security.

In addition, Soviet and Afghan pilots have launched well over 100 bomb and rocket attacks on Pakistani soil since late last year, killing more than 300 people. Zia's government has issued an



The President at home: once again, the Bomb strains relations

"extremely urgent" request for U.S. radar surveillance aircraft to help ward off the intruders. The Reagan Administration looks favorably on the idea, though it still disagrees with Pakistan on the type of equipment to send.

That high-stakes cooperation is being seriously compromised by the nuclear issue. Last month, long after the schedule for Armacost's visit was completed, Arshad Pervez, a Pakistani native who holds Canadian citizenship, was arrested in Philadelphia and charged with trying to export to Pakistan 25 tons of a special steel alloy used in the enrichment of uranium for nuclear weapons. A federal grand jury has since indicted both Pervez and a resident of the Pakistani city of Lahore, retired Brigadier Inam ul-Haq, for conspiring to illegally export strategic materials. U.S. investigators suspect that the Pakistani government is behind the il-

licit scheme, a charge that Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan denied last week. To buttress that claim, Pakistani authorities have issued a warrant for Inam's arrest.

That may not assuage U.S. legislators who are certain that Pakistan seeks the Bomb to match India, which exploded a "peaceful nuclear device" in 1974. Looming in the background is a 1985 law requiring a cutoff of U.S. aid to any country that tries to illegally acquire American technology or supplies for nuclear bomb making. With his plea to Zia, Armacost was hoping to prevent that cutoff from being applied automatically. The inspection request was specifically aimed at Pakistan's top-secret facility at Kahuta, where most nuclear research is believed to take place.

Pakistan's rejection virtually guarantees that the nuclear issue will continue to fester, thereby threatening the entire range of U.S. interests in the

region. One effect of Washington's pressure so far has been to unite a normally vociferous opposition behind Zia's authoritarian government. Declared Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, president of the right-wing Jamiatul-Ulema-e-Pakistan Party: "Pakistan must not accept the U.S. pressure. It should continue its nuclear program even if that means cutting off all American aid."

The next move may lie with the U.S. Congress. Last week, in an article in the *Washington Post*, Claiborne Pell, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, denounced Pakistan for "breaking its commitments and flouting U.S. laws." Representative Dante Fascell of Florida, who heads the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has asked the Administration to suspend military portions of the aid package until Pakistan shows that it is not involved in illicit attempts to obtain nuclear materials. And an appropriations subcommittee has already voted to suspend a small portion of the aid. Many analysts believe congressional action will end there, since awareness among the law-makers of the larger geopolitical issues is likely to temper a more draconian response to Pakistan's less than cooperative rejoinder. But at the same time, the hope among U.S. officials is that Pakistan will come to grips with the necessity to calm legitimate fears in Washington that Pakistan's nuclear program might touch off a dangerous regional arms race.

—By Michael S. Serrill.
Reported by Mohammed Aftab/
Islamabad



Antiaircraft guns guard the Institute of Nuclear Science at Kahuta
A minister termed inspections "an affront to our self-respect."

ARABS IN CANADA

Moslem youth fight to keep faith despite TV, fast food

By ZUHAIR KASHMERI
Special to The Globe and Mail

WINDSOR — Black-haired Aicha Yamout, 15, of Windsor, was the rebel among the eight young people at the weekend Moslem conference.

Plump, with a friendly face and an outgoing manner, she posed questions often tended to shock.

Why should pork be haran (forbidden)? Why do cattle have to be slaughtered in a certain way for Moslems? Why can't Moslems be allowed to drink in moderation? Why can't Moslem girls be allowed to swim in public pools with strange men?

"Of course, I swim in public pools. You can always wear a T-shirt over your costume," she said when the Moslem boys present said they did not want their sisters in public pools.

The eight ranged in age from 15 to 25 and their attire and speech was typical of the new generation of Moslem Canadians. They were firm in their belief that there is but one God, and Mohammed is his Prophet, but unsure in other respects as to how they should blend their Islam with the 1980s of North America.

Seven came from Ontario and the other, 23-year-old Pardis Khavari, represented the Maritime Islamic Association. Miss Khavari, dressed in a modest black skirt, blouse and heeled shoes, came from Halifax, which has a Moslem community of about 200 closely knit families.

Sitting around a table in a University of Windsor cafeteria, a few feet away from the pool tables and pinball machines, the group talked about their understanding of Islam while their elders sat upstairs discussing how the youngsters should be educated.

The occasion was the seventh annual convention of the Council of Moslem Communities of Canada. In a workshop Professor Asad Husain, who teaches Islam in the department of politics at Northeastern University, was telling about 60 parents how the influence of North American television shows should be countered.

Around the table, Miss Yamout and her 16-year-old girl friend, Badia Booze of Windsor, thought it a good idea to date Moslem boys. Aicha watches Benny Hill, a British television comedian, many of whose jokes are woven around sexual themes. Miss Booze talked about the television series Dallas and how one of the characters had mistresses.

Ali Mahadeen, 15, of London, Ont., said his father does not object to him dating Moslem girls as long as he does not get serious with any of them.

They all attend mixed parties — provided they are Moslem mixed parties — barring a few exceptions in school. Tariq Shousher, 19, a Moslem of Lebanese origin from London, Ont., said Moslems often don't fit in at mixed parties. "You go to a mixed party and you're sitting in a corner while all the other kids are getting drunk or stoned."

Dietary laws regarding meat brought out diverse opinions. Like Jews, Moslems also have to eat meat slaughtered so that the blood is drained from the body. A prayer is said during the slaughter and the meat then becomes what the Moslems call halal meat.

"Do you all like McDonald's hamburgers?" "Oh, yeah," they replied unanimously except

for Miss Khavari.

"Well, McDonald's meat isn't halal."

"Isn't it?" asked Miss Booze.

"I haven't eaten halal meat in my life," said Mr. Mahadeen.

"I love McDonald's. It's not that we aren't devout Moslems, it's just convenience," said 17-year-old Mona Monsour of Windsor.

Canadian life a problem for Moslems

By ZUHAIR KASHMERI

Every two months, 26-year-old Sheeba Aziz of Toronto religiously buys a \$30 money order and sends it to a mosque in her native city of Hyderabad, India.

Mahmood Mohinuddin of Mississauga, an insurance company manager, sometimes looks at his little daughter and wonders whether he will be able to arrange her marriage 10 years from now.

Iftakhar Ali, a Toronto salesman, finds that some of his office time may be spent under mental stress, defending the actions of the Ayatollah Khomeini in a heated debate.

To Canadians, Mrs. Aziz's actions are understandable in light of collections in churches every Sunday. Trying to understand the actions of the other two will take more effort and, according to some, an understanding of a religion followed by one of every six persons in the world — Islam.

The aim of the three appears to be what Murray Hogbeg, an editorial writer for the Kingston Whig Standard who converted to Islam 22 years ago, described at a conference on Islam organized by the World Council on Religions for Peace on May 8 in Toronto, "Moslems across the world are struggling to apply their system of value to a very changed world."

It is to grapple with that problem that more than 300 Moslems, representing 45 Islamic groups from Halifax to Vancouver, will gather today at the University of Windsor for a two-

day conference organized by the Council of Muslim Communities of Canada. The theme is Islamic Education in Canada and representation is expected from several Moslem countries.

Chairman of the council is Dr. Ahmed Fuad Sahin, a Niagara Falls urologist who came to Canada from Edinburgh University about 20 years ago. Dr. Sahin, who is of Turkish origin, says in the chairman's message, "We need leaders with good knowledge and understanding of Islam, with true compassion for their fellow Moslems, with patience, endurance and courage . . . only such leaders could save Moslems from the humiliating state they are in today."

Dr. Sahin and his colleague in the council, Mohammad S. Qaadri, editor of a monthly publication, Islam Canada, have ambitious plans and have been trying to persuade oil-rich nations like Saudi Arabia to support the education of Moslem youths in Canada.

Dr. Sahin said in an interview at his clinic in Niagara Falls: "I was trying to convince the Saudi people that you cannot have peace by buying tanks and planes but by intelligent Moslems explaining Islam to the West."

Dr. Sahin reflects the views of several Moslems interviewed in the Toronto area when he says that one of the most pressing problems facing the Moslems of

Canada, numbering between 150,000 and 200,000, is giving Moslem youth enough Islamic education. But he is not one of those who will appeal to the secular school system to do at taxpayers' expense what he feels the Moslems in Canada and around the world can do themselves.

The council is grappling with two ideas. One is a high school in Toronto patterned after the more exclusive private schools but open to Moslems of all classes. A feasibility study under Mr. Qaadri has already been completed and a final feasibility study is to be completed soon.

The school has been tentatively termed Islam Canada College after the exclusive Upper Canada College where Mr. Qaadri's 16-year-old son Shafiq studies and is looked upon with "respect and amazement" when he sometimes uses the school corridor to say his afternoon Zohar prayers (Moslems are required to face Mecca five times a day and pray).

Another idea being explored by Dr. Sahin is enrolling young and intelligent Moslems with leadership potential into exclusive private schools under an arrangement that they be spared some school time for Islamic education. Dr. Sahin is hoping some of the oil-rich states will finance this venture.

Other Moslems from ordinary walks of life find little harm in sneaking a beer or a drink every now and then and attending mixed parties, both frowned upon very sternly by Dr. Sahin and Mr. Qaadri.

Several young Moslems appear to live the schizophrenic existence described in the recently aired controversial TV film, Death of a Princess. The condition also can be best understood from Mrs. Aziz's situation. Although she does not drink, she occasionally likes to visit a disco and dance.

Sometimes after a disco I feel I have done the wrong thing. I come home and I pray and ask Allah to forgive me," she said in an interview.

On the other hand, she prays the special Jumma or Friday prayer each week, fasts in the month of Ramadan, observes the other days of celebration by preparing special treats for her son, whom she supports by herself, and other friends and relatives.

She is not in favor of changing Islam to suit Western traditions. She says, "We'd rather have the guilt feelings and pray to God for forgiveness. If we take out those things from Islam, then there is nothing to ask Allah to forgive us for."

She wears the veil whenever she visits Hyderabad. Like Mr. Ali, she supports some of the things the Ayatollah is trying to do in Iran, although neither supports the hostage-taking.

But the Moslem community appears to be split down the middle on the Ayatollah. People such as Mr. Mohinuddin and Mohamad Mirza, who works for a firm of architects and plan-

ners, aren't in favor of the Ayatollah's actions.

Mr. Mirza says that in his opinion the Ayatollah is "a KGB agent playing into the hands of the Russians."

Although the three men and Mrs. Aziz will not be at the two-day conference, some of their concerns are the ones likely to be aired in the hallways outside the workshop and discussion rooms. Issues will include Islam's being immediately linked to the Palestine Liberation Organization, terrorism and Libya, according to Mr. Mohinuddin.

Moslems are worried of being immediately branded a narrow-minded bunch of bigots. They are also concerned that unless the community finds itself soon, their children will grow up with the same identity crisis they are facing in Canada.

Several young Moslems appear to live the schizophrenic existence described in the recently aired controversial TV film, Death of a Princess. The condition also can be best understood from Mrs. Aziz's situation. Although she does not drink, she occasionally likes to visit a disco and dance.

Sometimes after a disco I feel I have done the wrong thing. I come home and I pray and ask Allah to forgive me," she said in an interview.

On the other hand, she prays the special Jumma or Friday prayer each week, fasts in the month of Ramadan, observes the other days of celebration by preparing special treats for her son, whom she supports by herself, and other friends and relatives.

She is not in favor of changing Islam to suit Western traditions. She says, "We'd rather have the guilt feelings and pray to God for forgiveness. If we take out those things from Islam, then there is nothing to ask Allah to forgive us for."

She wears the veil whenever she visits Hyderabad. Like Mr. Ali, she supports some of the things the Ayatollah is trying to do in Iran, although neither supports the hostage-taking.

But the Moslem community appears to be split down the middle on the Ayatollah. People such as Mr. Mohinuddin and Mohamad Mirza, who works for a firm of architects and plan-

Several young Moslems appear to live the schizophrenic existence described in the recently aired controversial TV film, Death of a Princess. The condition also can be best understood from Mrs. Aziz's situation. Although she does not drink, she occasionally likes to visit a disco and dance.

Sometimes after a disco I feel I have done the wrong thing. I come home and I pray and ask Allah to forgive me," she said in an interview.

On the other hand, she prays the special Jumma or Friday prayer each week, fasts in the month of Ramadan, observes the other days of celebration by preparing special treats for her son, whom she supports by herself, and other friends and relatives.

She is not in favor of changing Islam to suit Western traditions. She says, "We'd rather have the guilt feelings and pray to God for forgiveness. If we take out those things from Islam, then there is nothing to ask Allah to forgive us for."

She wears the veil whenever she visits Hyderabad. Like Mr. Ali, she supports some of the things the Ayatollah is trying to do in Iran, although neither supports the hostage-taking.

But the Moslem community appears to be split down the middle on the Ayatollah. People such as Mr. Mohinuddin and Mohamad Mirza, who works for a firm of architects and plan-

ners, aren't in favor of the Ayatollah's actions.

Mr. Mirza says that in his opinion the Ayatollah is "a KGB agent playing into the hands of the Russians."

Although the three men and Mrs. Aziz will not be at the two-day conference, some of their concerns are the ones likely to be aired in the hallways outside the workshop and discussion rooms. Issues will include Islam's being immediately linked to the Palestine Liberation Organization, terrorism and Libya, according to Mr. Mohinuddin.

Moslems are worried of being immediately branded a narrow-minded bunch of bigots. They are also concerned that unless the community finds itself soon, their children will grow up with the same identity crisis they are facing in Canada.

Several young Moslems appear to live the schizophrenic existence described in the recently aired controversial TV film, Death of a Princess. The condition also can be best understood from Mrs. Aziz's situation. Although she does not drink, she occasionally likes to visit a disco and dance.

Sometimes after a disco I feel I have done the wrong thing. I come home and I pray and ask Allah to forgive me," she said in an interview.

On the other hand, she prays the special Jumma or Friday prayer each week, fasts in the month of Ramadan, observes the other days of celebration by preparing special treats for her son, whom she supports by herself, and other friends and relatives.

She is not in favor of changing Islam to suit Western traditions. She says, "We'd rather have the guilt feelings and pray to God for forgiveness. If we take out those things from Islam, then there is nothing to ask Allah to forgive us for."

She wears the veil whenever she visits Hyderabad. Like Mr. Ali, she supports some of the things the Ayatollah is trying to do in Iran, although neither supports the hostage-taking.

But the Moslem community appears to be split down the middle on the Ayatollah. People such as Mr. Mohinuddin and Mohamad Mirza, who works for a firm of architects and plan-

Tehran's great debate

A war of words, little noticed in the outside world, is under way in Iran, as ministers and mullahs debate the country's economic future. At the same time, as **Leila Hemmat** and **Philip Marfleet** report, a wave of strikes suggests a new mood of discontent among the Iranian workforce.

An intense and fascinating debate is taking place in Iran, which is likely to determine the shape of Iranian society for many years to come. The debate centres on the question of how to construct an "Islamic" economy. A host of key questions are being widely discussed. Should Muslims pay taxes? Should state-owned industries be privatised? What are the rights of the masses? Who, ultimately, owns Iran?

The pressures imposed by war and a faltering economy have brought these long-simmering arguments to a head. Presenting his budget last November, Prime Minister Mir Hussein Mousavi described the economy as "extremely dependent and vulnerable". In January, the government unofficially halted all imports except food and arms.

While pressure is said to have eased recently as the volume of oil exports has risen, Iran is now suffering from the effects of Opec's January price cuts, which oil ministry officials have described as "another deadly blow".

The government has warned that Iran cannot rely upon oil revenues. Mousavi maintains that oil – "at present Iran's only source of income" – should be used "only temporarily, while other sectors of the country's economy are being expanded".

He argues that economic expansion must be based upon increasing productivity, especially in industry, improving the distribution of goods and finding new sources of state revenue. But it is in just these fields that the government has faced serious obstacles and that differences among Iran's leaders on major political questions have re-emerged.

A series of bills aimed at rationalising key sectors of the economy have been held up by the Majlis (parliament) and the Council of Guardians, a 12-member body junior only to Ayatollah Khomeini. In December, Mousavi complained publicly about delays: "It is now two years since we sent up bills on taxation, land distribution, foreign trade, privatisation and the limits of the private sector," he said. "Nothing has been done about it."

Bills on taxation and the private sector have since made some progress in the Majlis, but may still be blocked by the

Council of Guardians. Increased government concern about the fate of its legislation has become apparent in a series of statements by senior ministers. There are four key issues.

● **Taxation.** There is a hint of desperation in the government's campaign to push through a new tax system. Mousavi has declared that the very existence of the Islamic Republic depends on the government's ability to raise revenue from non-oil sources. "If we do not extract taxes and always rely on oil revenue, we will always be under the thumb of imperialism," he has warned.


A special ministerial team investigating the tax system recently reported that only 30 per cent of taxes due since 1982 has been collected. Of this modest total, 59 per cent was extracted from wage earners, while "very little" came from owners of businesses and those holding land or other capital.

Hussein Namazi, the minister of economic affairs, has declared that the new bill will reduce the tax burden on the poor. The wealthy are to pay more and there are to be special taxes on land and property.


The bill has met stiff opposition. One Majlis member, Azari Ghomi, declared that "bureaucratic control of government over the economy is harmful to the Islamic Republic". Together with such prominent members as Tehran deputy Rabbani Amlashi, he has argued against general systems of taxation on the grounds that they are "un-Islamic". Ghomi believes that only *khoms* and *zakat* – Islamic dues which are paid to the mosque – are appropriate for an Islamic state.

Opposition to the bill in the Majlis reflects fear among leading conservative mullahs that a more efficient system of taxation will diminish revenue received by the mosques and weaken the religious establishment. Last year, Ayatollah Golpayagani protested that payments to the government were being seen as an alternative to the payment of Islamic dues.

Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the speaker in the Majlis, has agreed that these Islamic dues have their place, but has maintained that "our bill is more important". With rising exasperation he has asked, "Who has to pay tax? What should we do? Stop the war, the



Mousavi: No government help for big business



Montazeri: The private sector has the experts



Rafsanjani: Pay taxes or stop the war

FEATURES • Iran


But Mousavi has found it necessary to spell out that Khomeini's definition of "the oppressed" as "the people and the bazaar" does not mean that the government will support big businessmen.

The bulk of the private sector, including the bazaar, consists of "small investments", says Mousavi. These can safely be supported, but there can be no question of the government helping big private capital. Mousavi insists, "I, as a very, very small and humble servant, would like to announce that the government is not following such a policy."

For some ministers it is not necessary to take a firm line on the debate. The minister of Pasharan (revolutionary guards) Mohsen Rafiqdust commented, "If one day privatisation is good for society and Islam, we support it. If one day state ownership is better, we support that."

But other ministers believe the link between opposition to taxation and to industrial policy is not coincidental. For Nabavi, "those who argue against taxes are the same people who believe we should also privatise old pipelines and mines".

● **Trade.** Current disputes have been given an added edge by a series of allegations over



Behzad Nabavi: championing a strong policy for industry

corruption and the black market. Supporters of legislation seeking to control trade, which is dominated by the bazaar, believe the causes of shortages of basic foods and domestic goods lie in the self-seeking practices of some merchants.

In the summer of 1983 allegations that government officials had backed merchants trading unfairly in rice brought the resignation of Asgaraloudi, the minister of commerce. Today the merchants are being backed by important religious figures. Ayatollah Montazeri has not only called for the opening up of areas of trade that are

under government control, but has specified that the example of deregulating the rice trade should be followed in the area of "non-essential goods".

Montazeri believes the problem of the black market lies less in the bazaar than in the activities of officials. He recently observed, "So long as there is a gross anomaly between free-market prices and those fixed by the government, the problem that has unfortunately arisen through embezzlement by some corrupt and opportunistic individuals in various places and probably in some ministries and co-operative units [will continue and] naturally the ground will remain fertile for plundering, smuggling and bribery."

Montazeri argued that the problem is to be solved by reducing "superfluous expenditure and formalities in ministries and organs". He called for the reduction of government subsidies and praised "the Islamic habit of contentment".

● **Land.** The battles over taxation, industry and trade now join the battle over land as the key concerns in Iranian society. The land problem illustrates the fundamental difficulty facing the government. Eager to increase agricultural production and cut the country's huge import bill, it is anxious to settle claims to land resulting from expropriations which took place during the revolution. But its land reform bill has been blocked by the Council of Guardians for two years.

The council is seen by supporters of the government's "radicals" as representing landed interests bitterly opposed to reforms. One member of the council, Ayatollah Jannati, recently commented that deadlock over the bill was complete and that only "enforcement of Velayat-e Faqih [government by the leading cleric, i.e. Khomeini] can resolve the crisis".

It is believed that Khomeini is unwilling to intervene in major disputes over economic and political matters. His statement last year favouring the bazaar in the debate over the private sector was made only after all other efforts to reconcile competing interests had failed. But if he does intervene, last year's experience suggests that he will not favour reform.

Despite the fact that the government has looked increasingly stable over the past two years, many Iranians feel that it cannot afford continued delay in its current programme of reform.

Economic pressures are likely to continue, while food shortages in some areas and growing resentment at the level of black-market prices are creating added tensions. The evident exasperation of some ministers may reflect their anxiety that the government should be seen to offer some respite to the poorest of "the oppressed". □

over wages, workers marched to the city centre. After a clash with the Pasharan, shops, cinemas and banks were attacked.

● The most serious dispute occurred in December at the giant Isfahan steel plant. Ten thousand workers are reported to have gone on strike in protest over management's employment of casual labour. Opposition organisations claim that up to 10 workers were executed.

Rafsanjani maintained that oppositionists were aiming to "destroy managers' peace of mind... creating an atmosphere to force out hard-working and caring people". He also condemned unrest at the Sarcheshmesh copper complex.

Other reliable reports speak of strikes and riots in the north-eastern city of Mashad.

Such disruption comes at a bad time for the government, as it seeks to reinvigorate the industrial sector and to raise levels of production. Rafsanjani has blamed organisations like the left-wing Mujahidin-e Khalq, but it is clear that the scale of many disputes indicates a wider movement.

Leading figures such as Ayatollah Ardebili have already warned that pressures on Iranian workers and unemployed are reaching critical levels (see our October 1984 issue). Recent appeals from ministers that the burdens on the oppressed should be alleviated suggest that the level of discontent is now causing anxiety in ruling circles.



Despite the watchful gaze of the Imam, little moves on the production line

Tehran's great debate

A war of words, little noticed in the outside world, is under way in Iran, as ministers and mullahs debate the country's economic future. At the same time, as **Leila Hemmat** and **Philip Marfleet** report, a wave of strikes suggests a new mood of discontent among the Iranian workforce.

An intense and fascinating debate is taking place in Iran, which is likely to determine the shape of Iranian society for many years to come. The debate centres on the question of how to construct an "Islamic" economy. A host of key questions are being widely discussed. Should Muslims pay taxes? Should state-owned industries be privatised? What are the rights of the masses? Who, ultimately, owns Iran?

The pressures imposed by war and a faltering economy have brought these long-simmering arguments to a head. Presenting his budget last November, Prime Minister Mir Hussein Mousavi described the economy as "extremely dependent and vulnerable". In January, the government unofficially halted all imports except food and arms.

While pressure is said to have eased recently as the volume of oil exports has risen, Iran is now suffering from the effects of Opec's January price cuts, which oil ministry officials have described as "another deadly blow".

The government has warned that Iran cannot rely upon oil revenues. Mousavi maintains that oil – "at present Iran's only source of income" – should be used "only temporarily, while other sectors of the country's economy are being expanded".

He argues that economic expansion must be based upon increasing productivity, especially in industry, improving the distribution of goods and finding new sources of state revenue. But it is in just these fields that the government has faced serious obstacles and that differences among Iran's leaders on major political questions have re-emerged.

A series of bills aimed at rationalising key sectors of the economy have been held up by the Majlis (parliament) and the Council of Guardians, a 12-member body junior only to Ayatollah Khomeini. In December, Mousavi complained publicly about delays: "It is now two years since we sent up bills on taxation, land distribution, foreign trade, privatisation and the limits of the private sector," he said. "Nothing has been done about it."

Bills on taxation and the private sector have since made some progress in the Majlis, but may still be blocked by the

Council of Guardians. Increased government concern about the fate of its legislation has become apparent in a series of statements by senior ministers. There are four key issues.

● **Taxation.** There is a hint of desperation in the government's campaign to push through a new tax system. Mousavi has declared that the very existence of the Islamic Republic depends on the government's ability to raise revenue from non-oil sources. "If we do not extract taxes and always rely on oil revenue, we will always be under the thumb of imperialism," he has warned.


A special ministerial team investigating the tax system recently reported that only 30 per cent of taxes due since 1982 has been collected. Of this modest total, 59 per cent was extracted from wage earners, while "very little" came from owners of businesses and those holding land or other capital.

Hussein Namazi, the minister of economic affairs, has declared that the new bill will reduce the tax burden on the poor. The wealthy are to pay more and there are to be special taxes on land and property.


The bill has met stiff opposition. One Majlis member, Azari Ghomi, declared that "bureaucratic control of government over the economy is harmful to the Islamic Republic". Together with such prominent members as Tehran deputy Rabbani Amlashi, he has argued against general systems of taxation on the grounds that they are "un-Islamic". Ghomi believes that only *khoms* and *zakat* – Islamic dues which are paid to the mosque – are appropriate for an Islamic state.

Opposition to the bill in the Majlis reflects fear among leading conservative mullahs that a more efficient system of taxation will diminish revenue received by the mosques and weaken the religious establishment. Last year, Ayatollah Golpayagani protested that payments to the government were being seen as an alternative to the payment of Islamic dues.

Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the speaker in the Majlis, has agreed that these Islamic dues have their place, but has maintained that "our bill is more important". With rising exasperation he has asked, "Who has to pay tax? What should we do? Stop the war, the



Mousavi: No government help for big business



Montazeri: The private sector has the experts



Rafsanjani: Pay taxes or stop the war

Toronto Star
January 3, 1987
P. B6

IRAN

"pragmatic" positions on all three questions, but few identifiable "revolutionaries" or "pragmatists."

The war with Iraq is the centrepiece of all political policy in Iran. It sustains the regime and the symbolism of the revolution; but it is also drawing away the lifeblood of the nation.

The war governs all mundane aspects of life. One cannot do anything — marry, open a bank account, or buy milk — without discharge papers showing that eligible males in the family have fought in the war. Avoiding conscription is virtually impossible. The government uses the war as the excuse of first resort for its every shortcoming and the justification for every excess.

No matter what they were told by "moderates" in Tehran, White House officials' hopes that Iran's leaders will somehow negotiate a settlement to the war are totally unrealistic. The symbolic power of the Islamic Republic is based on Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's basic doctrine of non-compromise with those things deemed evil and corrupt.

The revolution ousting the Shah was a studied exercise in non-compromise, as was the U.S. hostage-taking and the ouster of former president Abolhassan Bani-Sadr. In each case, the clerics gained power and public respect by their hard-line stance.

Symbolic demand

The non-negotiable demand in the war with Iraq is the ouster of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Iran will end the war when he is removed from the scene. No amount of cash will substitute for his head, for it is a symbolic demand. Hussein is a demonic presence in the cosmology of the Islamic Republic, and to allow him to remain would shake its foundations to the core.

Theoretically, time is on Iran's side in the war. Iran has three times the population of Iraq. And it is able to limp along without massive financial help from abroad. In a border war fought in difficult terrain, where heavy military equipment takes a back seat to sheer manpower, the Iranians would simply be able to outlast the Iraqis in the long run.

By William Beeman Special to The Star
WASHINGTON — When people first enter the bazaars of Iran they are charmed and awed by the labyrinthine confusion and by the congeniality of the merchants. But after spending a seemingly pleasant time buying trinkets, they may find to their surprise that they are lost, their money has been stolen, and what they thought was gold and turquoise is brass and blue plastic.

Iranian politics is something like Iranian bazaars — pleasant for a time, but dangerous for the naive. Americans and especially the White House now know what it is like to be snookered by the merchants of Tehran.

The clerical leaders of Iran care very little what the United States or the rest of the world thinks of them. They may be pleasant and sympathetic to outsiders, telling them exactly what they want to hear, but they are concerned first and foremost with solving their own domestic problems and making sure they are not stabbed in the back by their colleagues.

Three raging debates lie at the core of Iran's domestic political life. No one should try to enter Iran's political arena without a full awareness of them. They are: The conduct of the war with Iraq; the management of the domestic economy; the implementation of social and economic reform.

The split over these issues is so complete that it reaches to the core of the nation's leadership. Other issues, such as supporting the revolution, are now far less important than in the early days of the revolution.

The centrepiece

The principal leaders' positions vary from issue to issue. And the issues are difficult to resolve since entirely contradictory approaches are fully defensible from the standpoint of Islamic law. Outsiders can recognize opposing poles of opinion. But it is not so easy to discover any political factions espousing consistent philosophies. There are "revolutionary" and

But the war has gone on too long. Iranian casualties are likely over 250,000 by now; there is not a family in the nation that has not lost a young man. The population is growing weary. There have even been small, public anti-war protests.

There has been serious dissension between the regular army and two non-professional fighting groups over the war's conduct, particularly in the past year. The two groups are the "Pasdaran" (Revolutionary Guard) and the "Basij-e Mostazafin" (Mobilization of the Deprived).

The regular army, making up half of the fighting troops, is distrusted by the clerics, but they cannot dispense with it. The Pasdaran and the Basij are loyal to the principles of the Islamic Republic, and have been effective in quick-strike offensive operations. They tend to leave holding operations to the regular army. Lack of co-ordination between the two groups has been particularly acute in the past year.

Last February, Iran had a major victory in capturing the Faw Peninsula from Iraq. In August, it recaptured the city of Mehran. Since then, Iranian military efforts have flagged. Fighting between the Pasdaran and army broke out in several places in August and September. Each blamed the other for lack of progress during the fall, when Iran hoped to mount a long-vaulted "final offensive."

In addition, Iraq has worked ceaselessly to draw the war into the Persian Gulf, where it would have a massive strategic advantage in air power. Iraq has over 500 fighter jets, almost eight times as many as Iran. Iraq's basic strategy has been to bomb Iranian oil facilities in hopes of destroying its sole source of foreign currency.

In the early years of the war, Iraq aimed air strikes at the principal Iranian oil export terminal, Kharg Island. This was not very effective, but recently, they have bombed oil-pumping facilities and Iran has been forced to make drastic cuts in its oil production.

No one in the Iranian leadership favors a negotiated settlement of the war, but there are two distinct positions regarding its conduct. The "revolutionary" one views the war as a sacred crusade pitting Iranians against the demons of the world,

Iranian politics as devious as the old bazaar

including Saddam Hussein, the U.S., and the Soviets. This view favors supporting terrorism and "Islamic revolution" everywhere it occurs, and opposes anything seeming to involve compromise.

The "pragmatic" position sees Iraq as a military enemy and seeks to end the war expediently, without a Pyrrhic victory. People holding this view are likely to favor any measures to procure a military victory, including dealing with the United States, Israel and Europe.

The war costs Iran about \$14 billion a year. Oil revenues, virtually the only source of foreign income, were \$14.7 billion last year and are estimated at \$6 billion in 1986. With 1985 foreign-currency reserves at \$5 billion, it is clear Iran is in serious economic trouble.

All basic goods in the country are severely rationed at official prices — five times the free-market cost. A pound of meat costs about \$15. Even so, food subsidies cost the government some \$1 million a day. Inflation has been about 20 per cent in past years. The government claims it has been reduced, but residents deny any relief. Government workers, pensioners, and the urban poor suffer most, because of their low, fixed incomes.

The population, 48 million, is also increasing at 3.5 per cent a year, partly due to incentives given to mothers to bear children "for the revolution."

The people providing the greatest support for the Khomeini regime — the urban poor — are losing patience with the revolution, since their lot has hardly improved since the Shah.

On Nov. 9 in a south-Tehran area with irregular water supply, low-income residents protested the lack of drinking

water. Government officials were shocked to hear slogans praising the Shah's regime. On Oct. 2, taxi drivers protested gasoline rationing by picketing and burning their cabs on the street.

The "revolutionary" position on the economy blames profiteering and free enterprise for Iran's economic woes. Economic reform would consist of nationalizing all industry and food production. The "pragmatic" position says Iran suffers from nonintegration with the world economy. This position would maintain the private sector and try to expand international trade.

One of the most important goals of the revolution was to correct the massive social inequities of the Shah regime. A serious attempt was made to improve conditions for farmers, villagers, and the urban poor. This could not be done without forcible appropriation of the property holdings of the rich.

Serious tension

Such actions created serious political and religious tensions between those advocating social revolution at those espousing Islamic values sanctifying private property.

The problem is exemplified in the difficulties — so far unresolved — which arose over land reform. A large cosmetic land reform had been attempted under the Shah, but absentee landlords were still a dominant force in rural areas. The new land reform was designed to seize any remaining large agricultural holdings, and to distribute them to village agriculturalists. The policy began to be applied in April, 1980. Over 2,000 land transfer com-

182

Toronto Star
January 3, 1987
P.B6

IRAN

mittees established locally began to redistribute land with extraordinary ruthlessness.

Landowners immediately began to organize and to lobby politicians and theologians. Eventually a number of the most senior Islamic jurists (many landholders themselves) began to condemn the law, saying it was anti-Islamic, amounting to an illegal appropriation of private property.

The end result was that only 35,450 acres of agricultural land was actually distributed; rural life was disrupted and agricultural production was seriously impaired. Agriculturists, far from being encouraged to stay on the land, abandoned the villages en masse and moved to the already overcrowded urban areas.

☐ William Beeman is associate professor of anthropology at Brown University. He lived and worked for nearly 10 years in Iran and is the author of *Language, Status and Power in Iran*.

Global Mail
August 18, 1986
P.A.7

BY HELEN KAFI

L'Express
Helen Kafi, a freelance journalist, recently revisited her native Iran after an absence of eight years.

TEHRAN

WE LIVE in a perpetual phantasmagoria," Firouz explained quietly. "Iran is a huge insane asylum, a series of macabre carnivals, sordid plays and a very particular type of comedy of the absurd. Our lives are full of madness and frenzy."

Firouz is a curious fellow — half-serious, half-joking. For three years he has been working on a study of mores in the Iranian revolution. He has collected hundreds of popular stories, jokes from the bazaar, witticisms whispered only among friends. He has copied down the wall slogans, the anonymous graffiti. Together they constitute an exceptional portrait of the neuroses of one of the world's most oppressed people, a faithful reproduction of Persian humor — mostly of the black variety these days.

Firouz has his ways of refusing to conform to the rigid laws of Iran's mullahs, and he is not alone. In the face of terrible repression, people pretend to follow the anachronistic directives of the Islamic republic. But the disillusion is there. Subversive voices are heard, albeit quietly. Among family, friends and classmates, tiny groups of resistance form, clandestine networks that thumb their noses at the "divine laws."

The walls have ears, but also mouths. Every available space is covered with huge portraits of the nation's leaders, martyrs of the revolution and Islamic slogans. Despite the omnipresent "people's militia," hastily scrawled graffiti denounce the mullahs' regime. Special patrols equipped with paint buckets undo the work of the "counter-revolutionaries."

"Akbar, an unemployed 20-year-old, was sentenced to 15 years in prison for turning a portrait of President Ali Khamenei into that of a bloody vampire," says Firouz. But despite this tough approach, the authorities have been unable to dismantle the clandestine groups that skillful-

IRAN

ly organize the secret activities of thousands of people. The state's apparatus of coercion, with its various intelligence services, its morals committees, its special sections of revolutionary guards, focuses on fighting the armed counter-revolution, uncovering plots that weaken the regime and accentuate the cleavages at the heart of the leadership.

According to Firouz, "the important thing is to keep from playing politics." If one avoids that sometimes mortal sin, all sorts of deviations from the Imam's line are possible — for a price. Corruption has always been an accepted part of Iranian life; militant Islam has not changed that. A vast system of bribes, payoffs and illicit trade exists, reaching into the highest circles.

To dramatize its symbolic resistance to corruption and to keep revolutionary fever at a high pitch, the authorities periodically mount spectacular operations. On occasions such as Moslem unity week or voluntary-service day, squads of revolutionary militia charge through the streets. There are arbitrary arrests, public executions, identity checks and absurd spectacles of humiliation, often directed against women.

Stores that deal in black-market transactions — accounting for 95 per cent of total trade by some estimates — are closed by security forces and their products confiscated. "A few weeks ago, during the Feast of the Prophet, I was stopped 12 times by the militia," a taxi driver reported. "It took me seven hours instead of the usual two to cross from the north to the east of the capital. Everything was searched: my trunk, my glove compartment, my passengers' purses. Luckily they didn't find my music cassettes or I would have lost my licence."

The gap between north Tehran, with its chic neighborhoods and magnificent villas, and the south, a huge area of sordid shacks, has widened in the past seven years. North Tehran is lined with shops full of foreign luxury items hidden from the view of passers-by. In a dozen or so opulent villas well-known in Tehran's more fashionable circles, clandestine activities, both commercial and cultural, continue unfazed by the revolution.

To avoid official trouble there is one golden rule: if you don't have friends in high places, don't forget to pay the necessary bribes. Said one fellow from Chemi-ran: "To enforce the Khomeini doctrine,

according to which beauty, sensuality and 'joie de vivre' are considered mortal sins. An example? In the spring, 11 bombs went off in Tehran and its suburbs, they tell us. The media reported only two attacks, and then only because the damage was so bad it could not be covered up.

The club authenticates all this information and files it away secretly. It has an impressive collection of photos, all stamped by the Information Ministry but never officially released. They were bought from workers in the ministry, often at high prices, and are being collected with the intention of putting them on display in what club members hope is the not-too-distant future. "We know that some day," said a former political science professor at the University of Tehran, "these pictures will serve the cause we defend."

Members of the club maintain that their activities are not political, saying that they are working on a "contemporary history of Iran." But the work they do and the bribes they pay must cost dearly. Who finances them? Curiously, it is a woman, the sister of the Ayatollah Godoussi (the former prosecutor-general of the Islamic courts who was killed in an attack in 1981). Thanks to a network of "hajji" — those who have made the pilgrimage to Mecca and are exempt from importation taxes — and are exempt from importation taxes — and of influential traders in the bazaar, she reigns over the highly profitable black market in electronic goods.

The club provides many services. It has a complete guide to "forbidden Tehran," a list of coded phone numbers and secret passwords. It contains no addresses. "Alcohol, drugs, girls, subversive literature, anything that is forbidden can be delivered to you at home," one member says. But, more important, there is a list of about 10 confidential phone numbers that will help open doors at the highest levels.

The numbers are those of leading dignitaries in the regime, of top mullahs or of people like Ahmed Khomeini or Sadeq Tabatabai (respectively, the son and son-in-law of Ayatollah Khomeini), citizens above ideological suspicion but who club members say are highly corrupt. Through their intervention, they say, one can ob-

tain a passport and exit visa, the lease of a shop, even the liberation of a prisoner. All this, of course, is expensive, paid for in hard currency through a foreign bank. The cost of freeing a prisoner, for example, is between \$30,000 and \$40,000.

The Iran of the privileged is not limited to the exclusive residence of the "R" family, perched on the heights of Chemi-ran. In this same chic suburb, one finds bourgeois schools, aerobics classes, courses in painting and foreign languages, and so on.

The great silent majority of Iranians, meanwhile, continues to live amid great suffering. In the slums, the war with Iraq is a constant presence. It has claimed more than a million victims, leaving hundreds of thousands with handicaps or without homes. Unofficially, it has swollen the ranks of the unemployed from three million to six million. The poorest of the poor, chased out of government housing, have found shelter in disused factories or in southern Tehran. Apartments are filthy, without water or electricity. Survival is a matter of imagination, and there is a constant street trade in used clothing, junk metal, gas tanks and cigarettes, with prices usually a matter of a few cents. Beggars and children in rags harass passers-by. Drug use has also become a serious problem.

The Foundation of Martyrs, created at the beginning of the war in 1980 to aid the families of war victims, is paralyzed by a lack of funds and increasing pressure from above to serve as a propaganda vehicle. At its employment office, long lines of women wait, mostly in vain. The war widows, between 16 and 40 years old, are often bluntly advised to marry a "janbaz," a handicapped war veteran. Those who do so receive substantial state aid as "models of the Moslem woman."

At the foundation's office of public assistance, a child is the object of a violent tug-of-war between its mother and grandmother. The elder woman denounces her daughter-in-law as an adulteress and demands custody of the child. A somber mullah agrees and the younger woman is

An inside look at Iran: bribes and growing hatred

182

Gholamreza
August 18, 1986
P.A.F. IRAN

sent to prison to be judged by a revolutionary tribunal.

Thus it is that the poor suffer both from social injustice and from the terrifying application of Islamic justice. It is among the poor that women are stoned without trial, that small-time drug dealers are executed, that young delinquents are punished on the basis of an eye for an eye.

The Foundation of Martyrs is everywhere. Its stores burst with articles almost impossible to find elsewhere and they are sold at ridiculously low prices. But not everyone can use them. For example, to buy a package of candy, at one-tenth the usual price, one must have children. And only those handicapped war veterans suffering from spinal injuries are allowed to buy refrigerators, vacuum cleaners or stoves.

The Foundation of the Underprivileged, which, in theory, tries to improve the lives of the poorest, is the leading economic trust in the country. It oversees 200 industrial enterprises, 15,000 housing units, 50 mines, slaughterhouses and much more. Its budget is secret, its director is named by Ayatollah Khomeini and is answerable only to him.

The foundation's true activities, however, are reported to be the exporting of revolution. Its budget goes to the active support of several liberation movements and it has helped organize terrorist training camps.

Privilege and misery. Never has the face of the revolution appeared so sombre. The country's failing economy has put its leaders on the defensive as popular resentment grows. Taxpayers are crushed by the weight of payments required to finance the war.

Totalitarian, isolated, the regime is loathed by the people, violently criticized by the internal opposition and some members of the Shiite clergy. "The Islamic republic," said a religious authority in Isfahan, "is a ticking bomb. When the Imam dies, Iran will see the hideous face of civil war." Has the countdown already begun?

Pivot for fanaticism

By GEORGIE ANNE GEYER

(First of three)

For the last 12 months, a 79-year-old, bearded, black-robed caricature of a carnival swami has dominated world events, making the most powerful nations jump at his whim.

The ailing old leader, now bathed in blood, lit from inside with an eerie and abiding flame and fired with an Old Testament self-righteousness, is the Ayatollah Khomeini.

Who is he? Where did this figure so alien to the time and space we know come from? How did he get where he is? What formed the man who can hold the U.S. to ransom for lives and the world to ransom for oil?

Physically, he is like an avenging angel from the Old Testament. An enormous, bulky man, bundled always in black robes and the circular black turban that looks like a reverse halo from a black mass, he moves with youth and grace and the lightness of a spectre.

When I called on him last winter, for instance, he sat with me and now-deposed Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi, who was then certain that heaven itself was at hand, and stared beyond us, as if he were seeing some vision unseen by us. In retrospect ... he was.

He is also a true man of detachment. When his infant daughter drowned 35 years ago and his wife was grieving her heart out, Khomeini only prayed quietly over the body, showing no emotion for his adored youngest child. "God gave me the child, and now he has taken her back," his friends quote him as saying. That's detachment.

Yet, when I sat with him — and studied him afterwards — the "detachment syndrome" simply did not satisfy me. Was he not, instead, one of those men whose surface "detachment" was hiding his inner passions and even rage? I now think that.

Indeed, his whole life, which appears so one of a piece, turns out under closer examination to be far more mysterious and contradictory.

□ He was born May 17, 1900, in the town of Khomein (from which he takes his name) and they say his hatred for the Shah's "line" emerged from his father's murder, supposedly at the hand of the Shah's father, Reza Shah. Yet, history shows that his mother, Hajar Saghafi, herself testified at the trial of the murderer, who was just another landlord with whom he had had a fight over irrigation water.

□ After becoming an Islamic sage and holy man, Khomeini lectured at the Madresseh Faizieh on ethics and political science. He told his students not only that the clergy must involve themselves in politics to help those who were hungry and oppressed but that the students show research and curiosity. Then, he urged his students to stand up to him; today, anyone who does is fixed with the evil eye, and soon eliminated.

□ Throughout his life, from his early days as an Islamic student to his exile by the Shah in 1963 to Turkey and Iraq, he has stood fervently for the independence of Iran from the materialism of the Marxist East and the Shah's much-wooed West. In particular, he has urged his fanatical followers to eschew the technology of the "satanic, evil, debased, degraded" industrialized world.

When I visited him, Khomeini received people in a grave, trance-like state, sitting on a Persian rug and crouched like a lion momentarily calmed before leaping at his prey. He seemed the very quintessence of a return to the past, saying that he and his followers would soon take a space trip 1,700

years back to the perfect period of the 30 years after the Prophet Mohammed came to power in Arabia.

But in adjoining rooms, I might as well have been walking through preparations for a moon shot. The walls were lined with electronic equipment. Recorders, tapes, cassettes, telephone listening devices: Name anything American or German or Japanese devils made, and there it was.

As Ibrahim Yazdi, then his top aide and major contact with the Western press, explained to me, "When the Ayatollah wants to speak to Iran, we make 12 recordings of his message. Then it is put on the phone of Iran, where it is re-recorded. There, cassettes are made and carried by boys on Hondas to different parts of Iran, where they are replayed to millions."

If the Ayatollah Khomeini were, as Andrew Young once so blithely stated, a "saint," he was a saint without the slightest hesitancy about using the devil's tools.

Khomeini is explainable in four basic terms: Religion, blood, vengeance and too-rapid development.

His religion is his entire life; the very particularist Shia religion of Iran and that particularly fervent religiosity and militance of central Asia, where history's armies have marched and pillaged back and forth for centuries of religious war.

It is a faith that is intimately tied up with blood — the presence of it, the letting of it, the sacrifice of it. It is the Shi-ites who, every year during the "holy" month of Moharram in Iraq and in Iran, run in frenzied mobs down the streets, flagellating themselves with whips until streets quite literally run with blood.

The ancient Islamic idea that Moslems who die in battle for Islam will go directly to heaven — a very palpable heaven where they will be waited upon by nubile maidens and served hashish — was brought to frightening life in the last weeks at the embassy gates.

Other Middle Eastern statesmen will tell you the major motivating force of Khomeini lies in another ancient but more simple force — vengeance. Khomeini's eyes are, more than anything, vengeful. He believes his father was killed by the Shah's father; he believes his son, Mostafa, 49, was killed by the Shah's agents in Iraq in 1977. Indeed, after this event, he wrote his crucial document of the revolution, declaring: "It is the responsibility of the Iranian army and its heads to liberate their country from destruction."

The Shah pushed hard. Not only were his methods brutal and not only did he not give political power to the people he was educating, he created a system of development that created deep and intense uncertainty. Pilots were illiterate boys taken from the villages and taught to read only the pilot's manuals ... in English! But perhaps his greatest mistake was in cutting off theological schools from upward mobility in Iranian society.

In his attempts to destroy what he considered the retrogressive theology and secular influence of the ayatollahs and the mullahs (the lower priests), the Shah deliberately isolated the 50,000 students in the old theological schools. Their degrees were not accepted by the Shah's Iran, not for higher degrees elsewhere and not for jobs in government. So what the Shah did was to isolate behind him a hostile, well-organized group of the religious, given to fanaticism at best and to martyrdom at worst. The inner circle of these were Khomeini's students.

(over)

cont⁴ooo

Thus, when the fall and winter of Iran's discontent arrived in 1978 and 1979, all dissent fell back on the only counter-network of power and politics still in existence: The network of theological schools, mosques and religious organizations on the streets and in the bazaars. It was a network ready-made for the return of the Ayatollah Khomeini with his ancient faith and his Sony recorders.

Before he returned to his land, the Ayatollah made himself "Iran." He became the synthesis and the symbol of the nation, something men can only do from the distance that enchants. And for a long time after his return — again by keeping a certain distance from the people and by always keeping himself shrouded behind the sinister eyes and the ragged white beard and the unmoving lips — Khomeini remained "Iran."

Many, of course, dismiss him as simply "mad" or "demented." Certainly, the heaving, throbbing masses in the streets of Tehran, answering only to the Ayatollah's carefully recorded words, represent a mass hysteria, the ultimate fanaticism, the final glove slapped in the face of liberal, rational, Western Renaissance beliefs.

Meanwhile, the Ayatollah sits in his simple, whitewashed house in the "holy city" of Qom, unconcerned with what the rest of the world thinks. He lives in a world of nightmares, where he must be always aware of "devilish scheming" and "crimes against God." His dreams are of a perfect world where God's word will be Caesar's word and he, the philosopher-king. He intends creating a "Party of God."

President going too far in curbing role of state, Khomeini says in letter

Associated Press

NICOSIA

Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini has accused his country's President, Ali Khamenei, of trying to go too far in limiting the power of the Islamic Government.

The rare personal attack was contained in a letter from the ayatollah, published yesterday in Tehran, the official Islamic Republic News Agency said in a report monitored in Cyprus.


Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Speaker in the Majlis (parliament) and a key contender for power in a post-Khomeini Iran, welcomed the letter. He berated anyone who might deviate from the line set by Ayatollah Khomeini.

The developments appear to signal a stepped-up struggle over who will be the religious head of Iran after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, who is said to be ailing.

In his letter, the ayatollah criticized views he said the President had expressed during a sermon last Friday on the role of government in an Islamic society.

The letter's argument was couched in religious terms, but the strength of language was unusual, as was the fact that it was directed at a known individual, Mr. Khamenei. "Your observations during the Friday prayers apparently purports that you do not recognize the Government as an institution ordained by the Almighty and founded with absolute power entrusted to the prophet," Ayatollah Khomeini wrote.

"Your conclusion on the proposition based on my earlier statement that the 'Government exercises power only within the bounds of the divine statutes' is a



Ali Khamenei

misquote and a misinterpretation."

IRNA's dispatch did not give a full explanation of the ayatollah's views on the limits of government power, but portions of the letter quoted by Tehran Radio did give several examples of what powers he thought the Government should legitimately exercise.

"Our Government . . . has priority over all other Islamic tenets, even over prayer, fasting and the pilgrimage to Mecca," he was quoted as writing.

Under Shia Islam, the Koran's Islamic code can be reinterpreted to adapt to changing social and economic conditions.

The process of interpretation is bounded by various religious stipulations, but the final word at any one time comes from the religious leader (Imam) of the day, in this case Ayatollah Khomeini.

C. M. Jan 8, 88

Iranian leader changes views after rebuke by Khomeini

MANAMA, Bahrain (DPA) — Iranian President Ali Khamenei hailed the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini on the weekend as a "vigilant and decisive force" just days after the ayatollah had publicly rebuked him.

The president's remarks came Saturday, a day of political manoeuvring in Tehran that, to the surprise of many observers, saw:

- The ayatollah's hand-picked disciple, the Ayatollah Montazeri, appear to come out obliquely against his benefactor's views on Islamic government, and;

- Powerful Interior Minister Hajatoleslam Ali Akbar Mohatahshami speak out in favor of lifting a ban on political parties in Iran.

The developments came as a surprise in a political controversy stirred by Khomeini's criticism of Khamenei last week over what he saw as the president's attempt to give parliament the upper hand over the executive branch of government.

Publicly recanted

Parliamentary Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani was the first to express his whole-hearted support to Khomeini, the nation's spiritual leader. The president himself followed suit by publicly recanting Saturday at the holy city of Qom.

"Our unique and incomparable leader (Imam Khomeini) was the vigilant and decisive force of the Islamic Revolution who showed the people the way to the peak," the official Iranian news agency IRNA quoted Khamenei as saying.

Montazeri, who has his headquarters in Qom, was quoted by IRNA as urging the 12-member Council of Guardians to be "strong" in the face of attempts by some unidentified organs to tailor the application of laws to their tastes.

The council, headed by the Ayatollah Reda Mahdavi-Kani, oversees parliament.

Excerpts of Imam Khomeini's Speech in Connection with the Unity of the Theological Centers and the Universities

*In the Name of God, the Merciful,
the Compassionate*

The university is the center of prosperity and against the wretchedness of a nation.

It is from the universities that the destiny of a nation should be determined. Good universities make a nation prosperous while bad, un-Islamic universities push it backward.

The most heinous crimes committed by the former regime were perhaps that they did not allow the universities to function properly.

What is important in Islam are spiritual matters and not material matters. It is spiritual matters which are important in Islam and they must be spread among all strata through the universities,

that is both your universities and the universities of the clergy [the theological centers.] These universities should be centers for training human beings, both your universities and the universities of the clergy. The prophets (ﷺ) [too] were charged with this [training.]

All the holy books were sent down in order to train humans. Should good human beings emerge, everything would change into spirituality, that is, even material matters would be in the form of

spirituality.

On the contrary if some satanic strata and [consequently] deviated human beings came from your universities, even the spirituality would turn into materialism. It would be lost in materialism.

What the messengers wanted was to relate all matters to Divine Inspiration. The messengers came to make divine all dimensions of the universe and all dimensions of the human being who epitomizes the universe and is the essence of the universe, that is, to make a human being who is the epitome and essence of the universe, divine so that whatever he does would be according to divine nature. The university is the origin for all changes. From universities, both those of the old [classical] sciences and those of the modern sciences, the prosperity and the wretchedness of a nation originate. The universities must be taken seriously. Rectify the universities! Make them Islamic! Our nation has endeavored for Islam and should endeavor for Islam and it does; it must be Islamic in every aspect.

You scholars! Endeavor to make human beings! Should you make human beings you will save your country. If you make committed human beings, honest, believers in the other world and in God, faithful to God; if such human beings are trained in your and our universities, they will save our country. Therefore, the job is a noble one and the responsibility is very great. Today this responsibility is

would be responsible within your limits but now you are charged with the responsibility of a nation, of a country and [furthermore] you are responsible for Islam.

Before God we are all responsible today. We must all endeavor, universities should endeavor, the theological universities should endeavor, your academic universities should endeavor to make true human beings. You all follow this goal! If you train a scientist or a physician, even if he is the best in the world, as long as he does not possess a humanistic nature he is harmful. When this same physician treats somebody, he concentrates on how much money he can get out of it. He is not bothered with the treatment itself, he only thinks about the money he can make of it.

The problem is that of a humanistic and divine treatment. A physician can either administer divine treatment or satanic and taghuti treatment, the latter being that he would concentrate on how much money he could make out of a treatment.

People look up to the clergy. They pay attention to them. They pay attention to the honorable Prophet (ﷺ). This is because they [the clergy] are representatives of the honorable Prophet and the Imam of the Age (ع).

Should, God forbid, some wrong acts be committed by the clergy who are the representatives of the authorities of God and the Messenger of God (ﷺ), then they [these wrong acts] might be recorded by some biased people as being part of Islam and [in accordance with] Islam's teachings. Therefore this way is a dangerous but at the same time a noble way. Endeavor to pass this dangerous way safely, for this is the Straight Path. The divine Straight Path starts from here. The bridge of hell extends from the world to heaven and you are now on the way and on the path. Be careful not to go astray. Go straight along this path to heaven, so that you will achieve prosperity! Note that, God willing, in the future you will be teachers of people. A teacher of the people should himself be pure and sinless. Note that the job of the mullahs [theological scholars] is the most important one and that their responsibility is very great!

A clergyman can either save a nation or corrupt

it. Unless our universities and our schools are set on the right path we have no hope of achieving an Islamic Republic.

You, call the people to unite! Call upon them not to be divided! Call all of them to the unity of expression! For God the Exalted and the Blessed has ordered so. The important obligation is that borne by these two strata, that is the clergy and the scholars. It is these two groups who are the brains of the society. They are the contemplative brains . . . Your duty is more important than that of the others and your responsibility is very great. All people are responsible, your responsibility, however, is much greater. They [the enemies of Islam] intend to divide you. You who were connected to each other and there was no more talk that the academicians were such or the clergy such and such, who were all together and, praise be to God, moved on and understood that being together drives the movement forward. When you two strata who were two meditative brains united, other strata join you. Your duty, that is, that of the clergy and you, the scholars, is to keep together along the same path. Right now the scheme [of the enemies] is to divide you; for they have found out that it was this unity of expression in Iran and perhaps these two strata which caused such a thing [the Revolution.] The strata, of the clergy, with all its members, its preachers and all other members of this strata -- if these two strata are educated as Islam demands, if they are educated humanistically, then our country would not be taken captive by the satans, would be run on its own without foreign dependence and free from internal treachery; and there will be developments for you, both in studying and academic work, in education and science there will be developments. Therefore, a proper education should exist along with science, that is, a learned man should have a humanistic education which is the same as Islamic training.

Strive so that every step you take for science and knowledge, for inward and outward actions, produces piety, endurance and honesty in yourself so that when you graduate you will be a true human being, both learned and honest; so that you will be both honest in utilizing your knowledge and purify yourselves and will control yourselves. The self of man is stubborn and its stubbornness corrupts

man, just like if one rides a stubborn horse without any bridle he will be killed. The stubbornness of the self is worse and more dangerous than all other types of stubbornness. The stubbornness of the self

destroys man. With every step you take for teaching and learning you should take a step to control yourself...



در نشیو، روحاخی

پیوندنمان مبارک

Imam Khomeini's Message to the Students from Isfahan University and a Technical Development Group Dispatched to Kurdistan

*In the Name of God, the Merciful,
the Compassionate*

One of the problems we encounter is the use conspirators make of the feelings of our youth. These conspirators, who found themselves defeated, who could not fight our people as our people formed a solid unit and were successful in their struggle with those great powers, are now trying to use the pure feelings of our youth to their own benefit. Our youth are not aware of these conspiracies. Although we have been transformed and the Revolution has succeeded but has not as yet borne fruit, their aim is to make use of whatever means they have to spread propaganda throughout the country so that our youth despair of the way they have chosen. Our youth, although filled with the purest of sentiments -- our hope is dependent upon them -- unfortunately do not sit back and consider the sense of their words and talk sense back to them. The conspirators say, "The Revolution has brought no results." It is up to you young people to reply to those principles which the people originally aimed for.

Let's look and see if success has been achieved or not. Let's look and see what the principles were that day our people rushed into the streets. What did our women, men and youth want? Have their demands been met or not?

What they wanted and what was heard through-

out the country, towns streets, lanes, schools and everywhere was *independence, freedom Islamic Republic!* These three slogans were chanted by everyone. During those days, the only aim they had was to overthrow that regime and establish a new system in which they could have independence. Following the suffocation of 50 years or more, we could even say 2500 years, we have achieved freedom, no other countries are our masters; no one has made us their captive. Were these not the original principles? Were not the first principles of our people the same as those three slogans? And they say our Revolution is over but nothing has happened.

They say that the principles which our people first wanted have not been given. They say, "The system of the monarchy still exists." "Suffocation prevails." "Consultants of the superpowers are still at work here. They are active and our government and people are still under their rule."

When I tell you these facts, you yourself reply that not only have such aims been attained, but, it is freedom which has brought me and you here together. When did the opportunity exist in the past five years for you to assemble in such a gathering and talk? It is freedom which allows you to talk, to criticize. You can criticize the previous regimes and the present government as well. This is freedom. Nobody comes and asks you not to criticize. Therefore, we have attained freedom. It

is one of the things our people cried out for and we have attained it.

As for independence, they say the U.S. still governs here. You are aware that at the present time, our youths have occupied the centers of corruption. They hold Americans in this center. They took this center of corruption and the U.S. can't do a damn thing about it. Our youth should be confident that the U.S. can't do a damn thing. The talk about 'in case of military intervention' is nonsense. How can the U.S. militarily intervene in this country? It is impossible for them to do so. At the present time, the attention of all of the people of the world is directed here. How can the U.S. stand against all the people of the world and militarily intervene? It is a damned act if they choose military intervention. Don't be afraid. Our youth once again respond with feeling as to what we should do if the U.S. should militarily intervene here. 'If' should be forgotten. The U.S. is unable to militarily intervene here.

They have many problems and issues before them. They solve them only with difficulty. They can't do such an act. If they could have militarily intervened in Iran, they would have kept the Shah with their powers. With the power of propaganda, they struggled to keep him but our people did not pay any attention to them. Not only were the U.S. powers useless, but all those who stood together to keep the Shah here failed.

When this nation wants something, it is impossible to stand against them. Nobody can. No power can. It was not our youth who suggested there may be military intervention. Their intervention is always satanic and conspiratory. When they want to intervene, they encourage our youths to stage a demonstration. Then their elements break through the mob and create turmoil so that we no longer have a free or peaceful environment in order to carry out our programs. They use these satanic ways to push forward. They send their satans to our dear, pure-hearted youth. They create propaganda. They write what they want to do on the walls. We see that they have instigated our young people to stage an apparently lawful demonstration in the streets. But they essentially want to take unjustified advantage of such lawful demonstrations.

For instance, as to the occupation of the U.S. Embassy, that is, the U.S. center of conspiracy, by a great number of our youths, we were informed last night that there is a rumor of large demonstrations to be held in Tabriz and Tehran and other cities in support of Mr. Bazargan. They wanted to have such a demonstration. I do not know whether or not they succeeded. They wanted to raise such an issue.

Their intention is to take a situation to a point of grave consequence. For instance, "There is the Iraqi embassy, attack it and destroy it." Or, "There is the Afghan embassy, attack it and destroy it." They stir up such things so that our country will stand against all nations. These satans have these plans. Our youth must be aware. They must not be impressed by them. Did Mr. Bazargan, for whom they call the demonstration, oppose the Revolutionary Council? No. This is just a door. Mr. Bazargan has become a little tired. He said, "Let me sit on the side." But it does not mean that now that he is in the sidelines, he does not participate in any affairs. He is one of the persons most respected by all. They should not think he has been dishonored. Not at all. He is respected.

But for something which has been accepted by people, they should not rush into the streets and set up something which they want to make a game out of. Suddenly a person is killed and one or two slogans are given. If you recollect, I was not here. But I was informed that once when a group was demonstrating in Qum against the previous regime, they were holding a peaceful demonstration but suddenly, they saw that someone threw something from a corner and broke a window, a window of a bank office, or destroyed a place. Sometimes a person is killed. Then they attempt to stir up others and create a massacre. They act according to plan. Military intervention is not at all considered. In their conspiracies, they make use of our own forces. They do not use their own powers. They use our power in our own countries.

What do they benefit from in Kurdistan? An American soldier is not sent to serve them. They use their own satanic tactics. They benefit from persons who are somehow related or dishonest. These dishonest people take advantage of some simple-hearted Kurds. They say something to them



and spread the word. Their aim is to destroy Kurdistan. The Iranian army has gone to that territory to prevent their killings, decapitations and torture. Immediately afterwards, they started to write that we, namely, the Government of Iran, want to destroy the Kurds. Our army has gone to safeguard the Kurds, but they say it has gone to destroy them.

I have not heard anything about the support of the group called Fedayeen-e Khalq for the youths who have occupied the embassy. If they are not pro-American, why didn't they support our youth? If they are pro-Russian or non-nationalists, who are they? If they are nationalists, America is their enemy. They were our enemy when he was here. They were people who had a mission to their own country, namely, a mission to prevent this country from moving one step forward towards progress. We, you and our people, all consider America to be their first enemy. Now that our youth have occupied there and found it to be a center of conspiracy, I have not heard one word of support from the Fedayeen-e Khalq for our youth.

I have not heard anything. Perhaps you may have heard something. If the actions of our youths were, for instance, against the government or against Islam, you would see how they would fan the issue.

One of their plans is just this. I have a copy of it. It is signed by the Fedayeen-e Khalq. They are spreading such lies so that this movement will not reach fruition. They say, "Nothing has been done in Kurdistan. Nothing. Nothing." You yourselves have read about all that has been done in spite of all they do to prevent any action of ours. In order for us to do even more, there needs to be a peaceful environment. Can a group asphalt the roads when there is war in a country? It can't be done. Now you have read about all of the things done in Kurdistan, things you yourselves accomplished. God safeguard you youth. These elements, without any shame whatsoever, say that nothing has been done and it is the same as it was before.

They have written in one of their circulars that political prisoners existed during the time of Muham-



mad Reza and now they also exist and even, has increased. They have not thought that the political prisoners who are now in jail, were people who during the time of Muhammad Reza Khan were active against the nation. Do you consider thieves to be political prisoners? Do you consider those who have revolted against this country, against their nation, those who have committed treachery, to be political dignitaries? Was Nassiri a political dignitary? Was Hoveyda a political dignitary? Or were they thieves? Why do you call them political dignitaries? Those who are now in prison are the SAVAK elements. They are criminals and persons who either killed or gave the order for the killing or torturing of our youths.

Who was in prison during the time of Muhammad Reza? Which class was in prison? Learned scholars, university educated persons and our national dignitaries were in prison. Who is in prison now? Those who are from SAVAK. If you are not from SAVAK, how is it that you consider these persons to be political dignitaries? If you have no relation with the former regime, if you are not a part of the SAVAK mechanism and if you do not actively work for SAVAK, why do you write in your articles that political dignitaries in prison are

more now than during the time of Muhammad Reza? Do you consider thieves to be political dignitaries? It is known that your policy is other than the policy desired by our people, our genuine people. If you have no relations with them, how could you say those persons who were in prison during the past regime and are there now are both political dignitaries?

During the time when we had prisoners, we had real political prisoners like the deceased Taleqani, like Mr. Montazeri and like Mr. Lahouti, who were full of knowledge. A great number of such persons were in prison and suffered torture. The leg of one of our respected ruhani was sawed off. We were told that there were many nice and respected people who were in prison for many years, political dignitaries other than ruhani who underwent torture and torment, because they were opposed to the regime. Such persons were in prison during that time and now those who are from SAVAK are in prison. These persons who call themselves Fedayeen-e Khalq say nothing has been changed. They think, no, they do not think, rather, they delude themselves by saying that there is no difference between that imprisonment and this. Whether or not thieves are imprisoned or honest



persons are imprisoned, or whether or not plunderers and murderers are imprisoned or persons who want to prevent the plundering!

Such is their logic. Our youth must not be deceived by their rotten propaganda. This propaganda is made by America. America does not bring its army here. America brings its writers here. America brings its speakers here. America dispatches its own elements which have been trained for many years in order to stir up trouble.

America has created such disturbances in Kurdistan. They cause confusion in Tehran and sometimes they cause people to rush out into the streets. The act is such a way. Today, our youths occupy their den of corruption, in reaction to their keeping God's worst creature, our worst murderer. He served them and now they use pseudo-humanitarian excuses like wanting to give him medical attention.

Today, at this very moment, conspiracies exist to take advantage of the virtue and sincerity of our youth. Suppose they whisper into their ears, "England is the same as the U.S. What difference is there? Attack and destroy their embassy." "France is the same as they are." They do not do things in a

standard way. Their way is the way of anarchy.

They want people to think that our country is a country of chaos and anarchy where anyone can do anything he wants to do. They want the world to think that we need a guardian. Who is to be its guardian? Mr. Carter himself needs a guardian in order to prevent him from killing so many people. They have been struck with political insanity.

They are manic to let so many people be killed and to cause so much corruption. They should go to a mental asylum for medical treatment. Their brains should be given treatment. They want to say that our people are savage.

Once I was standing near the scene of a demonstration held by Iranians. It was during the time of Muhammad Reza. An American was standing beside me. He said, "Look at those savages." I said to him, "Are they savages because they are struggling to attain their rights?" They tend to see us as such. Even if we say a right word, they still see us as savages.

Our youth must be aware. They must not believe the words of everyone. One of the things

they do is to spray poison around so that we will become disappointed with our Revolution. They say, "Nothing has been done." If there are primary tasks, I say they have been accomplished. Secondary tasks are in the process of being performed. Look at the tasks and construction of housing done during the government of Bazargan. These unfair persons say that not even a single house was built. Look at what people have done in the Reconstruction Crusade, look at what service people have rendered to farmers. A great number of tasks have been accomplished. You just mentioned some of them. You have gone everywhere and have rehabilitated all disorderliness. These persons still say nothing has been done. On the other hand, they are actively involved in seeing that nothing gets done! These persons who introduce themselves as Fedayeen-e Khalq set things on fire with a match. They set the harvest of a peasant on fire with a match. They shoot a gun and make a hole in the oil pipeline so that the oil of our people is wasted.

If America wants to do something, it does so. America does not dispatch an army here, America dispatches persons worse than an army, civil or military. They use the same words. If an army came forward, we would also go forward. If the American army comes here, we will go forward together as a nation. I will go forward; all of you will go forward. America will not dispatch an army. Be quite certain of this. Do not be afraid of America at all or its conspiracies. You youth who are in the universities should neutralize their actions. You should stop them if they intend to cause trouble in the Reconstruction Crusade. You should stop them wherever you are. Do not let them grow. They are the first class servant of those whom we consider to be our first class enemy. I hope that God assists you all and that you be successful.

Do not expect immediate results in a country where everything has been destroyed, where they have escaped and destroyed the economy and left so many debts for our people. They ran away, they agitated everything and ran away. Do not expect everything to be restored quickly now that this Revolution is over. It requires time. A government should be established with your support and the support of the people. Proper elections should be held with the support of the people. People know

competent persons. It is not necessary that we train them for years. Not at all. They understand. This nation distinguishes among everything. It knows who is pious and who, at times, pretends to piety.

Such awareness exists in everyone who has lived for twenty or thirty years among these people and who knows their roots and who they are not. They realize who has charmed coquettishly and who has not. They realize well who the opponent was but they could not talk. People must select those persons whom they know to be in the service of this nation, those who have sympathy towards the deprived class. We do not intend to establish a House of Lords. The Senate was called the House of Lords. We want to abolish the Lords and make them human. We closed down the doors of that House in which those Lords sat and committed so much treachery against this country. The House of Venerable Old Men, the House of Lords or the Senate, consisted of a group of parasites, old men on the verge of extinction. After all the treachery that they committed in their lifetime, they gathered together and talked with their friends about all the medicine they took or the food they swallowed from the wealth of the people...

With the Will of God, the Majlis will be established. The Constitution will be put to a vote. It is nearly finished. It will be put to a vote after we read and approve it. If our people show coldness, it is one of the cases in which there is a conspiracy, in order to discourage people from this Constitution. Ask them which article among all articles of this Constitution is reactionary. The first article which they put their finger on was the fifth, "Leadership of the Theologians." It is an Islamic pattern and they are afraid of Islam, considering Islam to be reactionary, yet they do not dare call Islam itself reactionary. Rather, they say, Islam wants to take us back 1400 years. The meaning is the same. It is just that they do not use the word. So many progressive ideas are hidden within the idea of the leadership of the theologians which are not obvious in other articles. People themselves elect a person whose ethics, religion and nationalism as well as his knowledge and actions are set. Such a person supervises the situation so that treason is not committed. The same is true of the President whom people themselves elect. With the Will of

God, they will appoint an honest person from now on. But, nevertheless, an expert, religious theologian, who has spent his whole life concerned with theology and has served Islam for a lifetime is elected with precautionary measures to observe what he does, lest he does wrong. Our coming President will not do wrong but precautionary measures have been taken in order to prevent it from happening. Our military, gendarmerie and other high-ranking leaders are no longer persons who are treacherous. But precautionary measures have been taken so that the theologian, as an observer, supervises sensitive affairs. This is among the most progressive articles they approved in the Constitutional Law.


The same persons who shouted and wrote, "Who needs Islam. Let's have a Republic," are afraid of Islam. They say, "Let it be a Democracy or a Democratic Republic." They do not understand that there are so many democracies known today in the world but do you know any country in which the great powers have acted on the basis of democracy? The word *democracy* is used in a special way by everyone. It has a special meaning to the Russians. It has another meaning to the Americans. It had a

special meaning for Aristotle. Today, it has another meaning. We say that we do not want to include something which is ambiguous and is interpreted everywhere in a different sense in our Constitution, so that later on anyone could change it according to his or her own option. We say Islam does not intimate a different meaning in every place. Islam is clear and every Muslim knows what it means. We say Islamic Republic. Our people have also asked for an Islamic Republic. It is this which our people agreed to in a vote of 98.2 %. One and eight-tenths percent is not significant opposition.

From the very beginning they opposed it. They, who were against the Islamic Republic at that time, were afraid of Islam and not a Republic. Now they oppose the Assembly of Experts. Before that, they opposed the election of the Assembly. Later, they opposed the Assembly of Experts. The time will come when they will oppose the Majlis and then the referendum for the Constitution. Their problem is 'why Islam?' whereas our people know their goal to be Islam. Our people find their fulfillment in Islam. Islam possesses both the present and the future world. Our people want Islam. If our people only wanted a Republic, all of them would beat



Massive demonstrations in front of the American Spy Nest



their chests and congratulate everyone.

Since it is paired with the word Islam, they oppose it and call it reactionary. They consider Islam to be reactionary. They consider God to be reactionary. They are this kind of people! If they only had faith—but they have not had any up to the present time. They dislike the Prophet of Islam (ﷺ) more than they dislike you because he laid the foundation. It was a reactionary act which your nation of reactionaries performed. You removed the hands of treacherous persons from this country and they consider it reactionary. It was reactionary of you to choose to govern your own destiny. I do not know when they will awaken, when they will desist from their wrong actions and opposition. I regret that a group which should serve this country, does not appreciate that this nation gave their blood, threw out plunderers, removed parasites, punished some of the murderers and some others will receive punishment, with the Will of God. I regret the fact that they don't come onto the field and agree with this nation. The nation has given its

everything. You now sit freely and leisurely in your rooms and write against this nation. One regrets the reflections they have. Again, reactionary. Reactionary. If you opened their hearts they would say, "Islam is reactionary," but they do not dare say it aloud. Some obviously have said it and then repented but it is not known whether or not their repentance is genuine.

Our nation should awaken along with our youth. They should realize that America does not enter our battlefield with arms, but rather it comes with the pen. It does not come here with a military force, rather it will enter our battlefield with those persons who direct these affairs. You must be careful not to become tools in their hands by cooling-off and thinking that nothing has been done. Everything has been done. Do you consider the act of breaking down a satanic power which was supported by all the great powers to have been a trifling act? Not only did the great powers accept them, but the second class powers as well? What do you want higher than this? You have attained a reputation in the world as well as a sense of greatness which no one else enjoys. Do not destroy it for the sake of the fact that, for example, in a certain place, there are fewer asphalt roads than in another place. Did you give the blood of your children in order to get asphalted roads? Did you want asphalt? You acted for the sake of God. Acting for God is much higher than things like asphalt. It is higher than anything else. Do not sit and come here and complain about the affairs. Leave such complaints for a later time. We are now in the middle of the way. We must destroy this power. We must choke this conspiracy. It is conspiracies like this which persuade you to come and say that nothing has been done.

May God protect you. May the Will of God protect you all. God willing, He will save our youth. Our young people have been active from the beginning and they still are. They devoted themselves to us and to Islam. I pray for them. I am at their service. I would go and serve like them if I could, but I am an old man who is sitting here with nothing but a stammering tongue. God protect you all and give you success in all affairs.

May Peace and the Mercy of God be upon you.

Ruhollah al-Musavi al-Khomeini

Unhappy Alliance

EMERGING scarred, but seemingly victorious, from its wrestle to produce a new and more effective land reform act, the Persian government has been battered this week by a threatening wave of student demonstrations. Earlier this month, the cabinet approved a law that might—if it were to be honestly applied—transform the country's agricultural structure. This is not the first time a Persian government has tried to introduce land reform; always in the past the laws have been gutted by parliament and their skeletons left to rot on the statute books. But now the Shah and his prime minister, Dr Amini, have done away with parliament; the minister of finance, who opposed the law, has lost his job. If all goes to plan (and this week's riots add yet another element of doubt) the first distribution of land should start in about a month.

Under the new law, large landowners are to be limited to one village each. Those who now own several villages will be allowed 40 days in which to choose the one they want to keep; the rest of their land will be sold to the government in ten annual instalments. Then, over a 15-year period, the government will resell this land to peasants working in the district. There are plans for setting up co-operatives to which the new farmers, if they are to benefit from the law, will have to belong. Several co-operatives have already been established in an area near the Russian frontier where, for reasons of obvious counter-propaganda, the distribution is planned to begin.

The government is accusing the landowners of having instigated the student riots that began in Teheran over the week-end and later spread southwards to Shiraz. Such an alliance is improbable; but, in fact, both groups, for quite different reasons, are intent on ending Dr Amini's strong-man rule. Most of the students at Teheran university support the radical National Front. There was a time, early on, when the front backed Dr Amini; but it is now pressing hard for elections

and a return to parliamentary government. Dr Amini insists that the country is not ready for democracy; and certainly the two governments immediately before his collapsed speedily because of the evident dishonesty of the elections that brought them to power. In neither election was the National Front allowed to compete. The bitterness, and the weakness, of Dr Amini's position is that he has lost public support at the time when he needs it most.

LAOS

Wayside Halt

LAST week's meeting of princes in Geneva was intended to be journey's end in the Laotian crisis; this week's statements make it look like just another wayside halt. The three princes—Souvanna Phouma (neutralist), Boun Oum (right-wing) and Souphannouvong (pro-Communist) went to Geneva at the urgent invitation of the British and Russian co-chairmen of the Geneva conference on Laos. The idea was that they should at last form a coalition government prepared to endorse the work of the conference. The delegates to the conference are understandably anxious to go home, having agreed on most clauses of a declaration on Laotian neutrality and of a protocol defining the functions of the three-power commission that is to ensure respect for the neutrality of Laos. Prince Boun Oum and his "strong man," General Phoumi, were generally unco-operative, and on January 19th they flew home again with little accomplished, after an indecisive wrangle with the other princes over the allocation of seats in the proposed government of unity.

Since then, Prince Souvanna Phouma has twice declared himself pleased with the outcome of the talks; but Prince Boun Oum, back in Vientiane, has said there was no agreement. This week the frustrated Geneva conference seems to be returning to the bad early days of angry polemics, the chief Chinese delegate accusing the United States on Tuesday of having encouraged Prince Boun Oum's intransigence. There is, however, potential consolation in the thought that the three princes are to meet, yet again, in Luang Prabang next week. After so many slips one would not make a wager; but if Souvanna Phouma's optimism is not misplaced, this could yet be journey's end.

GERMANY

Camp Followers

OUTMANŒUVRED after the polls by Dr Adenauer, the west German Free Democrats now seem to have suffered another reverse. When the present coalition

between them and the Christian Democrats was formed in November, after weeks of bickering, it was understood the Free Democrats would be given cabinet posts in addition to their four cabinet posts in addition to their four cabinet posts. A number of state secretaryship departmental posts of a semi-political nature—were to go to them as well. Herr Mende, the party leader, who refused a place in the cabinet, was given the chairmanship of the Bundestag foreign affairs committee.

Things have not gone according to plan. The Free Democrats have not got quite the state secretaryships they wanted. Herr Mende's appointment has been blocked by the Social Democrats, on grounds that this is not the kind of post to be traded for a mess of coalition power. The difficulties will no doubt be passed over by the offer of alternative posts. The Free Democrats in office are not getting away any more than they did in the past.

In foreign policy in particular, their pact seems to have been negligible. When the party chose to swallow its pride and join a coalition under Dr Adenauer it was so partly on the advice of the venerable ex-President, Dr Heuss, who felt that a crucial time in east-west relations and hence for flexibility was needed inside the Bonn government. And the Free Democrats did succeed in inserting such worthy provisions as the need for better relations with Poland, and for east-west negotiations, into the coalition agreement. But in practice Dr Adenauer and Dr Schröder have called the foreign policy tune; and the Free Democrats have been left with a bad taste in their mouths.

That is, perhaps, a pity. Any party in Germany which advocates a more flexible eastern policy is bound to attract people who want their country to be reunited, and among these there are bound to be some wild men of the Right, who can be relied on to get more than their share of attention. In that sense the link between liberalism and nationalism, present in Germany since Napoleon's time, still has not been broken. But on the whole the men now at the head of the Free Democrat party are dangerous people who would throw up Germany's western ties for the sake of a rash eastern gamble, but an amiable, effective, group whose main argument against the Bonn establishment is that Europe does not end at the Elbe.

EIU Quarterly Economic Reviews

covering 57 countries or groups of countries

Out this week:

WESTERN GERMANY

Trade in 1961 resulted in a record export surplus despite revaluation and persistent reports of weakening exports during the year. The Review analyses the reasons for this and assesses in some detail the prospects, both for the internal economy and for foreign trade, in 1962. Industrial developments are reported, and the direction and scope of Germany's rising development aid described.

Further details from:

THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT LTD.,
5 Bury St., S.W.1 60 East 42nd St., New York 17
Tel: WHI 0353 Ext. 35 Tel: Murray Hill 7-6850

Appointments, Business and
Personal notices and other
Classified Advertisements
pages 373 & 374

regional federation is well founded. Publicly they assure Accra that Pafinecsa is conceived "within the framework of the All-African People's Conference." But this divergence of view over whether regionalism or Pan-Africanism comes first may prove a more important division than any that sets the Monrovia group apart from the Casablanca powers.

Persia's Gamble Against the Clock

FROM OUR MIDDLE EAST CORRESPONDENT

TEHERAN

ALTHOUGH Dr Ali Amini, the Persian prime minister, weathered last month's storm of student violence—and its ruthless suppression by a paratroop battalion—the disturbances have left the government with less public support than ever. It is generally accepted that Dr Amini was right in insisting that influences outside the university helped to stir up the students, and that paid gangs of hooligans, who notoriously play a squalid but important part in Teheran politics, took part in the street fighting. But it is equally clear that the paratroops got out of hand in putting down the riot; the government has tacitly admitted this by replacing the battalion commander. The prime minister has denied that he knew beforehand of the orders given to the troops, and there is good reason to believe him. Who, then, pressed the button? If that responsibility could be established, an important piece of the Persian jig-saw would fall into place.

At the height of the excitement, some 300 people were arrested; of these, more than two-thirds have by now been released. Dr Amini, supported by Dr Arzanjani, the minister of agriculture, lashed out in all directions—at the feudalists, the National Front, the Communists and the "Al Capones." This last reference was presumably to General Teymour Bakhtiar, who, when he was chief of security, reinforced his police by gangs of thugs and managed to amass a fortune for himself. After the riots General Bakhtiar was sent out of the country by the Shah; he is at present in Europe.

After an exchange of correspondence with the rector of Teheran university, Dr Amini seems to have made his peace with the scholars. The rector and his deans have withdrawn the resignations that they tendered in protest against the behaviour of the paratroops, and it is hoped to reopen the university before the end of the month. A lot of repair work has still to be done, and much equipment has still to be replaced. The government is also insisting that the university authorities set up a student guard to keep order in future. But who will the guards be? The method of selecting them seems likely to provoke heated debate among the students.

Teheran has regained its calm, but an end to Persia's troubles is remote. Dr Amini's government is pledged to a programme of radical reform by evolutionary methods. This includes the break-up of the big estates in favour of peasant ownership, and an extensive programme of industrial development. These changes imply a political and social transformation of the country. In time they would break the power of the traditional landowning class and produce thousands of articulate administrators and technicians in town and country. The experience of other countries suggests that at least a generation will have to pass before the programme is completed.

Except for the Shah himself (and his courtiers inspire little confidence) and the followers of Dr Amini, few Persians are prepared to wait this long. The breach between the prime minister and the National Front (the main opposition force) now seems irreparable. A policy of economic austerity and the dragging of government feet in bringing the corrupt to justice (most of the


senior officials arrested on charges of corruption still await their trial) sharpen the quarrel; but the real issue is over elections. The National Front wants them now, Dr Amini refuses to hold them until the electoral law has been changed. This issue has not only widened the gulf between the government and the front. It has also given the front, formerly a loose and shapeless alliance of nationalist groups, a cohesion which it has never had since Dr Mossadegh went into pyjamaed retirement.

The National Front wants elections as a means to power. But what it would do if it got power is still anybody's guess. It holds together on the election issue; but, if elections were no longer an issue, it would probably fall apart. Uncommitted Persians differ about the desirability of parliamentary government at the present stage. Some argue that free and honest elections would result in the return of the more responsible representatives of the landowners and of the National Front, with perhaps a sprinkling of communists giving a strong majority for radical but gradual reform along lines laid down by Dr Amini. Others fear that the extremists of all parties would get in, with a small but determined communist group holding the balance and making the practice of government impossible. The past performance of the Teheran *majlis* suggests that the pessimists have good grounds for their apprehension; even if "responsible elements" were returned, how many would remain responsible and for how long?

There are those who are urging accelerated reform—or revolution—; there are others who do not want any reform at all. These are mainly the big landowners, whose strongholds are the court and the army. They do not represent the whole landowning class, perhaps not even a majority; but they are there, in high positions.

Dr Amini claims that the land reform will save the landowning class (for which he is promptly attacked from the left). But there are many landowners who have no use for this form of salvation.


Land reform is starting in the district of Maragheh, in Azerbaijan. In repeated statements designed to placate the landowners, and, perhaps, to impress outsiders by the prudence with which reform is being put into effect, the minister of agriculture has declared that the Maragheh "pilot project" is experimental. Any mistakes made will be rectified by changes in the law, and taken into account when the reform is applied elsewhere. For



Survivor: Dr Amini

this very reason, some of the Maragheh landowners are already up in arms. "If you want to experiment," they ask, "why start on our lands? Why not make your mistakes on crown or government land instead?"

Although their motives are not unselfish, the Maragheh malcontents have a point. In the Qazvin area, for instance, where the Shah has already distributed large tracts of crown property, the lot of the peasantry has improved little, if at all. Farming is wretchedly inefficient. Since bread is a staple, wheat has to be grown however small the holding. The situation is getting worse as time passes and the sons of the family grow up and there is no land for them. On most such farms a time is reached when the younger sons drift off to the nearest town, which has little but casual labour to offer them. The government's answer to such problems is to form co-operatives. If enough officials, competent, honest, imaginative and patient, can be found to run the co-operatives the reform may succeed, given time. But Persia may have neither the men nor, more urgently, the time.



Hooded demonstrators outside the Hammersmith Palais.

Hooded students join torchlight protest

THIRTY hooded demonstrators chanting "Shah murderer" held an eerie torch-light protest outside the Hammersmith Palais where Iran New Year celebrations were getting under way.

Posters saying "Hail to the revolutionary Iranian woman" and "Free all political prisoners" greeted car-loads of Iranians who arrived at the Palais for the traditional festivities.

Leaflets in the name of the Iranian Student Society in Britain — a member organisation of the World Confederation of Iranian Students — were handed out condemning the political and economic situation in Iran.

REVENUE

A spokesman for the demonstrators said they were wearing hoods to hide their identity in case the authorities put "pressure" on their families in Iran.

"We are demonstrating to draw attention to every aspect of life in Iran — the poverty, political prisoners and torture."

Although Iran's oil revenue alone tops 20,000 million dollars a year, the vast majority of people live below subsistence level, he said.

In these "wretched conditions any voice of protest is strangled and every attempt to resist is met by imprisonment, torture and the firing squad."

The demonstrators, claimed the festivities at the Palais were organised by the Iran Embassy in the name of the Iranian Students Society which they claimed was a "phony" organisation.

However, a spokesman for the Iran Embassy said they did not recognise the group who were demonstrating.

The function was organised by the Knightsbridge based Iranian Student Society, which, an official said, had nothing to

do with the demonstrators.

Their society was legally registered under that name.

"In other words the demonstrators are breaking the law if they are calling themselves the Iranian Student Society."

"This Party was organised by us for all Iranians regardless of their political leanings. We are a non-political organisation only concerned with organising social activities."

"We represent those Iranians who wish to join our society and as far as the law is concerned we are the official representatives of the Iran students."

The Party was not organised by the Embassy, and the only connection was that the Iran government had paid for fifteen musicians to come from Iran to entertain.

"We love our country and like to get our people together," he added.

Tehran calm after riots

From UPI in Tehran

IRAN said yesterday that violence in the country was now under control and warned that people responsible for rioting and arson would be punished.

The Information Minister, Mr Dariussh Homayoun, issued the warning as troops and police clubbed student demonstrators at Tehran University and rounded up many of them in a raid on the campus.

At least 15 people have died in riots against the Shah's regime during the past week. Mr Homayoun said, after a special Government meeting on the widespread anti-Government movement: "The Government is in full control of the situation and has taken, and will take, all necessary preventive steps. But people must ignore the baseless rumours and the futile psychological warfare being waged by the miscreants."

Iranian tanks and heavy vehicles earlier entered the streets of central Tehran to foil a general strike allegedly called by the opposition. Soldiers took up positions in all main areas of the capital after the tanks and armoured personnel carriers withdrew early yesterday. But the strike was successful in the bazaar area, the centre of the Moslem clergy's growing power among orthodox Iranians. They resent the Government's liberalism but also want wide-ranging economic and social reforms.

Yesterday's riot at Tehran University began when about 200 students demanded the removal of the armed guard at the campus and better conditions. The students gathered inside the campus for a protest meeting, but police cordoned off the area, isolated the 200 and marched them into the street, where they were clubbed by police. The students included many girls.

By dusk, yesterday, the streets of Tehran were reported to be back to normal. Our correspondent adds: In an unexpected move, the Government appears to have started a campaign of intimidation against the country's powerful Moslem clergy. Last week troops entered the homes of two religious leaders in Qom, reportedly destroying a priceless collection of rare religious books and killing two students. One of the religious leaders, 77-year-old Haj Seyyed Mohammad Reza Golepayeganeh, suffered a heart attack.

Harsh tactics fail to teach Iran students a lesson

By Liz Thurgood

VIOLENCE is becoming almost routine at Iran's largest and most impressive campus, Tehran University. A week rarely passes without a student strike or police assault—making this the worst scholastic year in 15 years.

In April students broke into the faculty of humanities, a vice-dean's office went up in flames, club-wielding police rushed in to bang a few heads; and dozens of students were taken to hospital.

Students have turned out to be one of the worst thorns in the regime's side since the Shah consolidated his power in 1963 with, among other things, a large show of armed power at Tehran University. Few students remember this, but during the political upheavals of the past six months, Tehran University has again emerged as a major opposition force to the Shah's regime.

At the university, armed police guard the gates of the main campus, located on the

busy thoroughfare of Shah Reza in west Tehran. Entrance is impossible without a student pass or letter of introduction.

Awash with anti-Shah broadsheets and Marxist slogans, the university is a noisy centre of political Iran. Fired by youthful idealism, the student complaints are often louder and more bitter than those heard outside the campus. "They're angry," says a professor. "We can't get them to work."

The year started badly last October when, at traditional opening ceremonies, four "students"—all believed to have been recruits to Savak, the secret police—told the Shah of the campus's loyalty to the regime and their determination to weed out troublemakers. Professors and students were incensed. "Never before has Tehran University been so insulted," said one humanities faculty member. "It was a disgusting piece of theatre."

Violence struck within the month when several hundred striking students were clubbed



Combat troops on the streets of Tehran

by police. Most of the campus closed in sympathy and the vicious cycle of strike-police assaults had begun. They culminated in last week's stabbing of a vice-dean. Despite Iran's urgent needs for skilled manpower, the university is almost closed.

Superficially the students' demands seem harmless: The right to set up and supply stu-

dent libraries, and university help in organising such groups as mountain-climbing and research centres.

But, as is typical of Iran, the apparently humblest of requests is riddled with politics. Student libraries were closed last year because, in the authorities' eyes, they had become reading rooms of subversion.

Many students feel that the

regime is more interested in absorbing them into the system than in giving them a decent education. Teaching aides are poor, professors—largely apolitical—"moonlight," and discipline is more or less nonexistent.

The Government has failed to teach the students a lesson with harsh police tactics. Realising that the mountain-climbers were distributing anti-Shah literature, the Government last month sent in five helicopter-loads of police rangers to beat up a large group of students on the mountain trails just north of Tehran.

Adding to the Government's problems is the fact that 80 per cent of the 118,000 plus students come from the provinces and, without the familiar fabric of family and village life, fall easy prey to radical ideology. Many wait years to enter Tehran University precisely because it is the student centre of opposition.

As in most universities across the world, Tehran has a small

hard core of political activists. Most flock to the banner of religious idealism or Danesh-juan Islam. Others pick the label of Marxist-Leninists. But the solid core of their political convictions is based on opposition to what they consider an oppressive education and political system.

Few of the Left-wingers have studied Marx. Das Kapital is available in the university's central library but students assert that to take it out amounts to inviting a call from the secret police.


The religious students are better informed and more representative of public reaction to the materialism unleashed by the 1973 oil boom. Their hero is the late Dr Ali Shariati, an Islamic purist who died last summer in London. Despite their identity with the national protest movement, the students now work in relative isolation. All students associations, the traditional link to the dissident intellectuals, have long since been banned.

Lebanon Cabinet returns to office

From UPI in Beirut

In the first such move since independence in 1943, the outgoing Lebanese Cabinet returned to power yesterday as a last-ditch move to end a Government crisis.

During a Cabinet session, the Prime Minister, Selim Al Hoss, retracted the resignation of his Government, submitted on April 19, and President Sarkis approved the retraction. Mr Hoss and his eight-man team of technocrats resigned amid a furor over the Government's handling of security following clashes last month with Syrian troops of the ruling force and a wing with



Above, Taghi Farvar, and right, Mahommed Jamoor and his daughter in Soory

Close encounters

Peter Stalker visits a university which dismantled academic hierarchies, dissolved conventional faculties and opened up a new way of education for the Third World

PEOPLE breeze in and out of the office of Vice-Chancellor Taghi Farvar — students' research staff, van drivers, secretaries — and Farvar, enthusiastic, bearded, and garrulous, turns a friendly ear to every voice. Someone argues on the telephone. Across a coffee table a student is eating unleavened bread and goat's cheese. The tea man saunters in offering glasses and sugar lumps — as he does every 10 minutes or so. The only semblance of decorum is provided by the obligatory portrait of the Shah of Iran and his Empress staring out over the desk.

Bu-Ali Sina University in north-west Iran — a remarkable new experiment in Third World university education — prides itself on having dismantled academic hierarchies, although one suspects that, with Islamic disregard for status and office, a lot of the fixtures were already loose. There are no professors or fellows or any of the usual crusty dons. Lessons are an informal mixture of staff and students.

All the conventional faculties have been dissolved and stirred up to reappear as clusters — less formal group-

ings of subjects. There are three clusters: Ecodevelopment, Education, and Health Sciences.

Taghi Farvar is head of the Ecodevelopment cluster which, as the name implies, involves economics and technology with rather softer edges than usual.

The curriculum at Bu-Ali Sina has been designed to take as its raw material the dirty, untidy and often unpleasant world around it: a world where the clearer lines of Samuelson's Economics and Cotton and Wilkinson's Inorganic Chemistry seem slightly unreal. Just how unreal can be seen in the Khorrum Rud Valley — which the university has chosen as a pilot area. Guided by Moustafa Tahmati, a jovial 34-year-old post graduate lawyer, I stopped in Soory, one of its tiny villages.

The valley is lined by low dark rolling hills. It is bare except for occasional groups of rock — like huge lumps of black putty slapped on to the surface. The mountains in the background are snow-covered: even on the valley floor we are 5,000 feet up. I wonder why Soory's crumbling mud buildings and narrow slippery streets are

not washed away when the snow melts.

Moustafa has already spent a month in the village, meeting the people and trying to find out how they and the university can work together.

In a small gloomy room we meet Alykhan Jamoor, old, shrunken and toothless. His eldest son is 23-year-old Mohammed — one of twelve children of whom only three survived. Mohammed is married with two little girls, and four-year-old Sanohan is sick in bed. The problem is water. In spite of the snow there are no year-round sources of clean drinking water and most of the people carry intestinal parasites of one sort or another. One villager told me at least half the 450 people in the village were sick.

Water is the kind of subject that makes sense on the curriculum of Bu-Ali Sina. Students investigate it from all angles: chemical, geological, economic and social. Projects and research are carried out to seek out new sources of fresh water. The idea is to plug the university into the community's problems and have the students get their hands dirty trying to solve them — rather than

studying isolated academic disciplines, so that when they graduate they have skills, knowledge and experience specific to their own area — and are less likely to disappear to Tehran, or even London or New York to practise what the university has taught them.

That is a startling new approach, with revolutionary implications for Third World university education. But it is paradoxical that it should take place in Iran, the world's second largest oil exporter. The oil income has flowed right past the poor farmer in the countryside and the half of the population one would classify as rural remains as poor as if holes had never been punched in the ground.

The oil wealth has rushed on to Tehran, making it one of the fastest growing, and drably depressing cities, in the world. To make ends meet Mohammed has to leave his family for two or three months a year to work as a labourer in the city.

A small group of like-minded people are building Bu-Ali Sina into a university model that could help displace the imported irrelevances of Oxford or Paris, and its

importance as a potential new starting point for Third World universities has been recognised by both the United Nations Environment Programme, which supports the Ecodevelopment work, and by the World Health Organisation which has appointed the Health Sciences cluster as a collaborative centre — a place where health officials for other developing countries can come to be trained.

Most developing countries have the steadily widening split between city and country that Bu-Ali Sina is trying to heal. But university and village seems at first sight an unlikely alliance and there could be a danger of the university dominating the community rather than helping it. Taghi Farvar was confident that it would not.

"In the minds of the villagers, a university is not such a threatening idea as say a Government institution — it is after all a place they think some of their kids might go to." And he does not think the initiative and development ideas are more likely to come from the students and staff than the villagers.

We keep a very low pro-

file. We are not trying to develop the area: the area has to develop itself, all we provide is a technical backstop."

In Soory, I was shown how their technology could be used. After intercourse the Muslim is unclean until he has taken a ritual bath, so every morning you can see the men of the village troop off to the Hamim, the communal bath house. As the bath is hot it is a great consumer of energy. Bu-Ali Sina's environmental engineers are working on solar energy panels which even in winter could provide that hot water to heat the bath.

At the university they are also working in dozens of other areas: biogas generators to turn cow dung into methane, windmill water pumps, solar air heaters. Biologists are studying natural methods of pest control — introducing birds or insects to deal with specific pests. In each case the economic and social impact of a technology is the starting point.

Helping the villagers is not just a useful spin-off of university activity but its central purpose and while it may not have academic gla-

mour, it does have many other kinds of appeal. Bu-Ali Sina tries to maintain some of the conventional university cachet to attract students, staff and money. As Chancellor Farhad Riadi explained: "We're different from a conventional university and want to give our students new attitudes to development, but we also want to give them a chance to work within the system." So that students don't feel they are going out too much on a limb by coming to Bu-Ali Sina, jobs for graduates are pre-arranged with some of the Government services. They also hope that by staying sufficiently within Iran's system of higher education they will have a chance of changing it.

That will not be easy for it means calling into question the purpose of Third World universities. Often staffed and run along Western lines, they are often just an expensive way of exacerbating the divide between rich and poor, of creating yet another elite. Bu-Ali Sina is creating something different, academically and socially. If it survives it could provide a dramatic new starting point for Third World education.

pay the \$35-a-barrel price that Iran had been asking for its oil.

Talks between Japanese oil industry representatives and officials of the National Iranian Oil Co. had broken down April 17 with no agreement on Japanese acceptance of the Iranian plan to increase its oil prices by \$2.50 a barrel, retroactive to April 1. The U.S. praised Japan's decision, calling the Iranian price hike "highway robbery."

Japan was Iran's biggest oil customer, importing 500,000 barrels a day under one-year sales agreements. In February, crude oil had represented 96% of Iranian exports to Japan, worth \$783 million in revenues. Conversely, Iranian imports from Japan totaled only \$172 million worth of goods.

Iran's oil minister, Ali Akbar Moinefar, said April 20 that Iran would suspend its oil shipments to Japan unless Japan agreed to pay the \$35-a-barrel price. But several oil company executives had stressed that at a time when its oil exports had dropped to about 1.5 million barrels a day from 5.5 million in 1978 and 3.2 million in 1979, Iran was more dependent than ever on its oil revenues.

Japan, on the other hand, had a 90-day stockpile of oil, which would allow Japan to endure a cutoff of Iranian oil for a period of several months without suffering any serious economic hardship.

At the end of March, Japan's domestic oil stockpile had stood at 415.8 million barrels. A total cutoff of Iranian oil would deprive Japan of about 10% of its daily oil imports. If Japan decided to draw down its stockpile to make up the 10% shortfall, the stockpile would last 800 days.

Furthermore, Japan was expected to find alternative supplies from other oil exporting countries rather than deplete its domestic reserves. Several countries, among them the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Mexico, had expressed a willingness to increase their oil sales to Japan. □

Parents Visit Hostage Son. The mother and stepfather of Sgt. Kevin Hermening arrived in Teheran April 19 to visit their son, who was one of the 50 hostages in the U.S. Embassy. Kenneth and Barbara Timm made the trip despite President Carter's April 17 ban on trips to Iran.

Mrs. Timm said on her arrival that she wanted to meet with Iranian government officials, including religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Seeing her son, she added, "is not the sole purpose of coming to Iran. We would like to learn to understand the people."

Mrs. Timm was finally allowed to see her son April 21 in the U.S. Embassy compound. The militants permitted her to spend 45 minutes with the 20-year-old sergeant, the youngest hostage in the embassy. Several militants and an Iranian television crew remained in the room.

"We never quit holding hands," Mrs. Timm said afterward. "I kept telling him how strong he was, and he kept telling me how strong I was." She added that her son appeared to be "in excellent health," and she could find no signs of mental stress or brainwashing.

On the hostage crisis, Mrs. Timm said, "I want to see a peaceful settlement. I don't want to see sanctions, blockades or military action. I don't want to see any innocent people die." She said she favored a congressional investigation of U.S.-Iranian relations during the reign of deposed Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi.

The White House said April 21 that the Timms would not be prosecuted for traveling to Iran. The State Department said they had left the country before the ban was officially printed. The Timms had flown to Paris April 18 to obtain visas for Iran; the travel ban had been issued but was not yet printed in the Federal Register.

President Carter April 21 urged relatives of other hostages not to go to Iran, although he said he sympathized with their feelings. "My heart goes out to her," he said in reference to Mrs. Timm.

Hostage Kin Seek European Support—Relatives of four other hostages met with French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing April 23 to urge him to support U.S. efforts to free the Americans. Their meeting in Paris was the start of a one-week visit to European leaders.

The women were: Louisa Kennedy, wife of economic counselor Moorehead Kennedy, Jeanne Queen, mother of consular affairs officer Richard Queen, Barbara Rosen, wife of press officer Barry Rosen, and Pearl Golacinsky, mother of security officer Allan Golacinsky. They were members of the Family Liaison Action Group, an organization of the hostages' relatives in the U.S.

"Our appeal is not just to the heads of state," said Mrs. Kennedy, "but to the families of Europe..." The four women planned to split up for separate visits to Great Britain, West Germany and Italy and to attend a meeting of European Community representatives in Luxembourg.

Giscard "expressed the profound sympathy and solidarity of France" with the women. He said his government "will pursue its efforts to obtain the freedom of the hostages, alone and in conjunction with its European partners and with the United States..." □

Leftist-Moslem Clashes. Leftist students and Moslem fundamentalists engaged in clashes throughout Iran April 18-22, leaving several dead and hundreds injured. The violence was triggered by the students' defiance of the ruling Revolutionary Council's order April 18 giving the mostly left-wing political movements at universities three days to close their campus offices and bookstands.

The government had launched its campaign to purge Iranian colleges after a Moslem fundamentalist group allied with the militants holding the U.S. Embassy in Teheran took over several campuses around the country. The group, called the Students Following the Line of the Imam, demanded a purge of leftist students and teachers as part of an Islamic "cultural revolution."

Many of the leftist students obeyed the Revolutionary Council's order and evacuated

their campus facilities. But a few diehard groups held out, leading to the violence.

The leftist students were represented largely by two organizations—the radical Islamic Mujaheddin and the Marxist Fedayeen.

The fighting centered largely in Teheran, Isfahan, Shiraz, Meshed and Tabriz as Moslem civilians sought to enforce the government's closure order.

One student was reported killed and about 100 injured in the first outbreak of clashes April 18 at a teachers college in Teheran.

About 300 were injured April 19 in six hours of fighting at Shiraz University, in southern Iran.

The Revolutionary Council April 20 ordered the closing of all universities in an effort to stem the spreading unrest. However, violence resumed April 21 at Teheran University, where leftist students rejected a Revolutionary Council demand to end a sit-in protest. Eight persons were reported killed and 500 injured.

Fighting that spread April 22 to universities in Ahwaz in the west and in Resht in the north resulted in 10 dead and more than 100 injured. The clashes occurred when civilians responding to Islamic clergymen's appeals stormed the university buildings occupied by leftist students in an attempt to evict them from the campuses.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini April 21 denounced the leftist influence at the universities, demanding that they "be reconstructed from the beginning so that our youth have Islamic training." The young people of Iran, he said, should not be dependent "on the West, nor dependent on communism, nor dependent on Marxism."

President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr April 20 had warned that "the problem of the left will not be solved by using these [violent] methods" against them. "When the forces who have revolted do not obey the rules and laws, the atmosphere of a coup d'etat will be created," he said.

Bani-Sadr April 22 again criticized militant groups that sought to act on their own outside government. Calling for a "cultural revolution," he said the "first principle of this revolution is that the government elected by you must be the executive force of the people and no other executive force outside the government is justified in making people's decisions." □

Kurdish Rebels, Iranian Troops Clash. Kurdish rebels fought Iranian army troops in Kurdistan April 19-22. [See p. 89B1]

The fighting centered largely around Sanandaj, capital of Kurdistan, and Saqqiz. The Kurds claimed 320 rebels had been killed in the fighting.

An army communique April 21 said 20 soldiers were killed and 26 wounded in an insurgent attack on an army column.

Kurdish sources April 22 said Saqqiz came under government shelling that left 15 persons buried under the wreckage of a dozen houses. □

Iranian-Iraqi Dispute

Baghdad Defies Khomeini Threat. Iranian-Iraqi tensions heightened April 8 as

27, Cross team had visited the hostages April 11. [See p. 282B2]
ch. Daoudy returned to U.N. headquarters in New York and met June 19 with U.S. chief delegate Donald McHenry to report on his latest unsuccessful mission in Iran. McHenry said afterward, "There is nothing in the discussions that would lead me to conclude there is any change in the situation."

esi- Guard Commander Resigns. The commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guards resigned June 17 to protest factionalism in the paramilitary organization. President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr had appointed Abu Sharif, one of his supporters, to the post in May to extend his authority over the guard force.

gala, J. In his letter of resignation, Sharif said, "power-seeking and group divisions and other tendencies prevented" the guard from fulfilling its mission "to build an army . . . to support the oppressed people of the world and to continue the Islamic revolution."

the Some guard members were known to be supporters of Islamic fundamentalists opposed to Bani-Sadr.

mer Bani-Sadr suffered a further setback in his struggle with the Islamic hardliners when another of his appointees resigned June 19 for the same reason given by Sharif. The official was Taghi Riahi, head of Iran's state radio and television, who said he could not perform his duties because of divisions and power cliques within the broadcasting system.

on in In a move to bolster his authority, Bani-Sadr later June 19 carried out a major shift of the military command. He named Gen. Valiollah Fallah, the former army commander, as the new chief of staff, replacing Gen. Mohammed Hadi Shadmehr, who was appointed "supreme adviser" on military affairs.

the president also named Gen. Ghassem Ali Zahirnezhad to head the army, and Col. Javad Fakuri as air force commander. Fakuri replaced Gen. Amir Bahaman Bagheri, who recently resigned.

Plot vs. Bani-Sadr Reported—A newspaper owned by Bani-Sadr June 19 reported that an official of the fundamentalist Islamic Republican Party was planning to overthrow the president by compelling him to resign by political means or, if that failed, by force. [See p. 433D2]

The newspaper, the Islamic Revolution, cited the plot by publishing what it called the transcript of a tape recording allegedly quoting the official who made the threat. He was identified as Hassan Ayat, an aide to Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, leader of the Islamic Republican Party.

Responding to the newspaper's charges, Ayat accused Bani-Sadr of attempting "to frighten the parliament," where the majority Islamic Republican Party was trying to block the president's attempts to appoint a premier of his own choosing.

Bani-Sadr's struggle with the Islamic fundamentalists also centered over the American hostages. The fundamentalists favored spy trials, while the president and his supporters had criticized such suggestions.

European Gold Deposits Returned. Iran had quietly transferred its gold in European banks to Teheran, over the past four months it was reported June 17. The amount moved reportedly totaled about 14 tons, worth about \$300 million at current prices. [See p. 29D2]

Most of the gold apparently was brought back from Britain, although gold deposits in France, West Germany and Switzerland might also have been transferred. British customs data showed that Iran withdrew about nine tons of gold from Britain in April, with a value of about \$161 million.

It was believed that Iran had decided to have the gold returned out of concern that the European countries might freeze Iranian assets because of the continuing crisis over the U.S. hostages in Iran.

However, in a step that seemed to go against the pattern of gold withdrawals, the Iranian Central Bank issued orders that a "significant" share of its foreign exchange holdings be moved back to Britain. This order was reported June 17 as having been issued in the past two weeks.

Leftist Rally Ends in Riot. Members of the left-wing opposition group, People's Mujahedeen, meeting for a rally in the stadium near the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, were attacked June 12 by supporters of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

The encounter erupted into what was described as the worst riot in the Iranian capital since the shah fled the country in January 1979. One person was killed and at least 400 were injured.

The pro-Khomeini militants, armed with stones, attacked the leftists in the stadium. The fighting spread from the stadium to the immediate surroundings of the occupied U.S. Embassy, leading the Islamic Revolutionary Guards to open fire. They fired first into the air, and then into the crowd.

Khomeini's son, Ahmad, sharply criticized the militants June 14 for attacking the leftists, noting that permission for the political rally had been granted by the government.

The Islamic Republic, the newspaper published by the Islamic fundamentalists, maintained however that the riot was provoked by the People's Mujahedeen. The Muslim fundamentalists charged that the leftists were trying to overthrow the government, and wanted to "create martyrs for itself."

(Meanwhile, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had called for a "cultural revolution to finish the enemies of God," according to a French news report cited by AP June 14. Khomeini said that Iran's schools should be placed under "direct control in order to protect their students from contamination of ideas contrary to the value of Islam.")

The riot June 12 started shortly after military officials said that a new plot to overthrow Khomeini and restore the shah had been discovered. This news, however, apparently did not play a role in the riot.

The chief judge of the revolutionary military court announced that at least six officers and enlisted men had been arrested for participating in the conspiracy

to restore the shah. The plotters, Judge Hojatolislam Rey-Shahri said, wanted the shah and former Premier Shahpur Bakhtiari to rule Iran for a two-year provisional period, at the end of which a referendum on the country's future would be held.

The alleged plot, which Rey-Shahri said was codenamed "Operation Overthrow," was the second that Iran claimed to have discovered in the past month. Rey-Shahri said the conspirators would be brought to trial next week.

Jamaica

Debt Refinancing Plan Advances. Jamaica's faltering economy was given some hope of recovering June 4 when Prime Minister Michael Manley announced that the government was planning a major refinancing of its external debt and that "good progress" had been made in securing short-term financing to deal with the country's expected foreign trade deficit of \$430 million in 1980.

Jamaica had broken off credit negotiations with the International Monetary Fund March 25. The government was then forced to overhaul its commercial bank credits in order to meet its mounting debts. [See p. 276A1]

On April 15, Jamaica had narrowly avoided defaulting on some of its debts to commercial bank creditors when the banks agreed to allow Jamaica to roll over 90% of its foreign bank debt. But the banks had refused to consider proposals made by Jamaica for a medium-term economic recovery program because of doubts about the outcome of the upcoming presidential elections set for October. [See p. 314C2]

Stopping in New York on his way home from Libya June 4, Manley announced that loans of \$50 million from Libya and \$25 million in balance of payments support from the Netherlands had been secured. Together with an import credit from West Germany worth about \$8 million that had been negotiated by Jamaica's foreign minister, Percival J. Patterson, and a \$2 million loan from Sweden, Jamaica had come closer to finding the \$220 million it needed to satisfy its short-term debt payments (April 1980 to March 1981).

In addition, Manley said that Jamaica had gotten about \$97 million in oil purchase credits from Venezuela and a \$10 million loan from Iraq.

For the long term, Manley said that Jamaica's future economic health would depend on the expansion of its bauxite industry, a crucial source of foreign exchange. He said that a \$1 billion five-year expansion of the bauxite and aluminum industries was under way with the help of multinational aluminum companies. Existing plants, including the one owned by Alcoa, were worth \$500 million and plans were being made to expand their capacity by 50%. Basic engineering work was also being done for the construction of a new plant with the help of Algeria.

Lebanon

Moslems Clash In Beirut. Heavy fighting broke out May 28 in Beirut's suburbs and the village of Qakayieh in southern Lebanon between Shiite Moslems and left-wing

FACTS ON FILE

vol. 40
No 2067

June 20, 1980

INVESTMENT Companies, Trusts and Counselors. See also Stocks. Co names

NJ Gov Byrne signs Assemblyman Michael Aduato bill to allow sale of ins protecting value of investment in fund or other regulated investment cos (S), F 13,11,13:6

US Sup Ct agrees to rev Appeals Ct ruling that '40 Investment Advisers Act implicitly permits private damage suits by investors against investment advisers, suit brought by shareholder against real estate investment trust and its advisers; SEC, which favors investor suits, has offered amendment to clear up any confusion in law (S), N 7,69:1

Impending Sup Ct ruling in suit against Transamerica Mortgage Advisors will establish whether shareholders may bring private suits against investment advisers for fraudulent practices under Investment Advisers Act; Ct will decide, in separate case, whether independent dirs of investment co can terminate derivative shareholder suit against other dirs and co's investment adviser; SEC has filed friend of ct brief supporting right to terminate (M), D 18,14,1:5

INVESTMENT Company Institute. See also Banks—US, Je 16. Stocks (Genl)—US, Mr 28. Stocks (Genl)—US—Closed-End Companies, Ap 8. Stocks (Genl)—US—Mutual Funds, F 2, Mr 7

INVESTMENT Counsel Assn of America. See also Property and Investments, My 21

INVESTMENT Counselors. See also Stocks. Co names

INVESTMENT Trust Corp (GB)
Barclays Bank acquires 85% of shares in plan devised by Samuel Montague & Co under which bank buys trust with newly issued bank stock and will then sell it to Post Office pension fund for cash (S), JI 14,14,6:4

INVESTMENTS. Use Property and Investments

INVESTOR Responsibility Research Center. See also Corporations, Ap 9

INVESTORS Diversified Services Inc. See also IDS Realty Trust, My 13

IDS and IDS Realty Trust announce they have agreed to postpone until Mar 31 condition of previously announced financial assistance plan for trust (S), Mr 2,14,9:3

IDS repts 4th-qr net loss of \$8.6 million (S), Mr 17,14,7:4

Allegheny Corp stock climbs 3-7/8 points to 22 3/8 after co proposes merger with Investors Diversified Services; IDS stock gains 7 points to 37-1/4, S 22,p82

INVESTORS Funding Corp of New York. See also Fort Lee (NJ), F 4,9

INVESTORS Realty Trust. See also Summit Properties, D 7

IONENT Chemical Co. See also Toiletries, JI 7

IONA College. See also Basketball—College, D 25. Colls—NYS—Accreditation, Mr 30, Ap 2,19

Comment on proposed merger of Iona and St Thomas Aquinas Colls notes talks are going on against backdrop of some drastic changes and new alliances for either convenience or survival among univs; illius of Iona pres, Bro John E Driscoll, and several faculty members; drawings of coll seals (L), Ap 23,XXII,1:1; pres John Driscoll Jr lauds Apr 23 article on proposed Aquinas-Iona Colls merger but corrects any impression he may have given about possible merger between Fordham Univ and Marymount Coll (S), My 21,XXII,24:1; Marymount Coll pres Robert E Cristin Jr denies that Fordham Univ and Marymount Coll plan merger (S), My 21,XXII,24:1; merger talks between Iona and St Thomas Aquinas Colls end, after Aquinas trustees reject tentative agreement (S), D 14,11,3:6

IONESCO, Eugene. See also MP—Revs, California Reich, The (Movie), O 17. US—Social Conditions and Trends, D 26. Writing and Writers, Ap 18

IONOSPHERE. Use Space

IONS and Ionization. See also Astronautics—US, D 26

IOS Ltd. See also Vesco, Robert L, S 16

US Sup Ct again refuses to hear Vesco & Co Inc appeal of ruling that co must pay Internatl Controls Corp \$2.4-million in damages Robert L Vesco owes Internatl for his part in securities law violations; refuses to hear SEC stand that Arthur Lipper Corp and its pres, Arthur Lipper 3d, should be barred permanently from securities business for role with IOS in defrauding mutual funds IOS advised and their shareholders of some \$1.4-million; also refuses to hear appeal by Lipper Corp and Lipper that suspension is unjustified; appeals et set 1-yr penalty in Dec '76 (S), Ja 10,49:1; Costa Rican ct rules fugitive Amer financier Robert L Vesco must stand trial on fraud charges, brought by Costa Rican architect Carlos Reznitz for loss of \$217,175 invested in co; sets bail at \$400,000; co-defendants identified as Alberto Inocente Alvarez and Antonio Pena Chavarria (S), Mr 17,14,13:2

Swiss ct rules co founder Bernie Cornfeld must stand trial for allegedly inducing co employees in '69 to buy co stock owned by himself and other co insiders; his atty, Marc Bonnant, plans appeal; Cornfeld ill (S), My 19,14,2:5; Swiss ruling against Cornfeld revd; US Fed Judge Matt Byrne has granted him 3-wk stay of Fed jail term on unrelated charge to appear before Geneva ct (S), My 21,111,5:1; Cornfeld agrees to pay \$2 million to 380 former employees in Geneva whether or not he is convicted of swindling them for allegedly touting co shares when he knew co was about to collapse (S), Je 30,14,2:4

IOTRON Corp
Varo Inc signs agreement under which Iotron will merge with newly formed Varo subsidiary (S), N 18,28:5

IOWA
Article on Iowa's tough, new antibrig v law; Gov Robert D Ray, Atty Gen Richard Turner and Sen Gene Glenn comment; Ray ill (M), Ja 9,16:1; comment (S), Ja 15,14,4:3

Elections
Sen Dick Clark is in Iowa campaigning for June 6 Dem primary; Sen Roger Jepsen favored over Iowa Commerce Comm chmn Maurice Van Nostrand in Repub Sen primary; Repr Jerome Fitzgerald opposes Tom Whitney in Dem Gov primary; winner will face Gov Robert D Ray in Nov (M), Je 4,24:1; Jepsen wins Repub Sen nomination, defeating Van Nostrand (M), Je 7,21:1; Sen Browne, aide to former Sen Jack Miller, says that Tong Sun Park donated \$3,000 to Miller's '72 campaign but says that he believed it was illegal and had it returned (S), Je 20,11,7:2

Survey shows anti-abortionists' impact has been felt in elections across nation; in Iowa number of candidates who publicly oppose abortions have been nominated in both pol parties; at center of anti-abortion campaign is state pol action com Pro-Life Action Council headed by Carolyn Thompson (S), Je 20,11,10:2; Paul Brown, dir of Life Amendment Local Action, pol arm of anti-abortion Natl Right to Life Com, says Iowa has been selected for 1st of 11 Nov election campaigns in which org plans to lobby

aggressively, Roger Jepsen, who is supported by Right to Life Com, will try to unseat Sen Dick Clark, Dem (S), JI 3, 20:1

Table shows major party candidates for Sen and for Gov and present distribution of Sen and HR seats (S), N 6,21:3; **Repub Gov Robert Ray apparently re-elected** (S), N 8,19:1; tally (S), N 9,20:3; James A S Leach, Tom Tauke, Charles E Grassley, Neal Smith, Tom Harkin and Berkley Bedell are elected to HR (S), N 9,22:1; **Repub Roger Jepsen defeats Dem Sen Richard C Clark, Sen race; tally** (S), N 9,22:1; Sen and gubernatorial contests revd; Repubs capture Cong seat and take both houses of state Legis (S), N 9,24:5; Clark's staff talks about defeat and plans to seek new jobs (M), N 10,16:3; Clark's defeat laid to abortion issue; Jepsen supported const ban on abortions; illius (M), N 13,18:3

Tom Wicker, commenting on Sen Dick Clark's good relations with black African leaders, contends Clark's election defeat has brought consternation and dismay to black Africans (S), N 24,27:1; Ir takes exception to Tom Wicker's column, D 2,22:4; US delegate to UN Andrew Young says he has reassured African leaders that Sen Dick Clark was defeated by antiabortion forces in Nov election, not by anti-Africa backlash (S), D 18,9:1

IOWA, University of. See also Colls—US—Research, Ja 8. Football—College, N 28. Intelligence, S 29. Wrestling, Mr 19

IOWA Beef Processors
Pacific Holding Corp acquires co for \$270 million (M), N 7,70:1

IOWA-Illinois Gas & Electric Co. See also Elec Light—Iowa, Ag 5

IOWA Public Service Co. See also Elec Light—Iowa, Ag 5

IOWA State Penitentiary (Ft Madison). See also Prisons—Iowa, N 7

IOWA State University. See also Football—Bowl Games, Hall of Fame Bowl, N 19, D 21. Football—Bowl Games, Peach Bowl, Ja 1. Track—US—College, N 19

IPEX Group. See also Bridges—Michigan, Ja 1

IPM Technology Inc. See also Stocks (Genl)—US—Violations, 1PM

IPPOLITO, Andrew W. See also Discovery Oil Ltd, My 4

IPPOLITO, Carl. See also Crime—NJ, F 23

IPPOLITO, Joseph E. See also Gambling—NJ, Mr 24

IQ Tests. Use Mental Tests

IRAGGI, Mario J (Dean). See also New York City Community College, My 28

IRAN. See also Afghanistan, My 5,7,20, Je 16,24, S 24. Airplanes—Iran, Ja 11. Asian Development Bank, CENTO. Ethiopia, Ja 1, F 15,19, Mr 7, Je 19, Iraq, N 19. Middle East, Je 18,21, JI 3,17, D 20. Middle East—Israeli-Arab Conflict, Ja 1,7, Mr 23, My 28, JI 17, D 5. Pakistan—Pol, My 20, Je 13. Rhodesia, D 14. Shipbldg—US—Navy (US), Mr 24. Shipbldg—West Ger, Mr 2. South Africa, D 16. UN, Zaire, Je 2

Pres and Mrs Carter arrive in Iran; Carter confers with Shah; illius (L), Ja 1,1:5; about 200 Iranian students hold peaceful demonstration outside White House to protest Pres Carter's visit (S), Ja 1,12:3; Iranian dissidents rept 20 persons were killed when police opened fire on protest demonstration, Qom (S), Ja 11,6:1

Legal maneuvers in multimillion-dollar damage suit have turned up new charges of questionable activities relating to payment of agents' fees in sale to Iran of 80 F-14 interceptor planes built by Grumman Corp; allegations detailed (M), Ja 11,14,1:4

Supporters and opponents of Shah of Iran stage demonstrations in NYC on Jan 11 as Empress Farah visits city (S), Ja 12,11,3:1; Farah speaks to Asia Soc, NY Hilton; Shah's supporters and opponents stage demonstrations outside hotel, PBA urges Fed reimbursement to NYC for cost of providing Farah's protection, telegram to Pres Carter; Farah illius with Mobil chmn Rawleigh Warner Jr and Iranian Amb Ardeshir Zahedi; demonstrators' illius (M), Ja 13,11,3:3; Richard F L Carlson Jr says orgns such as Asia Soc should bear some of police costs incurred when their affairs invite protest demonstrations such as those attending dinner hon Empress of Iran, Ja 21,18:6

Iranian author Gholamhossein Saedi, who was barred by authorities from visiting US at inv of Internatl Freedom to Publish Com arm of Assn of Amer Publishers, is granted passport (S), Ja 30,8:5

Officials say Iran's request for new aircraft can be met only by stretching US arms sales out into future yrs because of Carter Adm's ceiling on arms sales (S), F 2,1:6

Shah of Iran arrives in New Delhi, India, for 4-day visit; students demonstrate to protest visit (S), F 3,14,14:3

Article on continuing influence of former OMB Dir Bert Lance at White House describes his involvement in efforts to have Pres Carter invite Northrup Corp chmn Thomas V Jones to state dinner for Shah in mid-Nov (M), F 7,5:2

Comment on Texton's alleged involvement in Iran via questionable payments of subsidiary Bell Helicopter to late Gen Mohammad Khatemi to facilitate sales of helicopters; effects of disclosures on Sen confirmation of Texton chief exec G William Miller as Fed Reserve Chmn noted (S), F 19,14,4:2

6 Iranians killed, 125 hurt, in anti-Govt rioting, Tabriz (S), F 20,6:4; troops patrol Tabriz; rioters reptly were protesting deaths in Jan clash between police and religious crowd, Qom (S), F 21,9:5; army takes over Tabriz as death toll from rioting reptly rises to at least 9; Govt blames riots on Islamic Marxists (S), F 22,9:2

Sen Banking Com agrees to recall Miller for further questioning (M), F 23,1:5; Miller sees 'no substance' in issue; concedes Sen Banking Com may press request for French data on payment to Air Taxi, Iranian sales agency, through Citibank Paris office; also says com may call Iranian officials A H Zanganeh and Ahmed Chafik (M), F 24,1:1; White House aides insist Miller nomination will not be withdrawn (S), F 24,1:2

Iranian troops withdrawn from Tabriz after pol rioting; 9 reptd killed, 650 detained (S), F 24,10:5; problems confronting Shah revd in wake of recent riots (S), F 26,14,1:3

Miller confirmation hearing revd (S), F 26,14,2:2; Sen Banking Com probe continues (S), F 27,14,1:6

Payment of \$2.9-million in comms to Iranian agents by Bell Helicopter for sale of 489 helicopters in early '70s noted (S), F 28,41:5

E Ger police seize 14 Iranian students occupying Iranian Embassy to protest their Govt's policies, E Berlin (S), F 28, 11:6

Sen Banking Com will confirm Miller following hearing in which he denied allegations that Bell Helicopter bribed Iranian Gen Mohammad Khatemi to obtain lucrative sales

says procedures before mil tribunals deny defendants possibility of fair trial, US Cong subcom on internatl o hearing (S), Mr 1,20:4

Police official is killed in demonstrations inspired by underground leaders opposing Govt, Tabriz (S), Mr 2,1

Hassan Safavi, former Iranian official who once prom Bell Helicopter interests, says 10 yrs ago he told 3 Bell execs that Air Force Gen Mohammad Khatemi had sec interest in Air Taxi, co that Bell paid \$2.9 million when won lucrative Iranian Govt contract (M), Mr 3,1:2

Informed sources say religious-cultural conservatism a Moslem anger over emancipation of women are as mu, blame for recent riots in Tabriz as 'Islamic Marxism' w central Govt cites as cause; map (M), Mr 5,7:1

Over 100 Iranian students enrolled at Bee County Co Tex, many of them linked to groups opposing Shah, ple not guilty to criminal trespass charges arising from demonstration (S), Mr 14,22:3

Pahlevi orders Savak security police officials to be demoted in wake of Tabriz riots (M), Mr 16,14:1; Ahm Banihmad introduces motion in Parliament censuring c for its handling of riots in Tabriz (S), Mr 17,2:3

Ingalls shipbuilding div of Litton Systems wins \$796 million Navy contract for construction of 4 destroyers t Iran (S), Mr 24,14,3:6

Paul Hofmann article on Iran's pol and soc unrest not Shah's authoritarian and paternalistic rule has been challenged by forces that have no legal outlet; drawing (M), Ap 2,14,5:3; demonstrators attack banks and other public places in 3 towns (S), Ap 3,6:3; David M Sloan article holds Shah has endowed Amer univs in effort to immunity from internatl criticism (M), Ap 3,23:1

Amb to Sudan Mostafa Elm-Motlaq is arrested for allegedly embezzling \$140,000 (S), Ap 5,8:4

Govt repts smashing Soviet espionage ring that include retired Iranian Brig Gen Ali Akbar Darakhsham and 2 Soviet Embassy employees; announcement comes amid Govt charges that 'foreign-backed elements' are respons for recent anti-Govt rioting (S), Ap 7,6:5; 83 persons arrested for distributing anti-Govt pamphlets, Teheran (S) Ap 23,7:1; 23 univ students arrested in anti-Govt demonstration, Babol (S), My 7,25:1; 3 students killed at scores of people injured when police and pro-Govt group clash with religious dissidents in several cities (S), My 10,6:2; anti-Govt rioting breaks out in Qom (S), My 11,11:1

Shah of Iran postpones trip to Eastern Eur and takes command of troops acting to break up demonstrations by thousands of Moslem extremists demanding his ouster and return to strict Islamic principles of rule (S), My 12,4:3, persons reptd killed and millions of dollars of property destroyed in anti-Govt riots in 25 cities since May 11, ill (S), My 13,1:4; unrest subsides after Govt warns that it w not tolerate further disorders (S), My 14,12:3; anti-Govt riots revd; illius (S), My 14,14,2:2; Govt troops patrol Teheran sts after Shah's opponents order stores to close (S), My 16,2:3; police clash with several hundred Teheran Univ students (S), My 17,14:6; Shah of Iran is facing stongest opposition in 15 yrs but he is not worried by riots and demands for reform in major cities; most power group opposing Shah is made up of traditional Moslems loyal to Ayatollah Moh mmed Khomeini; merchants and liberal politicians are also dissatisfied (M), My 18,1:5, 18, members of Iranian Studer Assn face deportation hearing after fight breaks out in Chicago at demonstration against Shah (M), My 19,12:1; police arrest 15 people after bomb explodes in Qom (S), My 23,12:4

Article on pol turmoil in Iran holds anti-Govt riots will continue unless Shah makes peace with Moslems; religious leader Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadary comments; illius; map (M), Je 4,1:2; riots revd (S), Je 4,14,2:4; about 3,000 Iranian students demonstrate in Washington, DC, on anniv of '63 uprising against Shah (S), Je 6,7:6

Shah names secret police chief Gen Nematollah Nassiri Amb to Pakistan in move that is regarded as demotion (S) Je 7,2:6

Shah names Gen Nasser Moghadam head of secret police (S), Je 8,22:4

Thousands of Moslems hold peaceful demonstration to protest killing of theology student by Govt troops, Qum (S) Je 18,8:1

Dr Gholam-Hossein Saedi, prominent Iranian author visiting US, says Pres Carter's support for human rights has raised hopes of intellectuals and writers in trouble with regime in Iran (S), Je 18,28:1

Documents subpoenaed by Govt from Textron Inc fail to show that former chmn G William Miller knew that Iran Air Force comdr Gen Mohammad Khatemi controlled Air Taxi, co that Bell Helicopter was using as its sales agent in Iran; indicate that Bell vp Farnk M Sylvester was informed in '71 in secret memorandum that Khatemi was 'real influence' behind Air Taxi (M), Je 29,14,7:1

Shah of Iran forbids members of royal family to make business deals in which they stand to benefit (M), JI 4,1:2

Article on close ties between US and Iran notes that during last 20 yrs US has sold over \$18 billion worth of arms to Iran and has helped organize vast security system that gives Shah Mohammed Pahlevi absolute control of country; illius (L), JI 9,1:4

Most Amers living in Iran, like those of other Middle Eastern countries, find themselves isolated from local people (M), JI 9,10:4

Pres Carter approves sale to Iran of nearly \$600 million in weapons, including 31 Phantom fighter-bombers (S), JI 16, 26:1

Writer Dr Gholam-Hossein Sa'edi speaks out against Iranian censorship during visit to US; drawing (M), JI 16, VII,p31; article by Sa'edi attacks Iran's censorship of writers; drawing (M), JI 21,25:2

Illius of Shah's 8-yr-old daughter Leila taking part in potato-sack race during visit to Capital Children's Museum, Washington, DC, JI 26,2:4

1 policeman is killed and 24 persons are injured in anti-Govt riots in Meshed (S), JI 26,7:1

Grumman Aerospace Corp completes last of its F-14 jet sales to Iran (S), JI 26,14,4:1; Carter Adm considers sale to Iran of 31 F-4 planes fitted with sophisticated electronic-warfare equipment; planes are part of Shah's request for over \$9 billion in US mil equipment; some Adm officials and Congressmen oppose sale because of possibility that planes would fall into wrong hands (M), JI 30,11:1

Govt says 7 people were killed, dozens injured and over 300 arrested in anti-Govt riots in 13 towns in last wk (S), Ag 2,6:2

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Shah

Chronology of events in Iran-contra affair

Associated Press

WASHINGTON

Here is a brief chronology of events related to the Iran-contra affair, the subject of yesterday's final report by investigating committees from the Senate and House of Representatives:

1984

March 7 — Cable News Network correspondent Jeremy Levin is kidnapped in Beirut. Mr. Levin, freed 11 months later, is the first of 15 U.S. hostages, of whom eight remain captive.

Summer — Iranian purchasing agents put out call for weapons, including TOW anti-tank missiles. By November, Iranians are suggesting link between weapons sales and release of U.S. hostages.

1985

July — Israeli official suggests dealing with Iran to U.S. national security adviser Robert McFarlane and says transfer of arms could lead to release of hostages. Mr. McFarlane takes the message to President Ronald Reagan.

Aug. 30 — First planeload of U.S.-made weapons is sent from Israel to Tehran. Mr. McFarlane and Donald Regan, White House chief of staff, later disagree over whether President Reagan approved shipment. Mr. Reagan says he does not remember.

Sept. 14 — Second shipment is sent to Tehran.

Sept. 15 — U.S. hostage Rev. Benjamin Weir is released.

Dec. 5 — Mr. Reagan signs a document describing operation with Iran as strictly an arms-for-hostages deal. Rear-Admiral John Poindexter, Mr. McFarlane's

successor as national security adviser, later testifies that on Nov. 21, 1986, he tore up only copy of this document that bore the President's signature.

1986

Jan. 17 — Mr. Reagan signs a secret Intelligence paper authorizing Central Intelligence Agency participation in the sales and ordering that the process be kept secret from Congress.

February — First direct shipment of arms from Pentagon stocks is sent to Iran.

April — National security aide Lt.-Col. Oliver North writes memo outlining plans to use \$12-million (U.S.) in profits from Iran arms sales for aid to contras fighting to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua. Supplying the contras violates a prohibition by Congress.

May 25 — Col. North and Mr. McFarlane fly to Tehran with shipment of spare parts, expecting hostages to be freed. Negotiations break down and they return to Washington.

Sept. 26 — Iranian middlemen deposit \$7-million into Swiss bank account. More spare parts and TOWs are prepared for shipment.

Oct. 5 — Col. North flies to West Germany for meeting with Iranian contact who says he can obtain release of one hostage for 500 TOWs.

Nov. 2 — U.S. hostage David Jacobsen, held since June of 1985, is freed.

Nov. 4 — A pro-Syrian news magazine in Beirut breaks news that Mr. McFarlane had flown to Iran to meet and negotiate with officials there.

Nov. 13 — White House admits selling arms to Iran. Mr. Reagan

repeats that his Administration has not bargained with terrorists or sold arms for hostages.

Nov. 21 — CIA director William Casey briefs Senate intelligence committee on arms deal, but makes no mention of diversion of funds. Col. North and his secretary, Fawn Hall, shred, alter or remove documents relevant to arms deal.

Nov. 25 — Mr. Reagan announces that Col. North has been fired and Admiral Poindexter has resigned. Attorney-General Edwin Meese discloses that \$10-million to \$30-million in arms-sale profits were diverted to the contras.

Nov. 26 — Mr. Reagan sets up Tower commission to review role of National Security Council.

Dec. 1-3 — Senate intelligence committee begins inquiry. Col. North and Admiral Poindexter both invoke the Fifth Amendment.

Dec. 19 — Lawrence Walsh is appointed independent counsel to investigate the deal. Both houses of Congress select investigating committees.

1987

Feb. 18 — Tower commission issues its report, rebuking Mr. Reagan for failing to control national security staff.

March 4 — Mr. Reagan acknowledges in televised speech that his Iranian initiative deteriorated into arms-for-hostages deal. "It was a mistake."

May 5 — Congressional Iran-contra hearings begin with testimony from retired U.S. Air Force General Richard Secord, who describes how \$3.5-million in proceeds from arms sales to Iran were diverted to the contras.

May 6 — Mr. Casey dies of brain cancer.

May 11 — Mr. McFarlane begins four days of testimony, during which he says Mr. Reagan instructed staff in 1984 to find ways around congressional ban on U.S. military aid to contras. Mr. McFarlane denies he, Col. North and Admiral Poindexter concocted cover story in early November, 1986, to cover up the Administration's arms sales to Iran.

July 7 — Col. North begins six days on stand during which he says he had authorization from his superiors for diverting Iran arms-sale money to the contras, Mr. Casey knew of the diversion all along, and Col. North always assumed Mr. Reagan knew about it. But he says he never discussed the plan with the President or received written presidential authorization for it.

July 15 — Admiral Poindexter testifies over five days that he never told Mr. Reagan that the Iran arms-sale proceeds were being diverted to the contras. Admiral Poindexter says Mr. Reagan, in writing, authorized straight arms-for-hostages swap in December of 1985, but that Admiral Poindexter tore up the document in November of 1986, as the affair unravelled.

Aug. 6 — Hearings conclude.

Nov. 18 — Final report of House and Senate investigating committees concludes that Mr. Reagan bears ultimate responsibility for Iran-contra affair because he allowed "cabal of the zealots" to seize control of policy and bypass the law. Committee Republicans dissent sharply, saying mistakes amounted only to errors in judgment.

Toronto Star
November 29, 1986
P. B4

① IRAN 2. U.S. - FOREIGN RELATIONS

By Dillip Hiro Special To The Star

LONDON — In contrast to the disarray prevalent in the Reagan administration, the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini appears well composed, even serene.

With the manner and content of Khomeini's speech on Prophet Mohammed's birthday anniversary last Thursday were indicative of this. "Iran is a country of Islam," he declared. "Neither the Kremlin nor the Black House (i.e. White House) is worthy of mention here."

Khomeini's assertion that "Those who broke relations with Iran have come back pleading, wanting to re-establish relations and making apologies," was reflected by James Schlesinger, former U.S. defence secretary. "While President (Jimmy) Carter did his grovelling before Iran in public, the Reagan administration prefers to do it in private," he said.

Clearly the Tehran government has emerged as the winner in the current controversy about the clandestine U.S. arms sales to Iran. The Iranian leaders have presented the U.S. behavior as a sign of weakness and confusion.

This is quite an achievement for a second-rate, Third-World country in its dealings with a superpower which until eight years ago dominated it.

A host of factors have combined to give Iran the upper hand in its relationship with the United States:

- Iran's unique strategic position;
- Its surprising determination to pursue the Gulf War;
- The consummate bargaining skills of its leaders; and

Why Iran is so vital to U.S.

Its strategic location and oil power are just too good to miss

□ The U.S. administration's unshakable wish to shape the Islamic Republic's destiny in the post-Khomeini era by ingratiating itself with certain Iranian military officers.

Iran is a strategic prize no U.S. policymaker can overlook. Since it occupies all of the eastern shore of the Gulf — an area with 55 per cent of the global oil reserves — it dominates the chief oil routes of the world.

It lies next to Afghanistan, the Indian subcontinent and the Soviet Union, with which it has a 1,250-mile border. Were Tehran to ally itself with Moscow, it would provide the Soviets with direct land routes to the Gulf and the Indian subcontinent.

Moreover, the Soviet navy would gain access to the warm waters of the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and would be able to intercept the oil lanes from the Gulf to the Far East and Western Europe. U.S. policy-makers view such a prospect with foreboding.

Aware of this the Iranian leaders have been exploiting the U.S. fears. In July of last year, President Ronald Reagan upgraded the secret U.S.-Iran contacts by sending a message of thanks to Hojatalislam Raisanjeni, speaker of the Iranian parliament, through Prime Minister

Nakasone in Tokyo for Rafsanjani's help in getting the last four hostages of the TWA hijacking released.

At the same time the Iranian foreign minister announced: "We intend to increase and expand our relations with the Soviet Union."

An East European diplomat in Tehran summed up the recent Tehran-Moscow relations thus: "Last April Iran sided with the Soviets when the U.S. bombed Libya. Then Iranian Prime Minister Mousavi welcomed the Soviet announcement of withdrawal of some of its troops from Afghanistan."

That the economic links between Iran and the Soviet Union were to be strengthened became clear when following his visit to Moscow in August, the Iranian oil minister said that Iran would resume its natural gas supplies to the Soviets — a trade it had terminated soon after the 1979 revolution.

"Due to the acute foreign exchange shortage the Iranians want to start selling gas to the Russians before the year is out," a Western diplomat told me in Tehran recently. "The whole deal will be worth \$2 billion to the Iranians. Whether the Russians would be able to pay them in hard currency is another matter."

This was the background against which the clandestine U.S.-Iran talks

were conducted. It strengthened the hand of the Iranian leaders who seemed to have played their cards skilfully.

At first they got the Reagan administration to cease pressuring Third-World countries from supplying U.S.-made arms and spares to Iran. Then they challenged American negotiators to prove their influence in Washington by getting them weapons directly from the United States.

Both Washington and Moscow have been impressed by the powerful military machine Khomeini has forged in Iran. Despite considerable difficulties in procuring U.S.-made military spares and ammunition, and a steep fall in its oil income, Iran's resolve to continue the Gulf War until the downfall of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein has remained undiminished.

The prospect of Iran emerging as the victor in the Gulf conflict has nudged the White House to court Tehran and find a foothold in Iran's internal power structure.

But the Iranian leaders are proving to be tough bargainers. According to Robert MacFarlane, he was told by John Poindexter, the National Security Adviser, that all the U.S. hostages in Lebanon would be released by the time he flew into Tehran with U.S.-made spares and

ammunition aboard his plane.

But on his arrival in Tehran on May 28 he learned from telephone conversations with the National Security Council staff that none of the hostages had been freed. Also he found that he was dealing with low level officials of the Iranian government.

In short, the Iranians managed to make their U.S. negotiators appear naive in private as they were to do so later in public by getting more out of them than giving them.

For its part, having been expelled ignominiously from the portals of power in Tehran eight years ago, the U.S. administration sees in the supply of military spares and ammunition for the U.S.-made weapons in use in Iran as the one and only way to re-enter the Iranian power equation — with some senior Iranian military leaders acting as their pawns.

It is probably a secret dream of Reagan to regain for the United States the strategic prize of Iran, something Carter lost. In the process of realizing it he has created the worst crisis of his presidency.

Those U.S. leaders who deal with Khomeini better beware. Six years ago Khomeini destroyed Carter's chance of re-election. Now he may well be paving the way for a lacklustre exit for Ronald Reagan.

□ Dillip Hiro, a London-based journalist and writer, has written a book on Iran and is currently working on a book on Moslem fundamentalism. He recently spent two weeks in Iran.

INTERNATIONAL

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
NATIONAL

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1986

Iranians in US who rejoiced over Shah's fall now oppose Khomeini

By Warren Richey
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

They once denounced the United States as a "great satan." But seven years after the fall of the Shah, some expatriate Iranians are struggling to deliver a new message to a reluctant American public.

These supporters of the militant People's Mujahedin, an underground guerrilla force of Iranians fighting to topple Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, now see the Iranian leader as the great satan.

While attempting to overcome the scars of the 1979 US hostage crisis, the Mujahedin's American supporters are hoping to build international pressure against Tehran's fundamentalist Islamic government, particularly on the issue of human rights abuses within Khomeini's Iran. Supporters admit it has been an uphill battle.

"No people on earth deserve dictators and terrorists. The people of Iran have suffered long enough," says an Iranian PhD mathematics student in Boston who says he is a supporter of the Mujahedin. "Shah was a dictator, but Khomeini is 100 times worse than him."

The People's Mujahedin is said to be the strongest of Khomeini's domestic political opponents. The organization has supporters scattered throughout the Iranian exile community, including many Iranians living in the US.

Last Friday, more than 1,000 Iranian Mujahedin supporters held a march in the



Expatriate Iranians conduct anti-Khomeini demonstration at 1984 Republican convention

freezing rain outside the White House to protest actions of the Khomeini regime.

It was a far cry from the reception received a few days earlier by Jonas Savimbi, the Angolan rebel leader who is fighting his own insurgency. The movement also lacks the recognition afforded the "contra" rebels fighting in Nicaragua, for whom the administration is said to be considering a \$100 million military aid package.

Mujahedin spokesmen stress they are not interested in US guns or money — and they are not likely to be offered any.

The US State Department has called the Mujahedin "an anti-American, anti-Western collectivist organization which employs terrorism and violence as standard instruments of its policies."

Mujahedin supporters deny they are anti-American. They maintain their fight is similar to that of the colonists in the American Revolutionary War.

"We hold no enmity toward the American people and the values cherished by the American people," says Ali Safavi, Washington-based spokesman for the Mujahedin. "What the Mujahedin is fight-

ing for the same as what the Americans fought for in the War of Independence."

According to a spokesman, the Mujahedin's goals in the US are:

- To heighten international pressure on the Khomeini government to halt widespread human rights abuses.
- To establish the Mujahedin as the internationally recognized legitimate opposition to the Khomeini government.
- To lay groundwork for future Iranian-US diplomatic relations after the downfall of the Khomeini regime.

Some observers question whether the Mujahedin's apparent pro-West shift and move toward more moderate rhetoric is simply a cosmetic effort aimed at trying to gain more support in the powerful industrialized nations. An Iranian journalist notes that the Mujahedin is no longer calling for Islamic fundamentalism, rather it is now calling for modernization in Iran. The journalist says the shift appears to be designed to make the Mujahedin's cause more acceptable to a Western audience.

Mujahedin supporters here dispute this interpretation. "The whole notion that the Mujahedin is anti-Western is absolutely unfounded," says Safavi. He adds that such assertions are orchestrated by the followers of the deposed Shah.

"Because the US administration claims that it supports democracy, just causes, and liberation movements, we expected it to condemn Khomeini much more than it has and in a much stronger way," the Iranian student says.



Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON

GOP

from preceding page

theatre are also under attack and banned from dealing with "un-Islamic" subjects such as portraying the face or figure of women. Sculpture and dance-ballet or Folk — are completely prohibited. In contrast, paintings glorifying Khomeini and other Ayatollahs or bloody scenes from the Iran-Iraq war are on constant display in our Art Galleries.

As the contradictions of the present regime become more obvious, our people's appreciation of progressive art increases. Literary works or music tapes are sold, at very high prices, openly or secretly, or passed around from one person to the next. The situation nevertheless remains complex and difficult, especially in the performing and fine arts.

Q: What forms of protest are left open for progressive artists?

A: The Islamic Republican regime is conducting a calculated programme of tracking down and, if possible, physically destroying artists and writers who survived imprisonment and torture of the Shah's regime. This is also true of all well-known political prisoners. Many political prisoners and literary figures who suffered imprisonment under the Shah were later executed by the present Ayatollahs.

Basically, the Ayatollahs as the proponents of War and Death oppose anything that portrays Hope and Happiness. Protest, artistic and otherwise, is becoming increasingly difficult. In 1983 for example, my book "Between Two Journeys" was published in Iran with an introduction explaining "that the book had previously appeared during the Shah's regime, but all copies were destroyed by Savak. We now have pleasure in reprinting it". In 1983 the Islamic Republic could not be seen to prohibit this work, but I doubt if it would be possible today.

Q: As a progressive Iranian writer how did you view the Americanisation of Iranian cultural life during the period when the USA dominated Iran's social and economic development?

A: The Americanisation of much of Iranian society during the Shah's rule was mainly rejected by the people. Only the financial oligarchy and

the upper strata of the Iranian middle class supported it. For example, when imported American pop music was all the rage the progressive intelligentsia turned to classical Persian music, whilst the ordinary people preferred their own "home produced" popular music.

Progressive painters in the main totally rejected modern (American) Abstract Art and concentrated on innovative artistic forms with social and political content and themes. The same applied to the art of the cinema, theatre and literature. The point is, all the financial and ideological resources of the Shah's state were placed at the disposal of those artists and intellectuals who favoured the influence of American contemporary culture. It must be stressed that it was due to this encouragement of American "culture" and way of life through a continual bombardment by the cinema, press and television, that led to some destructive consequences in our youth which persists to this day.

Q: Can the Islamic Republic protect and develop the best traditions of Iranian Art and Culture?

A: The Islamic Regime has adopted the stance of the Shah's regime in most of the political, economic and cultural fields. It has nothing new to offer the people: the term "Islamic Art" is nothing but an anti-people and worthless sham. Some sections of Iranian youth, despite the severe control

and brutality of the Mullahs, continue to pursue the American way of life. They wear T-shirts and blue jeans and watch and dance to all the latest American videos.

The Islamic regime is a serious obstacle in the path of the development of Iran's art and culture. It is only after the removal of this obstacle that Iranian Art and Culture will flourish.

Q: What is the content of your work?

A: It is the life of the people, especially the city dwellers that forms the main content of my work; my work is realistic and satirical. The Americanisation of Iranian culture already referred to, and its effects on the lives of the middle class provided me with a good opportunity to create numerous satirical works. At the same time some of my work is devoted to the portrayal of the struggle and resistance of the intellectuals against and under the Shah's dictatorship.

Despite all the problems of brutality and tyranny, facing the Iranian people, including the problems of poverty and illiteracy, and the insane war between Iran and Iraq, Iranian writers like myself have hope for the future.

The works of all progressive Artists and writers inside and outside of Iran is a reflection of our people's lives, their sufferings, their happiness and their hopes and ideals.

Fereydoun Tonkaboni was born in Tehran in 1937. He was a student of literature at Tehran University where he received his degree. He later taught at various high schools in Tehran. He published a novel in 1961, and since then has contributed to different monthly and weekly newspapers.

He was one of the founders of Iran's Writers' Association, established in 1966. The publication of his book Lively City in 1970 led to his arrest and imprisonment for six months by the SAVAK. His sentencing gave rise to a wave of protests by Iranian writers and artists. To quell the uproar, SAVAK arrested other writers including the well-known Beh-Azeen, who was the head of the Writers' Association.

In 1973, Tonkaboni was again arrested because of publishing another critical work, Worry and Unfruitfulness. This time, he was sentenced to two and one-half years. After his release Tonkaboni, in cooperation with other progressive writers, reestablished the Writers' Association and was elected as its board member.

Tonkaboni participated actively in the 1979 revolution. After the victory of the revolution, he, along with other progressive Iranian writers and artists, founded the Writers and Artists Council of Iran. He was elected to the Council's executive committee.

In 1983 the Writers and Artists Council of Iran was banned and many of its executive committee members were arrested. Tonkaboni was forced to flee Iran.

Arabia: The Islamic

World Review

320-917671

Ar 12

(STX)

Religious, political and ideological classes cover Islamic ethics and the goals and philosophy of the Islamic Revolution. The library at Evin prison has a capacity of some 50 students. When we visited it, the prisoners were studying a play by a 19th century CE Iranian playwright. In most prisons, we learned, physical training plays an important part in the detainees' lives. Sports facilities have been provided in prisons where they had been non-existent.

Professional and agricultural training is also provided. Workshops range from blanket-weaving to shoe-making, painting and mechanics. The detainees are given a small salary, we were told, while they learned an occupation, and their products have helped sustain the war effort. In March, cooperatives were to be introduced in prisons, with moderately priced goods.


It was announced in late February that a medical social security system for prisoners would be introduced. *Arabia* discovered that a Society for the Protection of Prisoners (SPP) was in charge of poor prisoners' families and that it had already given aid to 3,000 families. Also precautions were said to be taken to enable former prisoners to get employment after their release. Finally, drug addicts have been treated, and about 70 per cent of them have improved.

In talking to young prisoners, it became clear that some of them still sympathised with the Mujahidin, but hundreds of them were released who had either repented or been proved innocent. By November 1981, 1,932 detainees had been released and 1,714 were pardoned and set free on the occasion of the third anniversary of the Islamic Republic (February 11).

Ayatollah Khomeini's message on the occasion announced the release of 4,000 prisoners who, the opposition said, could only be common criminals. In early March, Hojjas-toleslam Tabrizi announced the release of 10,000 criminal and political prisoners within the following two months and said that the International Red Cross would be allowed to visit prisons.

This amnesty may be due to international pressure, as claimed by the Mujahidin, but it can also be seen as a sign of the self-confidence of the Islamic authorities. In the words of the French daily newspaper *Le Monde* recently, "Imam Khomeini's regime has already given evidence of its strength," and despite the war toll and hardship the people, in the majority, appear to support the regime.

The authorities' tough policy seems to have caused the assassination campaign to abate and their conciliatory attitude towards the prisoners, who had been "misled" by the Mujahidin, is likely to win over most of them to the regime or to neutralise them. The occasional bomb explosions which kill civilians have alienated support from the Mujahidin among sections of Iranian people. But the Mujahidin will not disarm easily and the indications are that the regime is determined to eradicate armed opposition.



The mosque: ideological bulwark of the republic

Mustapha Jehazi reports that Iran's 75,000 mosques are playing a leading role in the consolidation of the Islamic republic

As guests from different countries visiting Teheran, we were surprised not to see more mosques in the country of the Islamic Revolution. We could only see a few large ones standing out in a few areas. Our hosts, however, assured us that they were everywhere. Discreetly placed in back streets, many without minarets, the stranger is only aware of their presence at prayer time when the Adhan (call for prayer) is called. As one becomes more familiar with the local scene one notices ordinary people converging on them at different times of the day.

The masjid (mosque) is different from the church or the synagogue. A mere glance at the history of Islam would reveal that it has catered for every aspect of life. Apart from being a place of worship, the masjid has been an educational institution, a court for the settlement of disputes, a place where contracts and political treaties are concluded, and a refuge for the helpless and the persecuted. In a word, they are places for both spiritual and material activities.

Many times over the years in Iran the masjid has played the role of a political centre. The Sarbedaran movement in the 8th century AH – after the Mongol invasion – the Constitution movement of 1906 and also the present Islamic Revolution, all started from the mosque.

It seems that whenever the existence of Muslim society is threatened, the mosque becomes first the refuge and then the source of a new response to the danger. After the events of 1963 and Imam Khomeini's exile to Iraq, the masjid's role came to the fore again. With the monopoly of the media by the Shah's regime, the masjid became a source of information, political awareness and mobilisation. It was through the mosque that, for the first time in 1977, Imam Khomeini's speeches were heard on cassette by the Iranian people.

When the Islamic Revolution took place in Iran in 1979, the masjid developed its activities even more. The khutba (Friday prayer) is used to inform people of current political issues and to spread, explain and even criticise government decisions. In this way imams were

instrumental in the fall of Bani Sadr in June 1981 and in constantly exposing the Mujahidin e Khalq's terrorism. This has made them a target for Mujahidin attacks.

The 75,000 mosques all over Iran provide ideological classes for the people, between prayers, laying stress on Islamic ethics and contemporary ideological struggle. Each mosque has a library with hundreds or thousands of books according to its size. Particular attention is paid to the expansion of mosque libraries. While being used as training centres for martial skills, the masjids seem to have replaced cinemas, theatres and exhibition halls as sources of public attraction.

Moreover, people's difficulties and problems are discussed and solved. Families in need of money to cover expenses of, say, weddings or other personal needs, can obtain interest-free loans. The mosque has also played an important role in collecting and channeling donations to sustain the war effort.

Following the economic blockade and the requirements of the war with Iraq, the mosque has taken charge of rationing food products. Each family is given a card and receives a certain quantity of each product, calculated on the size of the family, at a subsidised price. Also, to protect the people's power of purchase against speculators, various consumer items can be found on sale in the mosques at a minimum state price. We realised in Teheran that the same goods are found in shops and supermarkets, but at three times the mosque prices. While rationing concerns everybody newly married couples are entitled to everything necessary for their households at competitive prices.

The people in charge of distributing rationed food and other items in the mosques are members of the comitehs, the organisations developed in the mosques to fight the Shah, and known as the hezbollahi (supporters of the party of God), ensure security in the cities. Mounted on big black motorbikes and equipped with walkie-talkies, the comitehs have been instrumental in dismantling networks of the Mujahidin e Khalq and in uncovering their arms caches. The mosques have become their garrisons.

Bassij Mostazafin (mobilisation of the impoverished) also have their headquarters in the masjids. The institution of the Bassij was ordered by Imam Khomeini following the US' abortive operation in the Tabas desert. Khomeini set the target of involving 20 million people in this institution which is under the authority of the Revolutionary Guard. Every night after prayer, mosque authorities train people in the use of various arms. So far around three million people have been trained in mosques, factories, schools and hospitals. Each mosque bears the legend: Garrison No. X.

Thus, the masjid tries to cope with every new situation. It acts as a decentralised government. All its activities are selfless. They are carried out "in the way of God," i.e. serving Islam by consolidating and protecting its revolution.

TORONTO STAR
FEB 16, 1983
PA14

11/16/81
A. C. ...

Khomeini's child soldiers are special victims of bitter Gulf war



Baby-faced: Iranian Revolutionary Guard is only 12 years old but he stands guard over 2,000 Iraqi prisoners.

By Amir Taheri Special to The Star

PARIS — They are frightened, hungry, cold and want to go home. Every day some of them die for lack of medical treatment. Many are suffering from psychological shock. And every day they are told that nobody wants them.

Most are just 12 years old and, numbering nearly 5,000, they are war prisoners of a special kind.

Calling themselves the "children of Allah", they are members of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's army of schoolboys that helped turn the tide of the Gulf war against Iraq.

Blood-filled horror

In one grisly operation, they stormed unarmed — screaming "God is great" — through Iraqi minefields and saw thousands of their young comrades blown to pieces in waves of blood-filled horror.

Captured by the Iraqis in various battles during the past 20 months, they

are kept in derelict camps and disused barracks north of Baghdad.

These boy soldiers account for more than half the Iranian war prisoners in Iraq.

Khomeini had promised that at least some of the children would be brought home in time for the fourth anniversary of his Islamic revolution last Friday.

But nothing happened and renewed large-scale fighting that began last week makes chances of an early return of the young prisoners even more remote.

The bitter hatred of the rulers of Tehran and Baghdad for each other has prevented talks on the fate of the captives. Tehran insists that the young prisoners should be treated as war prisoners so that the International Red Cross can handle their cases.

Bagdad says they are too young to be considered soldiers and suggests direct talks leading to their release.

Tehran refuses any contact with Bagdad and insists that Iraqi President

Saddam Hussein must resign before any talks can be considered.

Both the Red Cross and the United Nations have so far refused to take up the matter for fear of being thrown into a particularly ugly political dispute.

Recently Iraq allowed Iranian exiles through to visit some of the camps where the teenage prisoners are held.

Tired and demoralized

The visitors found the young prisoners demoralized, tired and subjected to almost continuous psychological harassment.

Some still profess devotion to Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution. Many were still keeping the aluminum "key to the paradise" given them by the mullahs on the eve of the battle.

The young captives did not understand why Iran was not prepared to negotiate their repatriation. They made desperate pleas to be allowed to leave Iraq. They wanted their names to be communicated to their parents.

The prisoners are kept in about a

dozen camps, each housing between 250 and 400. Each prisoner has a number stamped on the sole of his right foot. Conditions of hygiene are lamentable even in show camps. Rationed food consisted of bread, onions and dried dates.

Narcotics were available in the camps, and cases of sexual abuse were alleged by several boys.

Most of the children said they came from poor villages and claim to have been despatched to battle zones without adequate training.

Many said they had been proud of protection by "angels against bullets." Most had lost friends and companions in battles.

Iraqi authorities are reportedly divided on what to do with the children.

Hardliners want them handed over to the Mujahadeen guerrillas, who recently agreed to join Iraq in the struggle against Iran.

Other Iraqi officials, however, want them transferred to camps in Egypt under the supervision of the Arab Red Crescent.

LEADER SOURCE FILE

Globe & Mail
April 23, 1984
P7

A tired, haggard capital stopped dead in its tracks

BY ORLAND FRENCH

Mr. French is Queen's Park columnist for The Globe and Mail.

TEHRAN

THIS CITY appears to have stopped dead in its tracks. At the construction site of an arts centre the only sign of activity is a scene of three men with two wheelbarrows, moving gravel around. Around them rises the embryonic stage of foundation walls, steel reinforcing rods jutting from poured concrete. Overhead a great bird-like construction crane hovers, ready for action.

But there has been no action for six years, since the Islamic Revolution of 1978. Rust from the reinforcing rods has stained the concrete, and the wooden concrete forms below are slowly rotting away.

Other construction cranes around the city stand idle as well, abandoned after the revolution that swept away the monarchy and installed a fervent band of religious idealists.

The city has a tired, haggard appearance. There is no sign of new construction, or even of repair of the normal deterioration of roads and other public installations. Though the streets are jammed with traffic, there are few vehicles newer than six years old. Importation of cars is

Tehran's traffic jostles for space

banned, except for government officials and others who apparently really need them. One brand of car is assembled in Iran from British-built parts. The only new vehicles are trucks or four-wheel-drive vehicles — Japanese or European, of course, not American.

Tehran's traffic jostles — there is no other applicable word — like squealing piglets for space on the streets. There may not be an undented, unscratched vehicle in the city, especially after six years of unrelieved wear and tear.

Even the paint factories must have closed years ago, except for the one supplying the paint for the revolutionary slogans.

It's simple revolutionary jargon. "Down with the U.S.A." is neatly and boldly printed across the front of an airport terminal for all incoming visitors to see. Welcome to Tehran. Another official-looking sign says, "Down with the U.S. and Israel."

A huge portrait of Ayatollah Khomeini decorates the wall beside the front gate of the deserted U.S. Embassy. A sign says in English, "Why do the other nations not rise against imperialism?" Two banners in Farsi are strung across the gates. A few blocks away, the Canadian Embassy continues to struggle bravely, even though Canada has had no diplomatic presence in Iran since former ambassador Ken Taylor smuggled out six Americans. Six Iranians employed by the Government of Canada continue to operate a consular service at the embassy, which is currently under the Danish flag. The same situation exists at the British Embassy, which now flies the Swedish flag. The British Government has not yet returned the ambassador it recalled during the hostage crisis.

Pictures of the Ayatollah are everywhere, his fierce dark eyes glaring at all who pass by. There are more images of the Ayatollah in Tehran than statues of Lenin in the Soviet Union, although I'm sure neither man would care for the comparison.

In the lobby of the International Hotel, formerly the Intercontinental Hotel, there is a huge sign flung across the lobby wall, "Down with U.S." Hardly a greeting of welcome for North Americans. The hotel is owned by the ministry of information and tourism, officially known as the Ministry of Islamic Guidance.

(This is the same department which hands out press passes for visiting journalists. The Islamic guidance comes into play for the local media, which are encouraged by constitutional decree to "take the direction of the evolutionary course of the Islamic Revolution in the service of the spreading Islamic culture." The media must "prevent the spreading and dissemination of destructive characteristics and those which are anti-Islamic." Judging from what I saw in four editions of the English-language Tehran Times, I'd say that particular newspaper adheres to its constitutional requirements assiduously.)

The Intercontinental/International Hotel puts on a brave face as the best in Tehran, but it wears the signs of neglect badly. After six years under the new name of International, it still uses the stained table cloths, frayed towels and chipped tableware of the old Intercontinental chain. The only sign of a recent effort to spruce up the place was a new coat of bright orange paint on the bathroom door in my room.

There's no prevalent feeling of a country at war, although plastered here and there are jingoistic justifications of the war as an export of the revolution. In the hotel lobby, again, the Ayatollah Khomeini is quoted as saying, "The nation who chooses martyrdom is victorious." The stories of ill-trained youngsters being sent into battle are widespread in Tehran. One Iranian claimed each child is given a plastic, made-in-Taiwan key to wear around his neck as he plunges into battle. It is the key to heaven.

Martyrdom is everything. Government officials who have died violently since the revolution are described as "martyrs." The armed forces are charged with more than the responsibility of defending the

country; they also have a mission of spreading the Islamic school of thought.

Iranians critical of the Islamic republic said they felt the war was a convenient excuse to justify all the ill effects of the revolution. As long as there is a war on, draining the country of its resources and its youth, the people cannot expect an improvement in services. "That's why the war can't end," said one man, "because then they would have to explain themselves."

Among the things they would like to see explained is the rationing of essential consumer products — soap, rice, kerosene, butter — which has automatically created a black market. (There is also a black market for U.S. dollars. Iranians will offer up six times the official exchange rate for U.S. dollars. This practice is banned by law, and strict currency regulations are enforced at all entry and exit points.)

The population of Tehran, 5 million before the revolution, has doubled since. But housing accommodation has not kept pace, and real estate prices have soared out of sight.

378.4205

T I

July 8, 1982

e Week

1-5

review recommends PCL-
merger
aphers campaign to boost
image
senate defies council on
lings
ing interest in extra-mural
k among university teachers



HIGHER EDUCATION SUPPLEMENT

Priory House, St John's Lane, London EC1M 4BX. Telephone 01-253 3000

The Times' merger worries

6

Overseas News

Iranian universities reopen

by Dilip Hiro

Many Iranian universities and colleges of higher education are reopening after three years of inactivity caused by the cultural revolution.

This applies however, only to the faculties of physical sciences, engineering, technology and medicine. The faculties of social sciences and humanities remain closed.

In Greater Tehran, twelve out of the five universities and 11 colleges are now partially open. But the reopened institutions have little in common with their recent past. The student body is much reduced and both the curricula and the physical appearance of the institutions are changed.

The reopened universities are not accepting fresh students, only readmitting the old ones. Of these not many are still around. Those who had anything to do with the secular or Islamic left (Fedayeen, Tudeh and Mujahdeen) were either arrested, executed or driven underground.

Of those supporting the Islamic regime, many are in the military and the revolutionary guard corps and some in the civil service and the "Reconstruction Crusade".

As a result there are only about 4,500-5,000 students at Tehran University. The figure before the revolution was 17,000-18,000.

Three years ago the walls of Tehran University campus - a hotbed of secular and Islamic leftists - were covered with hundreds of hastily scrawled left-wing slogans. Today, the same walls carry well-painted slogans chosen from an official list.

This is one of the achievements of the University Crusade, which was launched in the wake of the appointment of the seven-member Cultural Revolution Committee (CRC) by Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1980.

The CRC, composed of clergy and scholarly laymen, has tried to achieve the twin objective of ending cultural imperialism, whether of Eastern or Western variety, and imbuing universi-



Iranian students occupied the United States Embassy in Tehran at the height of the revolution and held the staff hostage.

ties with Islamic values. It has redesigned curricula; sponsored new textbooks, or modified the existing ones in the light of Islamic teachings; helped the teaching staff to gain better understanding of Islam; and replaced Western concepts in education with Islamic ones.

The clergy have been active at different levels in helping the CRC to realize its aims. For instance, they are deeply involved in the running of the Centre for Textbooks set up by the committee. So far this centre had produced 3,000 textbooks, either original or in translation.

Most of these are on pure sciences, medicine and engineering: the disciplines where conflict between the pub-

lished knowledge and Islamic tenets is minimal.

What has proved daunting has been the programme of producing textbooks in social sciences - economics, psychology, sociology, political science, anthropology - that are imbued with Islamic perspective and values.

The other major problem facing the CRC is the shortage of teaching staff with acceptable Islamic credentials.

Despite these difficulties, the Islamic regime is intent on ending the distinction that now exists between universities and theological schools. Khomeini has called for the merger of Tehran University and Fazieha the leading theological college in Qom, to produce a new leadership for Iran.

Aus
for

from Geoff

The head of the university has called for the nation's

Professor of the University of Wales, has called for a tripartite system of vocational, technical and science colleges, general education, social sciences and universities, with the leading institutions.

Professor rates elementary form of education as a

But under the new and responsive of institutions altered. The example, we present duties of college service in producing.

According to partnership developed by employers and Firms would contribute to and designed to

The arts, while, would "to serve the general well-educated would help General uncertainty of social, political thought health, Pro

Martyrs and death obsess Iran

By John Kifner New York Times

A fountain of blood cascades crimson in the bright sunlight of the martyrs' cemetery.

Colored water, really, but chillingly realistic, the monumental fountain of blood stands in the middle of Behesht-e-Zahra, the sprawling, still-growing cemetery for Iranians who died six years ago in the revolution that overthrew the shah and for those killed over the last four years in the grinding border war with Iraq.

Row upon row, acre after acre, the graves stretch out, each topped by a little glass-fronted cupboard holding photographs of the deceased and, perhaps, a bunch of plastic flowers, a small Koran or other mementos.

"Have you seen the fountain of blood?" Iranians ask me as I wander through the cemetery. They pull at my sleeve, inordinantly proud, with the grisly obsession with martyrdom so striking here.

The cemetery has grown so large that there are auxiliary fountains of martyrs' blood in the new sections, and in the long shedlike shelter that is sometimes used when a crowd assembles for dawn prayers, there is a working model of a new fountain. It pulsates, pumping out the red liquid as would an open heart.

Relative calm

On my return to Iran this fall after four years, I was struck anew by the obsession with martyrdom, and by the institutionalization of the theocracy that has taken hold here. The constant agitation of the crowds in the streets that I remembered from past visits has given way to relative calm, even while war and death are constant subjects of public absorption.

On Friday, the Moslem Sabbath, I found the cemetery filled as usual. Black-clad women and family groups sit by the flat marble slabs covering the graves. Often, they bring picnic lunches and spend the day.

At special times, the 40th day after a death or the yearly anniversary, crowds of friends and relatives gather, bringing huge painted portraits of their martyr and listening to a balladeer sing of his virtues while they answer in chorus Allah-o-akhbar, God is great.

There are, according to a young man from the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, 10,000 people buried in each of the closely packed, huge square plots in the cemetery, and now there are nearly 40 squares.

As dusk gathered one recent Friday, processions formed in the new, only partly filled sections on the edge of the cemetery. On one side is the dense warren of graves with their cabinets of pictures, made almost carnival-like by the many colored flags flying overhead — for Islam, for mourning, for martyrdom, for the army. On the other, acres of flat tan earth stretch out, freshly leveled and prepared for new graves, with shallow indentations marking the rows that will be filled.

"Death to U.S.A." says the legend greeting travellers in huge letters on the outside wall of the international terminal at Mehrabad Airport. The man standing next to me in the line to register currency is carrying a stack of American \$100 bills four inches thick and wearing a Rotary Club pin in the lapel of his blazer.

The procedures are not as stringent as they were a few years ago, when one might expect a body search against

Iran

smuggling foreign money into the thriving black market.

At the Intercontinental Hotel, the staff rushes out under the "Death to U.S.A." sign — a fixture now of all the hotel lobbies in town — to warmly embrace a returning American who spent months there during the revolution and the hostage crisis.

The hotel is more worn now, its lobby decorated with revolutionary posters. Still, it seems busy again, bustling with foreign businessmen here to sell to an economy dependent on imports.

Islamic virtue reigns in every aspect of public life. Alcohol is strictly forbidden and every woman on the street wears either the traditional black chador, a cloth wrapping that must be grasped with hands and teeth to keep it in place, or the more practical hijab, a dark scarf pulled over the forehead, a baggy, dark smock and loose trousers.

Indeed, the government seems obsessed by sex. *Time*, *Newsweek* and other Western publications are regularly available, but a government functionary goes through them first, carefully inking over with felt pen all but the face in any woman's picture, particularly in the cases of the starlets in the newsmaker sections.

An Islamic skiing garment has been designed, at some cost in wind resistance, for women who want to try the snow at the ski resorts in the Elburz Mountains — separate slopes, of course — and a solid fence is being constructed down the middle of the beach along the Caspian Sea for segregated bathing.

Still, quirky contradictions continue, including an underlying fascination with America, its things, its popular culture. As the taxi drivers cruise the Islamic streets, they listen to cassettes of the latest American disco hits, with their insinuating words and rhythms.

Diplomats say that the authorities, more secure in power and hoping to bring back some of the needed professionals who have left, are relaxing somewhat, responding to a dictum from Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini on the sanctity of private property and personal freedom.

Some confiscated houses have been relinquished, and the privacy of homes, which once might be raided on suspicion of drinking or other evils, is to be respected.

Still, there are patrols of Islamic enforcers in white Nissan jeeps who can grab a woman off the streets if they do not like her garb — perhaps her scarf is set too far back, showing a fringe of hair — and carry her off to Evin Prison, where she is treated as a prostitute.

A European diplomat, offering a glass of a satanic beverage, reflected on the difficulty for a Westerner in understanding Iran. Almost anyone you might have social contact with is critical of the regime, he explained, and this is highly unrepresentative.

"The revolution," he said, "still enjoys a vast base of support in a nation overwhelmingly poor and devout, not least because it is seen as trying, whatever the shortcomings, to improve their lives."

The whisky and wine he was serving had been imported under a de facto arrangement negotiated between the diplomats and the authorities.

Today, the nation is effectively administered through the mosques. Draped in colored lights and hung with revolutionary exhortations, the local mosques are a sort of ward headquarters. And, in the Shiite tradition, Friday prayer is an essentially political event, with a lecture from the pulpit on the issues of the day.

Despite the hopes of its exiled opponents and the chaos and infighting of its first years, the theocratic revolution appears to have institutionalized itself.

"This government is stable," one European diplomat told me, and another added: "The government gets more and more solid."

Of the alliance that opposed the shah — Westernized intellectuals, leftist students educated abroad, disaffected government officials and technocrats, traditionalist merchants of the powerful bazaar, slum dwellers of south Tehran and the militant fundamentalist mullahs — it is the Shiite clergy who have survived and triumphed.

Opponents suppressed

They have also ruthlessly suppressed their opponents. The Paris-based National Council of Resistance, a coalition of 15 exile groups opposing the regime, claims that 40,000 people have been executed in Iran in the last three years and that at least 120,000 people are political prisoners.

"Of course, the real question is what happens after Khomeini dies," said a Western diplomat, voicing the thought that is in everyone's mind.

The ayatollah is 85 years old and is frequently reported to be in frail health, although he is abstemious and hoards his energy in a tightly guarded suburban villa in north Tehran, retiring for weeks at a time when he feels low.

Khomeini himself has long let it be known that his own favorite is his former student and revolutionary colleague Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri. Montazeri has been regarded in some intellectual circles as a kind of loyal but somewhat comical sidekick, and his scholarly credentials questioned.

But he has recently been named a grand ayatollah and meets frequently with government ministers and distinguished visitors. "Montazeri has been built up to a strong figure," said a Western diplomat, "but he wouldn't be such a godlike figure as Khomeini."

□ John Kifner, the New York Times bureau chief in Beirut, recently visited Tehran after an absence of four years.

Iran's Education System Under Khomeini's Rule of Terror

Khomeini's regime has committed such a crime against Iran's youth and education system that it will take many years of constructive efforts to undo its effect. Here we examine Iran's Education System under Khomeini's rule of terror.

Iran has a young population. According to figures published in 1976, 63.5% are under 25 years of age; the vast majority have been deprived of the basic education and welfare, both under the dictatorial regime of the Shah and under Khomeini's dictatorship.

Instead of starting at school, the vast majority of Iranian youth start from the very early age of 10 labouring under the most harsh and difficult conditions to save themselves and their families from starvation.

Although Khomeini made many promises before coming to power; figures published reveal that these harsh conditions continue to exist and worsen as they did at the time of the Shah.



Table 1 shows clearly the extent to which Iranian youth are exploited in the cities and villages from a very early age. (the figures used here are those published by the Centre of Statistics in Tehran in 1981).

Year	Age Group	No. at Work
1976	10 - 14	512,000
1976	15 - 19	1,055,000
1981	10 - 14	496,000
1981	15 - 19	1,489,000

Table (1) (Exploitation of Youngsters From Very Early Age).

Khomeini's regime despite its early promises actually has made efforts to legalise child labour. According to its proposed draft of the Labour Law child labour from the early age of 10-12 is legal.



One of the major consequences of backwardness, and domination by imperialism and reaction is that a large section of the population especially in the rural areas are illiterate. This was true at the time of the Shah's despotic regime in Iran. Figures published at the time showed 70% of the urban population and about 85% of the rural population to be illiterate. After the victory of the revolution the new rulers of Iran promised to eradicate illiteracy in Iran. A "Campaign Against Illiteracy" was launched and it was claimed that within five years illiteracy would be eliminated. However the reality today is very different.

Mr. Qera'ati head of the "Campaign Against Illiteracy" recently made this confession regarding the efforts of the Islamic Republic's rulers to uproot illiteracy:

"Since the day we started.... we have not been very successful during these years (nearly six years) we have succeeded in bringing 3 million pupils to our classes out of which we have been successful in teaching only 1 million....". He reveals the full extent of the catastrophe as follows:

"I must say that today we have more than 15 million illiterate people and annually 1 million is added We have no facility to cope quite clearly we have not been able

to uproot illiteracy..." (Friday prayers in Tehran 29th Dec. 1984).

The reality is that the number illiterates in our country has increased by 4-5 million since the revolution.

The medieval rulers of Iran have taken our country back to the Middle Ages.

These anti-humane, anti-culture criminals have committed crimes against our youth and our education system on such a vast scale that it will take many years of constructive efforts to undo its effect.

The representative of the regime in UNESCO has revealed the anti-culture, anti-education stance of Iran's rulers. According to him the number of pupils in elementary schools rose by 303267 in 1982/1983. At the same time the number of pupils applying to enter elementary education was 800,000, i.e. about half a million youngsters were denied the chance of even entering elementary schools.

Figures published recently show that the number of pupils in educational establishments for elementary and secondary levels are decreasing rapidly.



Type of establishment	No. of Pupils (boys & girls)		
	1980 - 81	1981 - 82	1982 - 83
Kindergarten	172,003	195,989	177,525
Elementary Schools	4,798,592	5,289,533	5,592,808
Secondary schools	941,528	929,038	849,054
Technical Schools	105,803	91,615	80,108
Agricultural schools	5,851	4,647	3,820
Professional schools	2,503	-	-

Table (2)

This is mainly due to the closures of these educational establishments, the lack of proper teaching facilities and the expulsion of thousands of able, but non-conforming teachers. In a country where technical, and

professional, skills are vital - the students in such establishments are vanishing rapidly.

The Minister of Education revealed in the Islamic Parliament that: "for next year Iran needs 25000 new classes and at least 4000 new educational establishments, but we only have budgeted for 100 new schools.." (Etefa'at 23rd Jan. 1985).

If the course of events continue as they have for the past six years, Iran's education system will totally collapse.

Iran's Higher Education Under Khomeini's Rule

Improving and expanding higher education is a top priority for any country which claims to challenge backwardness.

Indeed the experience of other countries has shown that lack of a proper higher education system produces serious obstacles to independence.

Iran's higher education establishments and universities have suffered most under Khomeini's rule of terror.

Shortly after the revolution armed gangs attacked the universities. Following this attack the universities remained closed for more than three years. Khomeini and his

followers who had given their blessing to their thugs for their attack on the students hailed this catastrophe as a "cultural revolution".


Thousands of progressive students and teachers were either expelled or were arrested and sent to the torture chambers of the Islamic Republic. Women students are forced out of universities and the remaining of the students are forced to conform to the Islamic code if they are to remain in the universities. The number of students in the universities and the teaching staff show a sharp decrease. As a result, many universities and higher educational establishments are threatened with permanent closure.

Table (3) is quite revealing:

The reality behind these figures are horrifying. Table (3) clearly shows that our higher education has gone back to 15 years ago.

According to the reactionary rulers of Iran, if universities are not "purified" according to their reactionary dogma their very existence pose a threat to the system.

Iran's present rulers have set themselves the task of destroying our educational systems. It is only through the overthrow of this despotic medieval regime and the establishment of a democratic state that our youth and students can hope for a better future.



Year	No. of Students			No. of Teachers		
	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
1972 - 73	115,311	80,781	34,530	9,890	8,764	1,126
1973 - 74	123,114	87,002	36,112	10,465	9,176	1,289
1974 - 75	135,354	96,720	38,634	12,310	10,628	1,682
1975 - 76	151,905	109,116	42,789	13,493	11,661	1,831
1976 - 77	154,215	108,196	46,019	13,952	11,894	2,058
1977 - 78	160,308	110,798	49,510	49,510	13,081	2,372
1978 - 79	175,675	121,427	54,248	16,222	14,008	2,214
1979 - 80	174,217	120,646	53,571	16,877	14,422	2,455
1982 - 83	117,148	80,792	36,353	9,042	7,618	1,424

Table (3) taken from the Centre of Statistics in Tehran.